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In the century and a half since the days of the ‘scramble for Africa’ a vast body of literature 
has emerged attempting to disentangle the complexities of the ‘New Imperialism’. One of the 
most prominent and enduring theories was proposed by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher 
in Africa and the Victorians, which linked the partition of East Africa with geo-strategic 
concerns connected to Egypt and India. Building upon John Darwin’s initial critique, this thesis 
will re-examine the partition of East Africa in an attempt at offering a comprehensive 
refutation of the Egypto-centric interpretation. The explanatory model will be exposed as a 
post-hoc fallacy, neither grounded in documentary evidence nor consistent with the sequence 
of events and policy-decisions. An alternative understanding will be proposed in which the 
partition of East Africa in successive stages from 1884 to 1895 formed part of a British policy-
continuum in the region, wherein protection of commercial interests and suppression of the 
slave trade were the principal determinants. By tracing the chronology of the partition it will 
be contended that its ultimate geographical scope was substantially determined at the very 
beginning of the colonisation process; whilst imperial agency were decisive in expanding the 
British sphere of influence to comprise Uganda in 1890 and similarly, public opinion was 
crucial for retaining it in 1892. In particular it will be argued that partition largely represented 
the cost-effective transplantation of British anti-slave trade policy from the maritime to the 
continental sphere, a shift enabled by the use of railway technology.  
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On 15 September 1884, The Times announced:  
Africa's time had apparently come [and that] the parcelling out of the heritage 
of Ham, which had been going on spasmodically for four centuries, would 
probably be completed in a few years.  
The writer marvelled at the 'bewildering rapidity' with which the 'annexations and 
“protections”' took place, and unwittingly coined the sobriquet 'the scramble for Africa.'1 Also 
noteworthy is the biblical reference to slavery, epitomised in the so-called ‘curse of Ham’, since 
it reveals the associations Africa still conjured among informed circles at the dawn of the 
partition. As bewildering it may have been to contemporary observers, the scramble has 
remained perplexing to historians who have been attracted to its complexities ever since. It 
certainly represents the high-water mark of Victorian imperialism; and to many observers 
today it embodies the very essence of an aggressive Western subjugation of the global south. 
However, because this last hurrah of large-scale territorial conquest occurred with such 
rapidity, the documentary evidence left over from the period has often been scant, 
fragmented and inconclusive. Hence, the very speed with which the partition took place made 
it not only compelling for historical analysis, but gave rise to fruitful ground for speculation 
over motives. The sheer scale of scholarly attention and theorising is encapsulated in Cain and 
Hopkins cautionary introduction to the topic: ‘Nowhere does the weight of historiography 
press so insistently upon the study of imperialism as in the case of the partition of Africa.’2 
                                                          
1 ‘The Scramble for Africa,’ The Times, 15 September 1884, p. 15. 
2 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2001, 2nd edition (Harlow: Longman, 2002). p. 303. 
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Explanatory models have ranged from emphasising economic,3 strategic,4 technological or 
ideological factors,5 and have been placed in metropolitan6 or peripheral7 frameworks. 
Naturally, combinations of all these aspects were at work during the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century. As such, the plethora of theories seeking to determine the motives of 
European policymakers is not only testament to the ambiguity of the documentary record, 
but reflective of the local factors involved in each particular region of Africa.  
As is often the case with rough-grained historical theories, they have upon close examination 
proved unequal to the task of rendering intelligible the full complexity of each individual case. 
Indeed, Cain and Hopkin also notes that: ‘the growth of knowledge has had the perplexing 
result of making it easier to say what is wrong with current interpretations than what is right 
[…] and that this ‘[d]isarray may well be a faithful representation of historical reality [that] 
accords with a view of history which denies that there is a whole to be grasped.8  
Yet as Ian Phimister reminds us, the purpose of explanatory models are not merely 
‘oversimplifications to be exposed’ but should rather be understood as frameworks which can 
                                                          
3 See: J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: Archibald Constable, 1902); Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism, the 
highest stage of capitalism; a popular outline (1928); P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, "Gentlemanly Capitalism and 
British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945," The Economic History Review 40, no.1 (1987): 1-
26. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.1987.tb00417.x; Cain et al., British Imperialism. 
4 See: William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, Volume I (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1935);  
William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, Volume 2 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1935); or Ronald 
Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, 
(London: Macmillan & Co, 1961). 
5 See: Godfrey Uzoigwe, Britain and the Conquest of Africa: The Age of Salisbury, (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1974); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion, 
3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in 
Victorian Britain (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012). 
6 Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). 
7 See: Åke Holmberg, African tribes and European Agencies: Colonialism and Humanitarianism in British South 
and East Africa, 1870-1895 (Göteborg: Akademiförlaget, 1966); or Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians 
‘man on the spot’ theory.  
8 Cain et al., British Imperialism, pp. 303-4. 
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introduce ‘order and intelligibility’ to a complex array of data.9 Whilst oversimplifications are, 
to a certain degree, an unavoidable aspect of historical analysis, there is a distinct difference 
between a reductive understanding of the historical process and a misunderstanding which 
has little to no basis in the documentary evidence or the sequence of events.  Indeed, this 
thesis will seek to expose the dominant historiographical model of the East African partition 
as one such misunderstanding, and also argue that it was a misinterpretation of motives that 
was fomented by the interested parties at the time in the years succeeding the partition to 
better justify the significant costs associated with the annexation. 
In the words of John Darwin, the partition of what today constitutes Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania long represented the ‘locus classicus’ of late-Victorian grand strategy.10 The 
negligible British economic interests in the region, combined with a sceptical disregard for the 
abolitionist engagement, have led many historians to deduce that the partition of East Africa 
was a result of strategic concerns. But despite its seductive geographically-derived logic, the 
strategic model raises more questions than it answers. As this thesis will demonstrate, the 
strategic interpretation is inconsistent with both the documentary evidence and the policy 
decisions. Instead of entertaining novel grand-defensive concerns, it will be proposed that 
British policy toward the region formed a continuum in which the annexation constituted a 
natural part, and to an extent, a conclusion. The basis on which this Victorian doctrine of 
continuity in foreign policy toward East Africa rested was the commitment to end the slave 
trade. Hence, it will be argued that it was the cost-effective execution of anti-slave trade policy 
                                                          
9 Robin Law, "Imperialism and Partition," Journal of African History 24, no. 1 (1983): 101-104. DOI: 
10.1017/S0021853700021551 cited in Ian Phimister, "Africa Partitioned," Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 18, 
no. 2 (1995): 355-81. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40241314 
10 John Darwin, "Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion," The English Historical 
Review 112, no. 447 (1997): 614-42. DOI: 10.1093/ehr/CXII.447.614 
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rather than imperial security considerations that constituted the central element of British 
East Africa policy over the 1880-90s.  
To demonstrate this argument the thesis incorporates two main themes. On the one hand it 
will establish that the strategic model is a post hoc fallacy and that it is an interpretation that 
has been excessively influenced by the benefit of hindsight and the study of maps, to the 
detriment of contemporary correspondence, analysis and policy decisions.  It will also be 
contended that British control of the Nile’s headwaters was a result of coincidence rather than 
a carefully laid-down plan, conceived and directed by British policymakers such as Lord 
Salisbury or Lord Rosebery.  
The second main component to the thesis concerns the primacy of anti-slave trade policy; in 
particular how the British efforts at halting the East African slave trade influenced the key 
stages of the partition process. It contends that the abolitionist cause had by the 1880s 
matured sufficiently to saturate the body politic; it no longer formed the exclusive concern of 
vanguard activists, but had become a mainstream issue among the public and political 
establishment. Thus Britain’s encounter with a revived East African slave trade triggered a 
form of ‘moral panic’ that significantly influenced policy decisions toward the region. In 
addition to these two broad themes, other factors which determined the annexation will be 
explored. These include the dynamics between Anglo-German intergovernmental co-
operation and local rivalry; the influence exerted by pressure groups and public opinion upon 
the formulation of policy; and how exploration, economic expectations, local crises and 
indeed coincidence determined the geographical scope of the partition.  
Although economic motives will be investigated and recognised, it will be argued that they do 
not constitute the exclusive or overarching impetus behind the scramble. In this respect it is 
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worth considering that the entirety of events which comprised the partition took place within 
a period of economic recession in Britain, what has been termed ‘the Great Depression’ of 
1873-96.11 These general economic conditions might account for some of the unrealistic 
commercial expectations that were entertained for the little explored regions surrounding the 
Equatorial great lakes.  As the second chapter will show, key characters in the early stages of 
the process, such as the Manchester cotton magnate Frederick Hutton or the Scottish 
shipowner William Mackinnon, were more akin to pawns of Foreign Office officialdom than 
free agents motivated by purely economic rewards. However the period in which this 
argument is most persuasive is during the interval between the Anglo-German Agreement of 
1886 and the Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty of 1890; when Mackinnon’s quest to secure 
the Equatorial Province, out of financial concerns, influenced the pattern of territorial claims. 
Whilst the later decision to hold Uganda in 1892 was certainly not a result of ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism.’12 This commercial aspect, or lack thereof in favour of personal philanthropy and 
prestige is comprehensively detailed in Marie de Kiewiet’s13 excellent doctoral dissertation, 
and building upon the former’s unpublished research, John Galbraith’s later account.14    
The thesis expends considerable effort upon the ideological and moral dimensions of imperial 
policymaking during the scramble. The origins of these ‘Empires of sentiment’ directly 
preceding the partition were recently explored by Joanna Lewis in her research pertaining to 
                                                          
11 D. J. Coppock, “British Industrial Growth during the 'Great Depression' (1873-96): A Pessimist's View,” The 
Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1964): 389-96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2593014 
12 See: Cain et al., British Imperialism, pp. 303-39; Raymond E. Dumett, ed., Gentlemanly Capitalism and British 
Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire (London: Longman, 1999); D. K. Fieldhouse, The Theory of Capitalist 
Imperialism (London: Longmans, 1967). 
13 Marie de Kiewiet, "The History of the Imperial British East Africa Company," (PhD diss., King's College 
London, 1955). Later surname: Hemphill. 
14 John S. Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa 1878–1895: A Study in the ‘New Imperialism’ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
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the memorialisation of David Livingstone.15 Since the thesis explores how the execution of 
anti-slave trade policy became a motive for imperial expansion, it forms part of what has 
become a growing body of literature which investigates the humanitarian element of late-
Victorian imperialism.16  
Whilst there were other ‘good causes’ liberal or religious groups sought to incorporate in 
imperial policy, such as temperance or arms-control; none were as prominent, nor have drawn 
similar levels of historiographical attention as abolitionism. Much has been written about the 
slave trade and anti-slavery, but there have been few detailed studies into the effects of 
abolitionist activism and ideology upon decision-making in regard to the partition of East 
Africa. Suzanne Miers,17 Seymour Drescher18 and Frederick Cooper19 have all written 
extensively upon the topic of slavery and abolition, but have not delved deeply into how it 
translated into annexation. Likewise have the excellent works of William Mulligan,20 Richard 
Huzzey,21 who both explore the abolitionist element of British imperial policy, not offered a 
                                                          
15 Joanna E. Lewis, "Empires of Sentiment; Intimacies from Death: David Livingstone and African Slavery ‘at the 
Heart of the Nation’," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no. 2 (2015): 210-37. 
DOI:10.1080/03086534.2014.974874 
16 See: Andrew Porter, "Trusteeship, Anti-slavery, and Humanitarianism," in The Oxford History of the British 
Empire: The Nineteenth Century Volume III, eds. Andrew Porter  and Alaine Low (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), pp. 198-221.; Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon, eds., Slavery, Diplomacy and Empire: Britain 
and the Suppression of the Slave Trade 1807-1975 (Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2009); Brendan Simms 
and D. J. B. Trim, eds, Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Huzzey, Freedom Burning; Bronwen Everill and Josiah Kaplan, eds, The History and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention and Aid in Africa (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Amalia Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian 
Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
17 See: Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade (London: Longman, 1975); Suzanne Miers, 
Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
18 Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
19 Frederick Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); 
Frederick Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya 
1890-1925 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
20 William Mulligan, “British Anti-Slave Trade and Anti-Slavery Policy in East Africa, Arabia and Turkey in the 
Late Nineteenth Century,” in Humanitarian Intervention: A History, eds. Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 257-80. 
21 Huzzey, Freedom Burning. 
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sufficiently comprehensive analysis into the particular details of the scramble for East Africa. 
The historiographical dominance of the Egyptocentric explanatory model may account for 
some of this scholarly oversight.  
 
The Strategic Explanatory Model and ‘Nile Valley Doctrine’ 
Within a decade of the Berlin West African Conference the East African mainland – what today 
constitutes Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – had, in successive stages, been incorporated into a 
British and German colonial empire.22 Although the thesis will argue that the most significant 
bilateral treaty in terms of determining the geographical scope of the partition was the one 
negotiated at the start of the process, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886; it was the later 
Anglo-German ‘Heligoland-Zanzibar’ Treaty of 1890 that finally reconciled the outstanding 
territorial disputes between the two nations in Africa.  Due to its ostensibly greater historical 
significance, the historiography focusing on this treaty has eclipsed that of the former. As will 
be detailed in chapter four, this chronological bias has substantially influenced the 
                                                          
22 A selection of the principal historical accounts pertaining to the partition of East Africa listed in chronological 
order P.L. McDermott, British East Africa, or IBEA: A History of the Formation and Work of the Imperial British 
East Africa Company (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd, 1893); Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert: Marquis of 
Salisbury Vol. IV 1887-1892 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932); William Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, 
2 Volumes (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1935); Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890: The 
Slave Trade and the Scramble (London: Faber & Faber, 1939); Kiewiet, History of the Imperial British East Africa 
Company; Roland Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957); 
Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians; George Neville Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile 1882-
1899 (Edinburgh: University Press, 1965); Gifford et al., Britain and Germany in Africa; Galbraith, Mackinnon 
and East Africa; Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa (London: Longman, 1974); Uzoigwe, The 
Age of Salisbury;  Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade; Woodruff D. Smith, The German Colonial 
Empire (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa 
1876-1912 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991); Darwin, Dynamics of Territorial Expansion; Colin Newbury, 
"Great Britain and the Partition of Africa, 1870-1914," in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The 
Nineteenth Century Volume III, eds. Andrew Porter  and Alaine Low (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 
624-650.; Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century; Arne Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism 1856-1918: A 
Political Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Huzzey, Freedom Burning. 
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understanding of the partition and in particular the motives behind it.  
Over the course of the twentieth century the historiography of the partition underwent 
radical changes. Two distinct and opposing interpretations of British motives came to the fore, 
namely a collection of individual analyses which might be loosely termed a ‘composite’ 
model23 emphasising Britain’s commercial, political and humanitarian engagement with the 
region; and, a rivalling geo-strategic model.24 However the strategic interpretation has 
arguably gained status as the orthodox wisdom. Testament to its overarching dominance is 
not only the sheer volume of scholarship published on the subject since its initial proposal in 
1935, but also the number of casual mentions ostensibly accepting the hypothesis as an 
                                                          
23 Composite, non-strategic model: Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa; Charles Miller, The Lunatic 
Express: An Entertainment in Imperialism (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 153-286, Uzoigwe, The Age of 
Salisbury; Darwin, Dynamics of Territorial Expansion, pp. 634-40.; Cain et al., British Imperialism, pp. 333-5., 
Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, pp. 227-31. 
24 Pre-1997 literature subscribing to the Egypto-centric hypothesis: Cecil, Life of Robert IV; Langer, Diplomacy 
of Imperialism 2 Vols.; Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 
1952), p. 160.; John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History Review 
6, no. 1 (1953): 14. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.1953.tb01482.x; Kiewiet, History of the Imperial British East 
Africa Company; Oliver, Harry Johnston; Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians; Sanderson, England, Europe 
and the Upper Nile; Wm. Roger Louis, “Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919,” and Robert 
O. Collins, “Origins of the Nile Struggle: Anglo-German Negotiations and the Mackinnon Agreement of 1890,” 
in Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry  and Colonial 
Rule, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 3-46, 119-151.; D.A. Low, Buganda in Modern History 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971), p. 78.; Herbert Paul Meritt, “Bismarck and the First Partition of 
East Africa,” English Historical Review 91, No. 360 (Jul., 1976), p. 585. http://www.jstor.org/stable/566628; 
Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, p.181.; C. C. Eldridge, Victorian Imperialism (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1978), pp. 163-7.; John Mackenzie, The Partition of Africa: And European Imperialism 1880-1900 
(London: Methuen, 1983), p.38.; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, pp. 297-357. Denis Judd, Empire: The 
British Imperial Experience, from 1765 to the Present (London: Fontana Press, 1996), p. 127.  
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undisputed fact even in research published after25 Darwin’s critique in 1997.26 
Certainly the most prominent of these analyses was proposed by Ronald Robinson and John 
Gallagher in Africa and the Victorians.27 The documentary basis of this interpretation derived 
from an assertion made by Lady Gwendolen Cecil in her biography of her late father Robert 
Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, published in 1931. She claimed that from 1889, the security 
of the Nile Valley had become a 'separate and dominating factor' in Lord Salisbury's foreign 
policy.28 Some four years later the Harvard historian William Langer published his two-volume 
opus Diplomacy of Imperialism29 which contained the original narrative which was to feature 
so prominently in the publications of Robinson et al.30 and Sanderson31 in the 1960s.  
As a reaction to the domination of Marxist economic interpretations of imperial history,32 
Robinson and Gallagher revived Langer’s Nile hypothesis to construe the partition of East 
                                                          
25 Post-1997 literature subscribing to the Egypto-centric hypothesis: Newbury, Great Britain and the Partition 
of Africa, p. 639.; John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, 2nd edition(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 196., Piers Brendon, Decline and Fall of the British Empire (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007), p. 
198.; M.E. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, 3rd Edition, (Harlow: Longman, 2010), pp.61-8.; Terje Tvedt, 
"Hydrology and Empire: The Nile, Water Imperialism and the Partition of Africa," The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 39, no. 2 (2011): 173-194. DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2011.568759;  T. G. Otte, The 
Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), p. 183, 194.; Tim Jeal, Explorers of the Nile: The Triumph and Tragedy of a Great Victorian Adventure 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 376-77., Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A History of British 
Imperialism 1850-2011, 5th edition (Harlow: Pearson, 2012), pp. 138-41.; Huzzey, Freedom Burning, p. 164.; 
Frits Bolkenstein, The Intellectual Temptation: Dangerous Ideas in Politics (Leiden: Author House, 2013), pp. xv-
xvi; Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny and foreword by Wm. Roger Louis, Africa and the 
Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2015). 
26 Darwin, Dynamics of Territorial Expansion, pp. 614-42. The refutation of the strategic explanatory model is 
included on pages 634-40. See also: Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, pp. 227-31, and Jonas Fossli Gjersø, "The 
Scramble for East Africa: British Motives Reconsidered, 1884-95," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History (2015) DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2015.1026131 
27 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians. Although Robinson et al.’s strategic hypothesis is almost identical 
to the one first posited by Langer, it is the former which have risen to prominence in the historiography. All 
later literature subscribing to this explanatory model of the East African partition cites Robinson et al. and as 
such this thesis will heretofore refer to Robinson et al. when referring to the Egypto-centric strategic 
hypothesis.  
28 Cecil, Life of Robert IV, pp. 139-40.  
29 Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism Vol II, pp. 537-580. 
30 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, pp. 274-338. 
31 Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, pp. 1-66. 




Africa in strategic terms, as it was argued ‘British Africa was a gigantic footnote to the Indian 
Empire.’33 The essence of Langer's analysis centres on the alleged primacy that British policy-
makers attached to securing the Nile. The absence of regular rains made the Egyptian 
agricultural sector reliant on the river flowing from the Ethiopian highlands and Central 
Equatorial Africa. Langer and his subsequent adherents argue that there was a contemporary 
fear that the Nile, as Egypt's Achilles heel, could simply have been dammed or deflected by 
any European Power desiring to destabilise the country. It was held that such an eventuality 
would have rendered both Egypt useless as a British base and closed the Suez Canal for the 
Royal Navy and British merchant shipping – thus severing the shortest link between Britain 
and British India.  
Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence to suggest that such fears were actually 
entertained, the model's relevance for Uganda derives from the country's geographical 
position as it straddles the north-western shores of the Victoria Nyanza, the region 
encompassing the source of the White Nile.  Yet in total, the water supplied by this tributary 
is meagre compared to the Blue Nile and Atbara River that take their source from north-east 
Africa. Egypt's annual floods are due to the seasonal rains that fall on the Ethiopian highlands 
which are the Blue Nile and Atbara River's catchment area. However during the summer 
season these rivers are laid dry and the White Nile provides the majority of the water that 
reaches Egypt. This reversal of roles is one of the key points that support the ‘Nilotic 
                                                          
33 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "The Partition of Africa," in The New Cambridge Modern History. 
Volume 11 Material Progress and World-wide Problems 1870-1898, ed. F.H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962), p. 616. 
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explanatory model’34 in regard to East Africa.35 The Nilotic narrative formed part of what 
Robinson et al. termed the 'New Frontiers of Insecurity' which placed the partition of East 
Africa in a wider framework of imperial security centred on India and the Mediterranean.36 
According to this analysis, at the end of the 1880s Salisbury transplanted the focus of his 
defensive policy from Afghanistan to the Upper Nile Valley since Ottoman weakness had 
forced Britain to revise its Mediterranean security policy, replacing the former strategic pivot 
of Constantinople with Cairo.37 It is argued that this revision had come about after the 
Ottoman capital was judged indefensible against Russia, and it was feared that the continued 
maintenance of the Straits' integrity against Russia and its potential French ally, would lead 
Britain into a dependency upon the Triple Alliance. By focusing on Cairo as a Mediterranean 
foothold Salisbury hoped to disentangle Britain from a deepening reliance on Bismarck.  
The geo-political relevance for East Africa was certainly well articulated:  
...the Mediterranean and Indian interest, like a driving wheel in some vast 
machine, was now engaging the lesser wheels of eastern-central Africa and 
connecting them one by one to its own workings. At the turn of Salisbury's 
strategy, these once remote and petty interests in the Sudan, Uganda and 
northern hinterlands of Zanzibar were changing into safeguards of Britain's 
world power.38 
In the model’s most recent incarnation, Terje Tvedt contends that he has introduced a novel 
interpretation of the events that included the partition of East Africa. Yet the primacy of the 
                                                          
34 The ‘Nilotic explanatory model’ refers to the hypotheses which have afforded primacy to the River Nile and 
the Nile Valley as the central geographical motive of European policymakers in regard to the partition of East 
Africa. This includes the strategic model, as espoused by Robinson et al., and the economic model as per 
Tvedt, Hydrology and Empire.  
35 Sanderson, England, Europe & The Upper Nile, p. 10. 
36 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, pp. 288-9.  
37 See: Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, Chapter 8: ‘Cairo or Constantinople?’ pp. 254-73. 
38 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, pp. 272-3, 284. 
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Nile is retained. He claims that British policy makers did not react in a defensive manner, but 
entertained an offensive strategy, that of boosting Egypt's summer supply of water in order to 
maximise cotton production.39 This would be achieved through the construction of barrages 
or dams up-stream capable of storing some of the excess water to be released in time of peak 
summer demand. Hence, by technical means Britain would increase the production volume 
of Egypt's principal cash-crop through reducing the volatility of its water supplies. This policy 
is held to have been the brainchild of the Egyptian civil service, in particular the British 
hydrologists William Willcocks and Colin Scott Moncrieff.40 Yet apart from its stronger 
agricultural and thus economic focus, Tvedt's analysis retains the essence of Langer's original 
geo-strategic account: namely that Egypto-centric British policy makers perceived the Nile as 
paramount to their interests, and was thus the principal factor which determined the 
annexation of Uganda in 1894 and consequentially the remaining East African territories in 
1895.   
Until Robinson et al.’s publication, the most comprehensive scholarship concerning the British 
presence in East Africa had been written by Reginald Coupland in his volumes East Africa and 
its Invaders and The Exploitation of East Africa.41 It was the latter which dealt with the 
scramble and in it Coupland deduced that the definitive partition occurred with the 
ratification of the Anglo-German Boundary Agreement in 1886. No more analysis than a brief 
epilogue was devoted to the later ‘Heligoland-Zanzibar Agreement’ of 1890.42 However for 
any adherent of the Nile hypothesis it is vital to discredit the political significance of the 1886 
                                                          
39 Tvedt, Hydrology and Empire, pp. 173 -194. 
40 Ibid., pp. 173 -194. 
41 Reginald Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders: From the Earliest Times to the Death of Seyyid Said in 1856 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). 
42 Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa. 
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Agreement, simply because no discernible interest was shown by British policymakers at the 
time in securing the Nile or protecting the Nile Valley.43 Indeed there was a virtual consensus 
among the British political establishment in the 1880s that Britain’s occupation of Egypt was 
of a temporary character.44 
To circumvent this problem Robinson et al. afforded prominence to the later treaty of 1890 
and belittled the significance of the 1886 Agreement. Thus the initial partition of 1886, which 
in most respects determined the modern borders between Kenya and Tanzania, was 
dismissed as ‘the slightest, the most tentative advance towards a more direct commitment, 
and it was far from denoting any new “imperialist” urge.’45 Robinson et al. argued that it had 
come about as a result of ‘the collapse of the old system of influence’ and as such the 
‘government had rigged up a new “sphere of interest” over part of the region.’46 What, 
however, is distinctively ironic about this assertion, when perceived in the context of the 
importance that the same authors attached to the 1890 treaty, is the fact that this later 
agreement merely enlarged the existing sphere of influence to comprise Uganda. If Salisbury, 
as Darwin rightly questions in his critique, had attached such overriding importance to 
securing Uganda for the British Empire in order to safeguard Egypt, would he then not have 
awarded it and the remaining territories in mainland East Africa at least protectorate status, 
as he did Zanzibar? The issues briefly raised in this introductory section are examined at length 
in chapters two, four and five, with a view at refuting the Egypto-centric explanatory model. 
                                                          
43 Britain’s policy toward Egypt over the 1880s is dealt with in chapter four. 
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45 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, p. 198. 




The hypothesis that forms the main body of this study was an unintended consequence of my 
master’s research into the Uganda Railway. Although I had at the time little reason to doubt 
that the large volume of historiography suggesting that East Africa was annexed out of 
strategic reasons was incorrect, I struggled to find a clear and unambiguous reference in the 
primary sources. Darwin was certainly right in characterising the evidence underpinning the 
Nilotic hypothesis as ‘astonishingly slender and extremely speculative.’47 The citations listed 
by the main literature were either circular, in that they simply referred to other scholarship 
that posited the same argument, particularly Langer or Robinson et al.,48 or they were, upon 
close investigation, misquotations taken out of context.  
This includes, but is not limited to, the correspondence and memoranda of Evelyn Baring, 
Clement Hill, Percy Anderson, Salisbury and Rosebery as is detailed in chapters four and five. 
An example of this practice of selective citation is the assertion that Salisbury demonstrated 
his commitment to ‘Nile Valley Doctrine’ during the Anglo-German negotiations in 1890.49 
Robinson et al writes:  
Early in May Salisbury made his position still clearer. The German Ambassador 
asked for a standstill agreement, but Salisbury told him that: “Africa was a very 
large place; we had interests in every part of it; the negociations [sic] at Berlin 
might take a long time; and that we could not undertake to maintain the status 
quo throughout the continent until those negociations were concluded … as far 
as I could see upon the map, Uganda was within the English and not the German 
hinterland…”. In the event he won his point with surprising ease. After three 
                                                          
47 Darwin, Dynamics of Territorial Expansion, p. 637. 
48 See: footnotes 23 and 24 concerning the pre- and post-1997 historiography subscribing to the Egypto-centric 
hypothesis. 
49 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, p. 292. 
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days of talks between the experts, the Germans agreed in principle to renounce 
Uganda…50 
However by simply including more of the quotation, a different meaning emerges which no 
longer infers Salisbury’s designs for Uganda:  
With reference to the particular matter to which he referred, I said that in the 
first place, as far as I could see upon the map, Uganda was within the English & 
not the German hinterland; that my belief was that no treaties had been 
concluded; & that if they had been concluded it must have been as far back as 
last Autumn; long before Sir Percy Anderson’s mission was thought of. Until our 
own official information was more complete, I should abstain from either 
approving or disapproving of the supposed treaties.51  
This was simply a factual observation made by Salisbury at the time and a geographical reality 
for the region ever since the ‘hinterland understanding’ of 1887,52 not some admission of a 
newly developed grand strategy focused on Uganda and the Upper Nile as Robinson et al. 
implies. As chapter four demonstrates, the IBEA’s treaty with kabaka Mwanga of Buganda 
had been obtained the preceding autumn by Frederick Jackson who had acted on his own 
initiative and indeed against his orders ‘not to get into Uganda.’53 Moreover, the partition of 
Uganda was quickly settled since Anderson suggested at the opening of the negotiations that 
their 'work would be facilitated by settling at once points which were not contended; 
regarding the 'Hinterland' Agreement of 1887 in this light.'54    
                                                          
50 Ibid., p. 292. And Salisbury to Malet, 5 May 1890, FO 84/2030, TNA. 
51 Salisbury to Malet, 5 May 1890, FO 84/2030, TNA 
52 Salisbury to Malet, 2 July 1887, FO 403/102, TNA. 
53 Charles Stokes to Euan Smith, 25 February 1890 enclosed in Euan Smith to Salisbury, 15 April 1890, FO 
403/137, TNA.  Also see: Frederick Jackson, Early Days in East Africa (London: Edward Arnold & Co, 1930), pp. 
222-3. 
54 Malet to Salisbury, 8 May 1890, FO 881/6146, TNA. 
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Another grave example of these speculative citations was made to support the entire Nilotic 
hypothesis. At the beginning of the chapter entitled ‘Salisbury’s Watch on the Nile, 1890’ 
Robinson et al. stated:  
By the end of 1889 Salisbury was clear that the whole of the Nile Valley must 
be reserved, yet December’s proposals breathed no word about Uganda. But 
by raising the Zanzibar issue, the Prime Minister had found a way of probing 
German intentions and measuring the scope of German concessions in east 
Africa. What he was after was a large-scale African agreement, which would 
launch the new strategy of defending the Valley of the Nile.55  
In support of this wide-ranging assertion Robinson et al. cited a memorandum written by 
Anderson which in no way refers to the Valley of the Nile or of Salisbury’s alleged grand 
strategy: ‘…if a general settlement were arrived at on the basis discussed with Count Hatzfeldt 
this question would be included in it.’56 The short handwritten note is partially illegible, but 
neither the typed version included in the Foreign Office records lends credence to the 
assertion; it simply stated that the question of the Witu delimitation would be included in a 
general settlement.57 As will also be detailed in chapter four the matter of Witu was a local 
concern, detached from the questions pertaining to the interior.   
However, perhaps the most notorious of these misquotations58 was made by virtue of a 
despatch that Baring sent Salisbury warning him about the Italian offensive toward Kassala in 
modern-day northern Ethiopia.59 Although Baring did refer to this as the ‘Nile Valley’ and 
recommended that it be incorporated into Egypt, he explicitly warned against any Egyptian 
                                                          
55 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, p. 291. 
56 Anderson, Memorandum, 15 January 1890, FO 84/2030, TNA. 
57 Salisbury to Malet, 5 January 1890, FO 403/136, TNA. 
58 This is also mentioned by John Darwin in his critique, see: Darwin, Dynamics of Territorial Expansion, p. 637. 
59 Baring to Salisbury, Secret, 15 December 1889, FO 78/4243, TNA. 
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re-conquest of territories south of Khartoum. These warnings were even included in the same 
letter.60 However this did not prevent Robinson et al. from citing it and Salisbury’s much later 
reply (which neither mentions Uganda),61 as evidence for Salisbury’s strategic designs for 
what is referred to as the ‘Upper Nile.’62 One of Robinson et al.’s principal adherents, G. N. 
Sanderson even remarks that: 
Baring seems to have believed that Egypt was safe so long a no European Power 
reached the Nile near Khartoum; it does not seem to have occurred to him that 
the Nile waters might be threatened in the far south.63 
A much simpler explanation would certainly be that Baring never actually entertained these 
fears. Rather, this preoccupation with the threat to ‘the Nile waters […] in the far south’ was 
the obsession of a cadre of historians eager to revise the history of East Africa’s partition, not 
one that occupied contemporary policymakers.  
What is also sometimes invoked as a last-ditch effort at defending the Nilotic explanatory 
model is the theory of tacit assumptions. In other words that the primacy of the Nile was so 
well-known in diplomatic and political circles that it was unnecessary to mention it, either in 
correspondence, memoranda or speeches. However, a detailed examination of the 
considerable volume of records that were produced by Foreign Office officials throughout this 
period reveals that very little, if anything, of British interests pertaining to the region was left 
unmentioned or not analysed in the documents.  
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78/4308, TNA. 
61 See: Salisbury to Baring, Private, 28 March 1890, FO 633/7, TNA. 
62 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians, pp. 283-9. 
63 Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, p. 18. 
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In the comprehensive memoranda drawn up by mandarins such as Anderson, Hill, Holmwood 
or Kirk it is inconceivable that an overarching policy-objective such as this should have gone 
unstated. Nor is it credible that this concern was not mentioned by the matter-of-fact 
Salisbury or Rosebery in their private or secret communications with cabinet colleagues. 
Strategy and the Nile were among the many factors discussed among the policymaking milieu, 
but not in the terms argued by Robinson et al., rather as geographical points of reference.  
What was most frequently mentioned in the files were Britain’s commercial and anti-slave 
trade interests in the region, which is probably more reflective of British motives than some 
novel strategic concern veiled in a conspiracy of silence. In order to demonstrate this and to 
avoid making similar errors of misquotation, this thesis incorporates what may at sometimes 
be construed as long extracts, as these are less liable to be misrepresented.    
The findings presented in the thesis are principally drawn from the memoranda and 
correspondence of the Foreign Office. In particular, the Anglo-German correspondence 
relating to Zanzibar has been extensively researched as these files offer the most 
comprehensive repository of contemporary analysis and communications regarding 1880-90s 
East Africa. It is worth noting that the sources concerning German policy are derived from 
British records and as such would also be reflective of British interpretations and prejudice. 
Yet, it is this understanding of German thinking that would also have shaped contemporary 
British analysis and policymaking. In lieu of German-derived primary material, the thesis has 
relied on secondary literature on German imperialism in East Africa.  
Apart from the official correspondence deposited at the National Archives, various private 
and semi-official correspondences have been consulted. These include the Cromer Papers and 
the Malet Papers at the National Archives, the Mackinnon Papers held at the School of 
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Oriental and African Studies, the Salisbury Papers held at Hatfield House, the British and 
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society Papers and the Gerald Portal Papers held at the University of 
Oxford, the Church Missionary Society Papers held at the University of Birmingham, the 
Joseph Thomson Papers held at the Royal Geographical Society, the Archbishop of Canterbury 
and other Church of England records held at Lambeth Palace Library, the Gladstone Papers 
held at the British Library and the Harry Johnston Papers held at the Royal Botanic Gardens 
at Kew. In addition to these main sources of archival evidence, both Hansard parliamentary 
records and digitalised press sources such as The Times and the Manchester Guardian have 
been consulted. Furthermore a wide range of contemporary literature and memoirs has been 
referred to complement the large body of documentary evidence.  
Of these sources the archival material held at Lambeth Palace has not earlier been consulted 
with regard to the partition and they shed light upon the importance of abolitionist agitation 
and the Church of England’s role during 1888 and 1889. Although the Foreign Office material 
has been used extensively by historians investigating the partition, the contextual 
interpretation of them have, as the thesis attempts to demonstrate, been lacking. This 
reconsideration has been enabled by appreciating more of the frequent references made to 
anti-slave trade policy in the primary material – particularly confidential correspondence and 
memoranda – at face value, and not simply disregarding these as rhetoric. Robinson et al. 
certainly dismissed these references outright:  
It mattered little that informed men knew that slave-trading in these regions 
was on the wane. The Foreign Office habitually explained its Africa moves to 
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the ordinary voter as measures against the slave trade, for this was all he knew 
or cared about tropical Africa.64   
 
Structure 
The thesis is divided into six chapters, all of which conform to a chronological format, although 
both the first and last chapters incorporate thematic elements. Whilst the thesis investigates 
events from the early 1870s to the late 1890s, it is the interval between 1882 and 1894 that 
retains the greatest focus. It is within this relatively short time period that the key events and 
policy decisions that are most directly relevant to the East African partition took place.  
The first chapter explores the East African slave trade, the institution of slavery in Zanzibar, 
the development of Britain’s anti-slave trade policy and its effect upon public opinion.65 Since 
it is partially thematic, it covers the time period from Sir Bartle Frere’s66 1873 treaty with the 
Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar to the collapse of this abolitionist framework, and corresponding 
revival of trafficking, in 1888. Importantly the chapter demonstrates that there was a sharp 
increase in the slave trade during this year, which is a fact that has been neglected by the 
existing volume of historiography. It is further established that this revived slave trade was a 
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65 Some of the most influential literature on East African slavery, the slave trade and plantation economies 
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66 See: John Benyon, ‘Frere, Sir (Henry) Bartle Edward, first baronet (1815–1884)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10171, accessed 19 March 2015]  
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direct cause of the Brussels Anti-Slave Trade conference in 1889-90 which shifted Britain’s 
abolitionist focus from the coast to the mainland.   
The second chapter considers the first partition of East Africa and the circumstances which 
led to the ratification of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886.  It highlights the importance 
of how both British anti-slave trade policy and the pre-partition Anglo-German exploration of 
the mainland influenced the geographical scope of the partition. Notably, the chapter traces 
the north-south division of the mainland to Carl Peters and his colleagues in the Society for 
German Colonisation’s decision to pursue the southern caravan route into the interior.67 Both 
this and the following chapters explore the role played imperial agents such as William 
Mackinnon and Carl Peters in determining outcomes.  
The dynamic between metropolitan policymakers, public opinion and the agents of European 
imperialism is detailed in the third chapter. In particular it is hypothesised that the British and 
German governments subscribed to a doctrine of co-operation and that expressions of rivalry 
largely derived from the private colonial companies, fomented by public opinion.68 The 
chapter also considers the contrasting British and German approaches to colonialism and how 
indigenous discontent with German tactics morphed into open rebellion. The exigencies of 
the insurrection complicated the co-operative dimension to Anglo-German official relations 
since Bismarck relied upon the assistance of the Royal Navy to counter the insurgency. 
Similarly, British policymakers were reluctant to associate too closely with their German 
counterparts, since this could risk bringing the rebellion into the British sphere. As the chapter 
                                                          
67 Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation (GfdK) and not to be confused with the German Colonial Society 
(Deutscher Kolonialverein). For a detailed study of his significance in relation to German colonialism and the 
partition, see: Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism. 
68 This apparent doctrine of co-operation between the European governments during the partition is also 
examined by Ronald Hyam, see: Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, pp. 203-79.  
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demonstrates the result was the imposition of a joint naval blockade of the East African 
coastline. 
The fourth chapter investigates the circumstances surrounding the Anglo-German 
‘Heligoland-Zanzibar’ Treaty of 1890 with a view at exposing it as entirely divorced from geo-
political concerns relating to Egypt. Firstly, by considering issues such as the relief of Emin 
Pasha, Frederick Jackson’s expedition and the instability in Buganda, it seeks to clarify how 
and why Mackinnon’s IBEA gained a foothold in Uganda. Secondly, it attempts to determine 
why the Anglo-German negotiations came about and connects it with the respective 
governments’ need to contain local colonial rivalry, particularly over Witu and the adjoining 
islands Manda and Patta. Thirdly, the chapter considers how the orthodox historiography is 
inconsistent with the documentary evidence and policy-decisions:  some of which include Sir 
Evelyn Baring’s Sudan policy and Salisbury’s geopolitical priorities in regard to Egypt and the 
Nile Valley. It is contended that the de facto formulators of policy were the imperial agents, 
and that the extension of Britain’s sphere of influence in East Africa to comprise Uganda was 
sanctioned by the prime minister as a way in which to preserve the IBEA, maintain the British 
presence and execute anti-slave trade policy cost-effectively. 
The fifth chapter examines British Uganda policy during the first four years of the 1890s. This 
includes Salisbury’s decision to twice sanction the evacuation of Uganda and of his successor 
Rosebery’s intervention which prevented the execution of this policy. Hence, the chapter 
considers the circumstances surrounding the retention of Uganda, which includes both an 
examination of Rosebery’s personal agency and the effect of the great mobilisation of public 
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opinion upon the policymaking of Gladstone’s cabinet.69 The roles of groups such as the 
Church Missionary Society, the Anti-Slavery Society and indeed the IBEA are investigated with 
a view at determining the influence of their lobbying activity upon public opinion, 
policymaking and indeed the historiography of the partition. 
The final chapter concerns the decision to construct the Uganda Railway and in particular how 
the idea of a line connecting the coast and Mombasa with the great inland sea of the Victoria 
Nyanza was fundamental to British designs for the region throughout the partition process.70 
Apart from its economic purpose the railway included a significant abolitionist element, a 
dimension which positioned it at the heart of British anti-slave trade policy. Courtesy of this 
dual purpose the railway was championed by both the humanitarian anti-slavery and 
missionary lobby in addition to the commercial interests represented by the IBEA. The chapter 
argues that the line assumed the status of a sine qua non to the retention and development 
of Britain’s sphere of influence in East Africa; and, by virtue of this important position in the 
chain of causation, the reasons given for why the railway was built represented also in large 
part the reasons for why Uganda and the territories separating it from the coast were 
declared British protectorates in 1894-5. 
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The East African Slave Trade and its Influence upon the Early Partition, 1873-1888 
 
The issue of the East African slave trade emerged over the course of the 1880s from relative 
obscurity – as the concern of a few specialists in the Foreign Office and the British and Foreign 
Anti-Slave Trade Society (BFASS) – to one of Europe-wide notoriety. It is this rise to 
prominence and the British response that will form the subject of this chapter, while the 
practical policy implications of the slave trade’s later development will be investigated in 
subsequent chapters. Although anti-slavery formed a significant component of British foreign 
policy throughout the nineteenth century,71 its notoriety outside a circle of Westminster 
bureaucrats, naval officers and philanthropic interest groups had faded by the late 1870s. In 
itself, this was nothing new as interest for abolitionism among the political establishment and 
general public had waxed and waned since the late eighteenth century. Since the decades of 
Wilberforce’s activism of the late 18th and early 19th century, attention to the plight of African 
slaves had been raised in the 1830-40s, early 1870s and then finally in the late 1880s and early 
1890s.         
Whilst British diplomatic and naval actions successfully ended the West African trade, the East 
African slave trade blossomed in the 1840-60s on the back of increased labour demand from 
Zanzibar’s clove plantations. But it was not until Livingstone witnessed the massacre at 
Nyangwe in 1871 that serious political attention again was devoted to the problem. In 1873, 
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Sir Bartle Frere was despatched on a diplomatic mission to the Sultan of Zanzibar to negotiate 
a new anti-slave trade treaty. Although not changing the legal status of slavery, it did result 
in the closure of Zanzibar’s slave markets. From an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 slaves 
imported annually to Zanzibar and Pemba before the treaty, the number fell to an estimated 
6,000 p.a. in the decade succeeding it.72 
By the early 1880s, both the political circumstances in East Africa and British slave trade 
suppression tactics had changed dramatically. Initially it was the physical removal of the Royal 
Navy’s anti-slave trade squadron’s flagship – namely the decommissioning of the stationary 
HMS London – that forced a reconsideration of tactics. On the advice of the British Consul-
General Sir John Kirk, the liberal Foreign Secretary Earl Granville sanctioned the deployment 
of Vice-Consuls to enforce the abolitionist treaty network on the mainland. Subsequently, it 
was the appearance of Germany upon the East African scene which undermined British 
political hegemony in the region and with it British efforts against the slave trade.  
What, however, will be emphasised in this chapter is firstly how the exigencies of Britain’s 
anti-slave trade policy led to a mainland presence - a proto-partition - planned and in part 
executed prior to the appearance of German agents; and secondly, how the breakdown of 
the British-imposed institutional framework of slave trade suppression in East Africa spurred 
a substantial revival of the traffic in 1888. The data used to demonstrate this trend has been 
extracted from individual dhow capture reports issued by the Royal Navy and, although a brief 
mention of this increased slave trade in general terms was made by Suzanne Miers,73 there 
has been no presentation of detailed statistics in the literature which reveals the true extent 
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of the traffic’s surge. Hence, the causal relationship between the slave trade’s volatility and 
British policy responses will be explored with a view at demonstrating how the 1888 revival 
prompted the Brussels Anti-Slave Trade Conference of 1889-90 and thus indirectly formed 
the grounds upon which the partition was legitimised. 
 
Slavery in Zanzibar and Pemba 
The engine of the East African slave trade was the Sultanate of Zanzibar’s slave-based socio-
economic model.  Accounting for the majority of the slave labour demand in the decades of 
the mid- to late-19th century was the Island of Zanzibar and Pemba’s plantation economies. 
Although this chapter will not attempt to replicate Frederick Cooper’s excellent studies of East 
African plantation slavery, a brief mention of the underlying structures driving demand for 
slaves is warranted in a study of the slave trade and its suppression.74 
In the two millennia before the Anglo-German partition, the archipelago of Zanzibar, Pemba 
and Mafia had formed an important entrepôt in the Indian Ocean trading network. The 
monsoon winds had brought Arab, Persian and West-Indian traders to the islands on which 
they settled in small numbers during the 11th and 12th centuries. The Swahili patois language 
and culture emerged when these intermixed with the indigenous African population. Two 
centuries of Portuguese rule began with the visit of Vasco da Gama to the islands in 1499, 
whilst the conquest of the islands in 1698 by the Sultan of Oman heralded the start of a 
corresponding period of Arab sovereignty. As Cooper argues, it was the Omani colonisation 
of Zanzibar that forged a link between the sources of slaves and ivory in Central Equatorial 
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Africa and the markets for these commodities in Arabia, the Persian Gulf region and India.75 
Hence, the Omani introduction of long-distance caravan trade enabled exchanges between 
the communities settled around the great lakes and modern-day western Congo with the East 
African coastal region. By virtue of this geographical location, straddling both the Indian 
Ocean and Equatorial Africa, Zanzibar emerged over the course of the 18th century as the 
region’s chief supplier of slaves.  
However, its status as principally a trans-shipment hub was not challenged until the 
emergence of both internal and external pressures to end the export trade; what British 
officials referred to as the ‘northern slave trade’ on account of its usual destination. Slavery 
had existed in the archipelago and the African mainland communities for centuries within the 
kinship and dependency model.76 Unlike the quasi-industrialised model of plantation slavery 
European powers had introduced to the West-Indies, traditional modes of slavery in East 
Africa existed within the extended family and tribal group whereby slaves, rather than 
exclusively a source of labour, were dependents and thus contributed to the head of the 
tribe’s status and power. Slavery was similarly enmeshed in the social organisation of the 
Omani Arab-derived polity established in Zanzibar and filled a wide-ranging array of domestic 
roles. However by the late 18th and early 19th centuries the rise of a plantation economy 
fuelled domestic demand at the expense of slave exports. But despite the growth in domestic 
demand and the legal commitments entered into with Britain in 1822 and 1873, the export 
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of slaves from Zanzibar continued, albeit at a much reduced level, well into the rest of the 
nineteenth century and beyond.77 
In the 1840s, the plantation-style economy based on production of cloves reached its apogée 
and eclipsed the traditional model of slave re-exports to the Persian Gulf region.78 Due to the 
labour-intensive nature of clove plantations, in concert with the treaties the Sultan had 
undertaken with Britain; Zanzibar and Pemba thereafter formed the principal end-destination 
of slaves trafficked from the African mainland. By the time of the partition, Zanzibar and 
Pemba’s total population of 400,000 were divided into four main groups: Omani Arabs (2.5 
%), indigenous Africans and freedmen (ca. 29%), British Indians (ca. 2.1%) and slaves (ca. 
66.5%).79 The Island of Pemba alone was estimated to contain a population of 100,000 of 
which 5% were Omani Arab, 7% Indigenous Wa-Pemba, 1% British Indian and 87% slaves.80 In 
addition there were, according to Sultan Barghash’s estimates, approximately 200 European 
and Goanese residents on the two islands.81  
Naturally not all of the Sultanate’s 266,000 slaves were employed on the clove plantations of 
Zanzibar and Pemba. Indeed, by the early 1880s nearly all of the Sultanate’s clove plantations 
were situated on the Island of Pemba which serves to explain why the majority of dhow 
captures were made in these waters.82 In similarity with other slave-holding economies, the 
slaves of Zanzibar also filled other roles such as domestic slaves, secretarial positions in the 
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Sultan’s administration and in his harems as concubines and eunuchs. Due to the variable 
labour requirements of the clove crop, mostly around the short time window of harvesting, 
the slaves were said to enjoy more freedom than their counterparts in the West Indies did a 
century earlier.83  In fact the most frequently touted excuse against the abolition of slavery as 
an institution in Zanzibar by British bureaucrats and politicians’ dealing with the question was 
that Arab domestic slavery was ostensibly a benign form of bonded servitude beneficial to 
both the economy and the slave.84 Kirk reminds us of this argument in 1885:  
…cultivation can never repay the settler unless he makes use of slave labour in 
some form or other. The truth is, the native populations are happy as they are, 
having few wants, and those obtainable without labour, in our acceptation of 
the term, unless under compulsion; therefore they can never be relied on to 
work when required, while without a command of regular labour, no 
undertaking in the tropics can be expected to prove remunerative.85 
Since the Indian population were also British subjects they were barred from owning or hiring 
slaves which included ownership of the plantations which employed them – a criminalisation 
that was formalised by the 1873 treaty. This, however, did not prevent the Indian merchants 
from financing either the plantations or the caravans and indirectly profiting from both the 
slave trade and slave labour. Hence a form of labour division between the three main ethnic 
communities had emerged roughly divided into Indian control of finance, Arab control of 
policy and with the forced labour supplied by the bonded Africans trafficked from the 
mainland. 
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The East African Slave Trade and its Suppression, 1873-85 
Preceding Sir Bartle Frere’s Mission to Zanzibar in 1872 and the ensuing treaty of 1873, an 
estimated 20,000-25,000 Africans were imported annually from the mainland primarily to 
work as slaves on the shambas or plantations of Zanzibar and Pemba.86 In the decade 
succeeding the treaty, only an estimated total of 55,000 had been illicitly trafficked. Whilst 
this certainly was a considerable reduction in numbers, the problem still drew the attention 
of abolitionist politicians such as the Liberal Foreign Secretary Earl Granville who considered 
alternative suppression tactics in the early 1880s.87   
Although the sums represented the total of actual individuals landed on the islands, it did not 
take into account the substantial mortality among the captives en route to the coast. Frere 
himself estimated in 1872 that ‘for every slave exported, from eight to ten perished before 
reaching the Coast, leaving large districts of the country for many miles utterly depopulated 
in consequence of the ravages of the slave hunters.’88 Hence, British authorities estimated in 
the early 1870s that the human toll of the East African slave trade ranged from 160,000 to 
250,000 captives per annum, the vast majority of which died on the long march toward the 
coast and during transhipment.89 A decade later the Royal Navy estimated the number of 
slaves imported annually to the islands to range between 6,000 to 8,000. Applying the same 
multiple of deaths en route to the coast would suggest the total number of captives was 
48,000 to 80,000, a significant reduction, but it hardly marked an end to the trade.90 
                                                          
86 Miles to Granville, 1 March 1883, T 1/14421, TNA. 
87 Hill, Memorandum, 23 August 1882, FO 881/4676, TNA. 
88 Memorandum of Conversation with HH Khedive 17 December 1872, enclosed in Frere to Granville, 1 January 
1873, FO 881/2270, TNA. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Miles to Granville, 1 March 1883, T 1/14421, TNA. 
40 
 
Due to the ineffectiveness of the 1822 treaty with the Sultan of Oman, British anti-slave trade 
suppression in East Africa prior to the 1873 treaty had relied on the cruisers of the Royal 
Navy’s East India Station. A squadron of naval vessels patrolled the coast from the 
Mozambique Channel to the Arabian Peninsula and intercepted dhows suspected of carrying 
slaves. While it doubtlessly reduced the scale of the trafficking, it had been unsuccessful in 
stopping it altogether or even to such an extent as to prevent the inland massacre committed 
by slavers as witnessed by Livingstone at Nyangwe in 1871.91 But with Sir Bartle Frere, came 
a two-pronged approach, of combining naval repression with the earnest execution of treaty 
obligations by the Sultan of Zanzibar. Hence the new tactic revolved around strengthening 
and co-opting the authority of the Sultan – using the existing local power structures to further 
British imperial policy objectives.  
By the mid-nineteenth century Britain had strengthened its influence over Zanzibar. The 
Increasing economic importance of the archipelago had led the Sultan of Oman to move his 
capital there in 1840. But upon his death in 1856, a succession dispute arose between his two 
sons; Thuwaini of Muscat and Majid of Zanzibar, during which the British Governor-General 
of India Lord Canning acted as an arbitrator.92 The British government of India became 
involved due to its interest in avoiding the instability that would ensue in the Indian Ocean 
from an Omani civil war. Britain underwrote Zanzibar’s independence and thus the 
bifurcation of the Omani Sultanate by agreeing to provide an annual subsidy to Thuwaini paid 
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over the Indian treasury – the so-called Canning Award or Muscat Subsidy.93 By virtue of its 
role as kingmaker Britain also co-opted Zanzibar as a client state, a position it informally 
maintained until it was declared a British protectorate in 1890.94    
A decade after the Canning Award, Britain sought to expand the return it received from this 
subsidy to more than just the avoidance of piracy and disruption to Indian seaborne trade. 
Anti-slavery had again risen to prominence in metropolitan public opinion and London sought 
to include active measures against the slave trade – materialised in the treaty of 1873. As will 
be shown below, the elapse of another decade brought demands for further expansion of 
British influence in East Africa. At first indirectly via its proxy Zanzibar, but over the course of 
the 1880s through more direct means. In similarity with the 1870s these demands came as a 
response to anti-slavery concerns, in particular fanned by the persistence, and in 1888 the 
substantial revival, of the East African slave trade. 
 
The East African Slave Trade, Post-1873 Treaty 
Writing in 1883, Lieutenant-Colonel S.B. Miles observed that:  
The Treaty of 1873 marked a new era in the history of the suppression of the 
Slave Trade on the East Coast of Africa, and there is a very wide difference 
between the condition of the Trade prior to that date and what it is as 
present.95  
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The three main effects of the treaty were identified as:  
(1) the final and almost complete annihilation of the Trade from Zanzibar to the 
Persian Gulf ; (2) the diminution of the Trade between the mainland and the 
Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba ; and (3) the better care and treatment of the 
slave in these islands from his having become a more valuable commodity.96 
Immediately prior to the treaty, a hurricane had swept over Zanzibar and destroyed most of 
the clove plantations. Pemba, however, had been left unscathed and emerged as the principal 
destination for the ensuing slave smuggling trade. The physical destruction of a major slave 
market combined with the promulgation by the Sultan to halt slave exports to the Persian 
Gulf led to a temporary cessation of the trade. In addition to the legal measures, a new naval 
suppression tactic had also proven successful. The novel technique was based on the use of 
HMS London, a stationary naval vessel anchored in Zanzibar Harbour. Instead of relying 
exclusively on the cruisers of the East India Station, the navy would thus also employ a 
collection of smaller boats better suited to intercepting the dhows engaged in the smuggling 
trade. Indeed it was the light craft of HMS London, two steam launches and two 45ft boats in 
addition to a corvette that captured the majority of the slave dhows over the following 
decade.97 Their speed and manoeuvrability was advantageous during pursuit of shallow 
draught dhows along a coastline dotted with coves, sandbanks and reefs. 
Between 1874 and 1881, the Royal Navy captured 2,761 slaves with an annual average of 
around 300. The trend was unequivocally negative: in 1874 there had been 674 captures 
made, whilst five years later the number was only 74. But to contemporary experts such as 
Kirk the Navy’s capture statistics belied the true scale of the import trade. In Kirk and Miles’s 
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calculations of actual imports, a multiple of twenty was applied which brought the annual 
average to around 6,000.98 This figure corresponded better to both the mortality and 
manumission rate of the slave stocks at Zanzibar and Pemba. If these were on the order of 
266,000 as was suggested by Sultan Barghash, and the annual mortality rate was between 8-
12% as suggested by the Royal Navy, it would require annual births and imports to total 21-
32,000 in order to maintain slave stocks at the same level.99 Similarly, if Sir Bartle Frere’s 1872 
assumption were to be applied – that for each slave transhipped, eight or ten had died on the 
march – it would indicate that the annual scale of the East African slave trade in the decade 
after the 1873 treaty were on the order of 48-60,000 individuals.  
Whether or not this is an exaggeration is difficult to verify other than through the testimony 
of missionaries and explorers who at times reported of depopulated districts in the 
mainland’s interior. Vice-Consul Frederick Holmwood had reported in 1876 that 
approximately 30,000 slaves had been taken north from Pangani in 1876.100 It could however 
be assumed that the en route mortality rates had been reduced due to the increased value of 
the slaves, which would suggest that the total human toll of the East African slave trade was 
lower than 50,000 per annum. Kirk, in his eager defence of the Sultan’s sincerity in 
suppressing the trade and thus the very structure of authority he had carefully constructed 
since the early 1870s, subscribed to this minimalist projection. He had found that most of the 
Navy’s captives were both old and ‘true domestics’ which would imply that a form of second-
hand trade had emerged to replace the old land-based trade in so-called ‘fresh’ slaves. 
Accordingly Kirk believed the annual import estimate should be revised down to half, around 
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3,000 and be considered a simple ‘smuggling business.’101 Kirk’s views were corroborated by 
the Commander of the East Indies Station Admiral Sir John Corbett who in 1879 had declared:  
We have certainly stamped out the slave carriage at sea as a regular trade […] 
but the smuggling still goes on, and may be expected to continue, in spite of 
our precautions, so long as there are human beings to be bought in Africa, and 
so long as […] Pemba […] is dependent on slave labour for its prosperity.’102 
The diminution of the trade during this period could not be solely nor, according to the Royal 
Navy even partly, be ascribed to British actions. It was the fall in demand for slaves on Pemba 
and Zanzibar’s clove plantations that had caused this reduction. This reduced labour demand 
had come as a result of falling international clove prices and not from some moral reflections 
on behalf of the planation-owning Omani elite, although the Sultan’s increase of the clove-
tax had also contributed to the decline in profitability.103 
However, questions had also been raised about the sincerity with which the Sultan actively 
had suppressed the trade:  
Very little discernment is needed to perceive that His Highness' spasmodic and 
ostentatious efforts are more indicative of a desire to attract favourable notice 
than of an honest resolve to sweep away the Slave Trade.’104  
As opposed to his position in 1873: ‘comparatively poor; surrounded by his kinsmen – 
intolerant Metowwas and influential Arabs – on whose counsels and support he was 
dependent’, the Sultan Barghash had in the early 1880s emerged as the undisputed ruler of 
the archipelago and the mainland dominions.  
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His power was in large part based on his land-holdings and tax income:  
By means of the large revenue which he derives from his estate and custom-
house, and which is in a large degree a result of the Treaty of 1873, he has 
succeeded in consolidating his rule and raising himself to an independent 
position. There is no public voice to oppose him.105  
Testament to the effectiveness of his collaboration was the capture of 453 slaves in 1877 
which surpassed the Royal Navy’s 294.106 Evidently the Sultan could have stopped the trade 
if he so desired, but in the balance between placating British public opinion and the 
betterment of his own finances he chose the latter. Britain in the late 1870s paid little 
attention to the plight of such humanitarian concerns; thus the Sultan could afford to display 
a lacklustre interest.  
 
‘Striking at the Root of the Evil in the Interior’107: Revised Suppression Tactics, 1882-4 
However by the early 1880s, both the East African slave trade and British interest for it had 
re-emerged - a revival that would have severe political consequences for both the Sultanate 
and the British position in the region. A range of factors conspired to thrust the issue back on 
the political agenda. In December 1881, Charles Brownrigg, the captain of HMS London, had 
been killed while boarding a dhow holding around a hundred slaves destined for Pemba.108 
The public outcry did not fall on deaf ears as Britain had elected a Liberal government 
sympathetic to the abolitionist cause and was about to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of 
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the emancipation of the slaves held in British colonies. The depot ship itself was due to be 
decommissioned after almost a decade of service as a hulk in Zanzibar harbour. Additionally, 
1884 was a famine year which caused a substantial increase in slave trafficking. 
The Foreign Office clerk Sir Clement Lloyd Hill in consultation with Kirk drew up a 
memorandum in August 1882 which considered a radical change in Britain’s anti-slave trade 
policy toward East Africa: ‘The policy which was inaugurated in 1873 has been costly, but 
effective as far as it went. The present moment would, however, appear singularly opportune 
to effect a change in it.’109 The radical proposal involved a mainland presence: ‘the time has 
come when suppression of the Zanzibar Slave Trade by means of our navy can be superseded 
by other agencies working on shore.’110 This measure, Hill argued, would incur an annual cost-
saving to the Treasury of £54,000. Not an insignificant sum when compared to the annual 
outlay spent on cruisers and naval bounties were estimated to be £82-110,000.111 
A mainland presence had been contemplated by the navy since the early 1870s. A naval 
officer, Captain Owen, had even declared Mombasa a British protectorate in 1824 so as to 
put a stop to the slave trade.112 His initiative met however little sympathy or sanction by 
London and the affair wound up only after two years. Some fifty years later, Owen’s naval 
colleagues lauded the decision to establish a British consulate in Mozambique. Captain War, 
commanding the ‘Thetis’ wrote in 1875 that: ‘The establishment of an English Consulate at 
Mozambique in August last has probably been a greater blow to the Slave Trade in those 
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waters than many captures could have been.’113 Indeed the venture had proved so successful 
that his colleague Captain Foot declared five years later that:  
I can suggest no other means of effectually stopping this Traffic than the 
striking at the root of the evil in the interior; and I believe co-operation with 
the Sultan of Zanzibar on the mainland would effect the object in view, be a 
saving of expense to the nation, and benefit to the trading community at 
large.114 
Hill’s suggestion of a British proto-incursion to the mainland had come shortly after the 
conservative Lord Salisbury had in 1878 pursued the exact opposite policy. In Salisbury’s 
capacity as Secretary of State for India, he had secretly spoiled the Scottish shipowner William 
Mackinnon’s plans for gaining a concession from the Sultan to develop his mainland 
dominions.115 Marie de Kiewiet speculated whether Salisbury’s actions were not so much a 
result of conservative policy, than of him having ‘a more sure grip on imperial affairs than his 
predecessor’ Lord Derby.116 Salisbury was wary of embroiling Britain in potentially costly 
imperial ventures without the sanction of Parliament. But in 1880 the Conservatives had been 
swept from power in favour of Gladstone’s second Liberal government. Gladstone’s foreign 
secretary, Earl Granville, was a prominent abolitionist and favoured a strengthening of 
Britain’s anti-slave trade policy in East Africa. Granville had also served as foreign secretary in 
Gladstone’s first ministry between 1870-4 and had overseen the first treaty – and it would 
not seem unlikely that he saw an opportunity to repeat his earlier success. The question had 
become particularly urgent due to the impending decommissioning of the ‘rotten’ two-decker 
                                                          
113 Hill, Memorandum, 23 August 1882, FO 881/4676, TNA. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Kiewiet, History of the Imperial British East Africa Company, pp. 43-5. 
116 Ibid., pp. 44-5. 
48 
 
ship of the line HMS London which had formed the cornerstone of suppression tactics since 
1874.117 
The new régime would marginalise the navy’s role and instead make the soft power exerted 
by the consuls combined with the co-operation of the Sultan the main tactic. This ‘increase of 
Consular supervision on the mainland’ it was held, would ‘develop trade and civilization, 
attract settlers, and strengthen the hands of the Sultan’s authorities.’118 However, regardless 
of the somewhat naïve confidence in a diplomatic approach, it was the reliance on the 
Sultan’s authority as the iron fist beneath the velvet glove that ultimately proved the policy 
flawed.  
In practical terms, HMS London and her boats were to be replaced by three ‘travelling Vice-
Consuls […] who would be attached to the head-quarters at Zanzibar, with residences on the 
mainland, where they would move about as occasion required.’119 The second component to 
Hill and Kirk’s new policy was the addition of an agency steamer since hitherto the Agent and 
his staff had been largely tied to Zanzibar ‘having no means of locomotion but the dangerous 
and undignified native craft, or the occasional use of a man-of-war.’120 Indeed it was held that:  
with a steam-vessel under his orders, the Agent would be incalculably more 
useful in every respect, in preventing native outbreaks and missionary quarrels, 
in encouraging British subjects, in developing trade, in keeping the Sultan’s 
authorities up to the mark and in supporting British influence on the 
mainland.121 
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The last component of this three-pronged tactic was the continuation of the mail subsidy. The 
bi-monthly visit of steamers from Aden employed by the Mackinnon-owned British-India 
Steam Navigation Company (BI) was thought to ensure the maintenance of the British 
presence. Hill believed the annual allocation of £10,000 as money well-spent:  
the continuance of a line of steamers is essential, both for the suppression of 
the Slave Trade by the extension of legitimate trade, and for the maintenance 
of our communications with the whole East African Coast.’122  
Hence, in Hill’s view it was the ‘intermingling of races’ and Britain’s ‘civilizing influence’ that 
would bring about the end of the East African slave trade rather than the brute force of the 
naval suppression strategy employed thus far. In fact he had quoted Captain Sulivan of the 
HMS London who, in 1876, certainly had been ahead of his time by advising a comprehensive 
development policy in lieu of naval tactics: ‘Religion, education, trade, and agriculture must 
go hand in hand… and the Slave Trade will be abolished, not by the capture of slaves or 
slavers’.123 This tightened integration was what this naval officer had construed as the key for 
progress:  
‘politically, commercially, and socially  the East Coast of Africa, India, and Great 
Britain will be benefited by substituting measures on shore for those now 
employed afloat in suppressing the Slave Trade.’124 
In the years which immediately preceded partition, British authorities had mediated a new 
strategy for suppressing the slave trade which involved a mainland presence. Although little 
else resulted from this than a strengthened consular supervision of the coastal regions, it was 
nonetheless a tentative premonition of what followed after the conclusion of the West 






African Conference at Berlin in 1885. Unlike during the heyday of the scramble proper, a 
proto-partition was considered exclusively on grounds of slave-trade suppression, by virtue 
of the impending decommissioning of HMS London. As will be shown below and in the 
following chapters, execution of anti-slave trade policy featured prominently in the 
deliberations over the extension of British imperial control in East Africa for the duration of 
the partition.   
 
The East African Famine, Public Opinion and the Mahdist Threat, 1884-5 
By the autumn and winter of 1884-5 the East African slave trade was again made notorious 
among the British public. This time it was not the death of a heroic naval officer that made 
news headlines, but rather the traffic’s ‘sudden renewal.’125 As a result of Granville’s revised 
policy, Vice-Consuls Gissing, Smith and Haggard had been despatched to the region to assist 
Kirk.126 Until 1884, the fresh recruits had been occupied in dealing with the French ‘engagé’ 
trade. French planters in the Comoro Islands had attempted to evade British measures by 
issuing the slaves imported from the mainland with free papers, despite never intending to 
actually grant these individuals their freedom.127 Additionally the French presence in 
Madagascar and the Comoros undermined British efforts through the issuing of Arab dhow-
owners with the French flag. By flying the tricolour as a flag of convenience, dhow captains 
evaded the British naval patrol since Britain did not have a mutual right of search treaty with 
France. On this account dhows that had no connection to France, other than having been 
measured by its Consulate at Mayotte, and despite holding large numbers of slaves, could not 
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be intercepted and searched as such steps would constitute a violation of French 
sovereignty.128 
In September, Kirk reported of a ‘drought, which over the whole of east tropical Africa has 
this year been severe, has caused famine and death in some of the inland districts, and 
everywhere raised the prices of all articles of food.’129 Only the coastal towns had been spared 
from the ravages of the famine due to the deliveries of grain made by the mail-steamers. 
Already in September Kirk made the causal link between the famine and the resultant slave 
trafficking clear:  
It was evident from what Captain Gissing and I saw and heard in the Malindi 
district that this famine would offer an occasion for the renewal of the Slave 
Trade, for not only were the Giriama people parting with their slaves to the 
people of the coast in exchange for grain, but some had sold their children; 
indeed as things then were it was difficult to say much against such transfer, so 
long as the slaves were not passed and trafficked with elsewhere.130  
The pawning of children and slaves was a customary survival tactic employed in times of 
famine. However the transaction was not intended to be permanent, rather a temporary 
expedient to ensure the survival of kin until rains again ensured stable food crops.131 Despite 
the dire situation Kirk believed it would soon be improved due to reports of rains having 
fallen.  
However a month later conditions on the mainland had only deteriorated and the newly 
appointed Vice-Consul Gissing had to correct his earlier report of improving weather 
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conditions. This had only been true to the extent of his travels to the Malindi district. As 
conditions had worsened, Kirk reiterated his warning of a revived slave trade:  
Under such circumstances it will be very difficult to stop slaves from being sold 
or pawned. When I was at Takaungu, fathers were in some cases selling their 
children as a last recourse, and as the only way that presented of keeping either 
alive, and unless we offer them an alternative, it is not easy to put a stop to 
such things.132 
By the year’s end, the situation in East Africa had gained notoriety in Britain and critics had 
linked the revival of the slave trade with the decommissioning of the London. Acting Consul 
at Zanzibar, Frederick Holmwood, wrote to The Times in January 1885 and testified that the 
famine had over the past twelve months indeed been ‘unprecedented in severity’ and caused 
the death of ‘thousands’ in the Sultan’s mainland dominions.133 As for the interior region 
beyond the Sultan’s auspices the consequences of the absence of rains had been even more 
severe with ‘the populations of whole districts being swept away.’ Holmwood corroborated 
Kirk’s six month earlier report of parents, even those who inhabited the coastal towns, had 
sold their children into slavery as testament to the scale of the calamity.134 
But the consul was eager to impress upon British policymakers and public that the revived 
slave trade was not a result of any failing in the execution of Britain’s anti-slave trade policy, 
and in particular that it was not caused by the withdrawal of HMS London. In his letter to the 
editor Holmwood also assured The Times’ readership that both Kirk and the Sultan had done 
everything in their power to redress the situation, but that the scale of the humanitarian 
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catastrophe was such that even their best efforts in the form of grain distribution was not 
sufficient to ‘alleviate a tithe of the prevailing distress.’135 
Complicating the situation in East Africa was the ongoing Mahdist insurrection in the Sudan. 
The rebellion which had ousted Egyptian rule from the region had been instigated by the 
Muslim slave trading community who had been dissatisfied with Egyptian attempts to stop 
the trade.136 The two most famous executors of this British-derived policy objective were Sir 
Samuel Baker and General Charles Gordon – the latter was overrun and killed by the Mahdists 
in February 1885. Kirk thought that the revival of the slave trade came at a ‘peculiarly 
awkward time’ since according to intercepted letters from Zanzibar to Oman, there circulated 
rumours that Britain had softened its anti-slave trade policy and associated ‘this supposed 
weakness […] directly with the reported slaughter of 30,000 Christians in the Soudan.’137 
According to Kirk, the author of this letter was an ‘Ibadhia’ Muslim – a puritanical sect of Islam 
predominant in Oman and Zanzibar – and accordingly did not: ‘believe in the coming of a 
Mahdi; yet, in writing to a relative engaged in the Slave Trade, he approved the Soudan-
Mahdi’s doings, showing how closely related such risings as these in the Soudan are with the 
Slave Trade.’138 Hence, Kirk entertained a fear that if Britain should appear permissive toward 
the slave trade, if only to alleviate suffering caused by the famine, it would send a signal in a 
domino-like fashion to the Arab community in Zanzibar that they could revive the trade by 
means of ‘a fanatic movement’ akin to that in the Sudan.139 The alarming reports led Granville 
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to instruct the Admiralty to ‘exercise a strict as possible supervision over the coast’ and to 
demand of the Sultan to issue a notice negating any such rumours.140 
Despite the growing concerns over the famine’s apparent effect upon slave trafficking and 
the perception of increases taking hold, this was not reflected in the Royal Navy’s capture 
statistics. Only 201 were captured in 1884 and a similar number of 221 were recorded in 
1885.141 In fact, the vast majority of 1884’s total was made up of one single capture – a dhow 
caught in November by HMS Osprey containing 169 slaves – predominantly ‘starving 
Wazaramo, emaciated to skeletons, carried from a famine-stricken district where the 
population is dying of hunger and disease.’142 Compared to the average of 184 witnessed over 
the five preceding years, both 1884-5 were unremarkable.143 However any data for this period 
should be qualified by the absence of the HMS London who had proved effective in countering 
the asymmetric nature of the smuggling trade.  
The re-emergence of the East African slave trade in the British political discourse in 1884 was 
not only due to news from Zanzibar; rather it was the fiftieth anniversary of the abolition of 
slavery in the British colonies that brought the issue back to public attention. The occasion 
had been marked with much fanfare in London’s Guildhall with Prince Edward presiding and 
Earl Granville delivering the keynote address. It was at this ‘densely crowded’ assembly of the 
great and good of London’s high society that the awkward persistence of the Zanzibar slave 
trade and ‘Mahometan slavery’ was raised. In his speech, Granville declared that ‘immense 
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progress’ had been made in suppressing the trafficking thanks to the work of Kirk and the 
Sultan, whilst ‘great assistance was expected from the establishment of vice consuls on the 
mainland.’144 At this event, as it would turn out on the cusp of the partition, it was this latter 
point that gained traction among the assembly in their proposal for a resolution. In particular 
that ‘slavery must be destroyed at its source’ and that ‘legitimate trade must be introduced 
into the heart of Africa.’145 These were the principal ways, in the former Conservative Foreign 
Secretary Earl Derby’s words, to end ‘the indescribable horrors of the Central and East African 
slave trade, as fatal to human life on shore as the dreaded passage formerly was at sea.’146 
Naturally then, when the British explorer Harry Johnston147 had offered his self-proclaimed 
territorial rights just north of the Kilimanjaro to Granville’s deputy Edmund Fitzmaurice, 
Granville’s reply in October 1884 was consistent with these earlier pronouncements. Granville 
found:  
…it would be undesirable that an opportunity should be neglected of securing 
a hold over a territory adapted for British enterprise and favourably situated 
for striking a blow at the Slave Trade.’148  
A territorial presence on the mainland followed as a natural conclusion to the gradual 
intensification of the Liberal party’s anti-slave trade policy in the region. But before any steps 
could be taken for establishing a British protectorate in the hills north of the Kilimanjaro, as 
will be investigated in the following chapter, the plans had been forestalled. Unknown to 
British policymakers the representatives of a private German colonial society had at the time 
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already taken steps toward establishing a German colony on the East African mainland. The 
Berlin Conference, the anniversary of abolition, and the unfolding Gordon drama in 
Khartoum, all positioned Africa and the Arab slave trade squarely in the public eye during the 
autumn and winter months of 1884-5. Evocative reports of famine and its associated slave 
trafficking strengthened Granville’s political resolve to tackle the problem at its root, whilst 
Johnston’s treaties enabled the establishment of a British mainland presence. Hence, it was 
on anti-slavery grounds Britain committed itself as a participant in the partition of East Africa 
in the autumn of 1884.  
 
Suppression of the Slave Trade during the Early Partition, 1885-88 
If 1884 proved a bad year for Britain’s agents in Zanzibar and the mainland, little improvement 
was achieved in the one that followed. In August of 1885, Kirk had the dubious honour of 
reporting to his new superior Lord Salisbury of ‘a marked revival of the slave trade from the 
coast of the mainland opposite Zanzibar.’149 Of all the changes that both Britain and East 
Africa had undergone in the year that had elapsed since the autumn of 1884, the slave trade 
did not count among them. 
In May, the price of slaves at the horn of Africa had ranged from 50 to 60 dollars each whilst 
during the famine the selling price at the coast opposite Zanzibar was around 4 to 10. It was 
this substantial arbitrage that the ‘Muscat shippers and Somali Chiefs’ had exploited, and in 
Kirk’s opinion, accounted for the increased trafficking.150 Of the five dhows that had been 
captured in quick succession during the autumn of 1885, over forty slaves had been liberated 
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and all of which were ‘strong and healthy’ despite coming from the districts hit by the famine 
– a fact which indicated that the crisis was over.151 
The arrival of Germany in the territories of Usagara, what the Sultan of Zanzibar considered 
his vassal dominions on the mainland, was a complicating factor for the execution of Britain’s 
anti-slave trade policy. Since Britain had relied on local power structures to enforce its policy 
objectives, the German intrusion undermined these efforts. The Sultan was reluctant to 
introduce any strict countermeasures so as not to prejudice his own position among the 
Omani-elite.152 Witu on the mainland, under his vassal Chief Simba, had already been 
absorbed as a German protectorate courtesy of a treaty signed in 1866, whilst a growing 
section of the region interior from Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani also had come under German 
protection.153 Kirk was the one who had done most to forge the superstructure of British 
authority in Zanzibar and he was disinclined to let it be sabotaged by the newcomers. 
Although Kirk had professed to insist upon the abolition of slavery in Zanzibar and Pemba, he 
was sympathetic to the Sultan’s reluctance in the matter due to the new geo-political 
circumstances: ‘His Highness seems little disposed further to complicate his compromised 
position at the present time by adding to his difficulties a social revolution…’154 
The Sultan was not the only member of the ancien régime whose position had become 
tenuous. Ironically Kirk would fall victim to his own success two years later, when he in 1887, 
was unofficially dismissed from his role as Consul-General. The decision had come as a result 
of German diplomatic pressure since Bismarck's administration perceived him to be the 
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principal hindrance to their interests in East Africa.155 With Kirk’s dismissal also went the 
incisive analyses of the regional slave trade. His services were retained, but from his address 
in Sevenoaks rather than on-the-spot in Zanzibar.156 His successor Colonel Charles Euan 
Smith’s more descriptive style offered little in the way of analysis of the underlying factors 
which drove the trade. Euan Smith also fell victim to German ire in March 1889 when details 
of a bribery scandal came to light and he also was recalled, albeit temporarily.157   
Already by 1885-6 the Vice-Consular system had ‘broken down altogether’ and, according to 
the naval officers responsible for the region, there appeared to be few signs of any diminution 
of the trade.158 The Slave Trade adviser to the Treasury had even recommended trebling the 
slave trade vote from £2,000 to £6,000 since, ‘contrary to Sir John Kirk’s anticipation, the Slave 
Trade on the East Coast of Africa had suddenly broken out afresh.’159  In total, 116 slaves were 
freed which represented a near halving of the captures made the previous year.160 Yet, 
despite the apparent decline in scale, no victory was declared by the men-on-the-spot. As 
Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick Richards stated:  
The number of captures made is small, owing to the inadequacy of the force 
which I have been enabled to station upon the division, and to the fact that the 
cruisers have been for the most part diverted to other duties owing to the 
recent action of Germany in these waters…’161  
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Regardless of British naval actions, without abolition the demand for slaves at Pemba 
remained constant and ‘the export thither from the mainland is more or less continuous 
throughout the year.’162 Kirk corroborated the Navy’s speculation of a hidden trade to 
Muscat, whilst he also relayed rumours that ‘private Germans’ had enticed the local 
population with the prospect of freely trading in slaves should they accept German 
protection.163  
The Rear-Admiral’s report also hid a rather more ominous tale from the northern hunting-
grounds of his squadron which betrayed both the humanitarian implications of the trafficking 
and how it evaded naval detection. A Swedish medical missionary had, upon venturing 10 
miles from the coast, travelled with a caravan of about 700 child slaves. The caravan had come 
from Ethiopia and the slaves ‘were intended for the Jeddah market.’ According to the 
missionary’s report: ‘the boys had nearly all been made eunuchs, they being more valuable 
as such in the Turkish and Egyptian markets.’164 Kirk had also reported of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar’s importation of eunuchs to his harem two years earlier. Although a violation of the 
1873 treaty, the Consul had turned a blind eye to this ‘consignment’ of ten Georgian women 
and nine eunuch boys.165 Kirk was philosophical about the issue:  
The difficulty of dealing with the case of such women is, that being brought up 
from childhood to look forward to harem life, they think when taken up by a 
Sovereign Prince that they have drawn the highest prize in the lottery of life; 
and in cases of this sort, with which we have before attempted to deal, it has 
been found impossible to do anything, owing to the determination of the 
women themselves to reach their destination. The case of eunuchs is different; 
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once reduced to that state it is difficult to say what else, out of Europe, they 
are fit for; but surely the mutilation of boys for the Oriental market ought to be 
treated as a capital crime.’166 
However, the most important development in terms of the slave trade was the disintegration 
of the Sultan’s authority on the mainland. The consequences of this political change were not 
apparent in the Royal Navy’s capture rate for 1886 or 1887. Yet the Anglo-German partition 
and in particular Barghash’s death in March 1888 caused a sharp surge in the slave trade as 
witnessed by the quadrupling of liberated slaves compared to the five previous years.167 In 
fact the total of 841 slaves liberated in 1888 by the Royal Navy’s cruisers, were the highest 
number on record since the ratification of the 1873 treaty and substantially higher than the 
277 of 1887.168 In the years prior to his retirement in 1887, Kirk had reiterated the negative 
consequences of the power vacuum that had emerged on the mainland for Britain’s 
suppression of the slave trade: ‘the cause is evident in the unsettled state of government on 
this coast due to German claims and hostile demonstrations in that region.’169 Whilst local 
instability in East Africa had increased export, a similar erosion of the Sultan of Muscat’s 
authority in Oman – and with it the British Agent’s ability to prevent the landing of slaves – 
had occurred which increased demand. This external effect was of particular importance 
seeing that Muscat was the trade’s principal transhipment hub on the Arabian Peninsula.170 
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The Last Abolitionist Awakening: Britain and the East African Slave Trade, 1888     
The first six months of 1888 the Anti-Slave Trade Squadron logged a record 323 captured 
slaves and by the end of the year the total had reached 841.171 Applying this number to Kirk’s 
1887 estimate, that the Royal Navy ‘never have been able to intercept more than 5 per cent 
of the slaves taken afloat’, the actual scale of slave imports were around 16,000 that year, 
roughly equal to pre-1873 levels.172 The surge in trafficking was so substantial that a 
suggestion was made by the Foreign Office to ‘fit out native vessels’ in order to intercept slave 
dhows more effectively, a proposition which was met with little enthusiasm by the 
Admiralty.173  
Although the new Consul-General Charles Euan Smith never delved into much analysis of 
what may have caused this revival, he was clear about the limited ‘moral influence’ exercised 
by Barghash’s successor the Sultan Khalifa bin Said on the mainland: ‘His Highness the present 
Sultan cannot be anticipated to wield the tenth part of the authority exercised by his 
predecessor.’174 Apart from the death of Barghash which arguably was the proximate cause 
of the 1888 surge, most of the anti-slavery institutions in East Africa had over the course of 
the 1880s been eroded. The highly successful depot ship HMS London and her boats had been 
decommissioned in 1883, by 1885-6 the new Vice-Consular system instituted by Kirk had 
broken down, in 1885 a German protectorate was declared on the mainland thus 
undermining the authority of the Sultan, and the 1887 departure of Kirk who was the 
individual that more than any other could be credited for devising and executing Britain’s anti-
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slave trade policy in the region. All these conspired to mark an end to what had constituted 
the superstructure of British anti-slave trade suppression in East Africa since 1873 – the result 
of which was a resurgence of trafficking not witnessed since the decades before those very 
institutions had been put in place. 
These developments had not gone unnoticed in Europe and especially not in Britain. In fact 
they set the stage for an abolitionist ‘awakening’ not witnessed since the early 1870s. In July 
and August several questions were raised in the House of Commons as a direct result of this 
newfound interest for the East African slave trade.175 The MP for South Donegal, John 
MacNeill questioned on the 30 July whether the decision to decommission the HMS London 
had encouraged the revived trafficking. The issue had been raised earlier that month in an 
article published in the Contemporary Review which proclaimed that ‘the Slave Trade in Africa 
“has been resumed with redoubled energy,” and “has become more rampant than ever”’ The 
Under-Secretary for State James Fergusson denied any such suggestion and argued to the 
contrary that: ‘the withdrawal of this particular vessel was part of a scheme for more effectual 
suppression,’ a reference to Kirk’s Vice-Consular scheme that had failed in 1885-6.176   
The day following MacNeill’s questions in parliament, the French Cardinal Charles Lavigerie 
gave a speech in London upon the invitation of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 
(BFASS).177 According to the New York Times Lavigerie had come on a mission by the Pope to 
‘arouse English public opinion concerning the slave trade in Africa.’178 The ‘very influential’ 
meeting was held in Prince’s Hall in Piccadilly and presided over by Earl Granville;179 the 
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former liberal foreign secretary had thought it an ‘honour’ to chair the meeting. On the stand 
together with Granville, stood the Roman-Catholic Bishop Manning, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury had declined his invitation.180 Lavigerie was the founder of the White Fathers 
mission, a Roman-Catholic missionary society based in Algiers, but with activity throughout 
the continent. He had since 1886 led a campaign against the African slave trade, but the 
interest garnered by his petition to the Foreign Office in 1886 which urged ‘collective action’ 
against the East African slave trade stood in stark contrast to his reception two years later.181 
The Cardinal’s visit revitalised the anti-slave trade campaign in Britain which had been 
lacklustre for over a decade and had profound policy-implications for the partition of Africa.182 
As the historian Richard Huzzey pointed out, the arousal of British interest was also in part 
due to the public resentment of rival ‘Johnny-come-lately’ European powers apparent 
usurpation of what had been a distinctly British cause for almost a century.183 
In his speech the Cardinal cited the British explorer Verney Lovett Cameron184 that ‘half a 
million slaves at the least are sold every year in the interior of Africa’ a number allegedly 
confirmed or even raised by the testimony of his own missionaries.185 After recounting in 
graphic detail the scale of human suffering that was caused by the trade, Lavigerie 
pronounced that the nations of Europe had through their partition acquired duties as well as 
rights. One of these duties was the stamping out of the slave trade in the interior, not simply 
by persuasion or legitimate trade, but through force. Lavigerie proposed at the end of his 
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speech an abolitionist ‘crusade’ against the Islamic slave trade that ravaged the interior of 
Africa:  
But though I appeal to the Christian charity of all, though I ask for your pity and 
compassion for the black slaves, remember this - charity is much, compassion 
is much, but force is absolutely necessary. Nor can the opposition be successful 
merely by hindering the transport of slaves into Asia by means of cruisers; it is 
necessary to strike the evil at its root, and to destroy the markets of the interior, 
or to render them useless by establishing as your great Gordon wished to do 
for the basin of the Nile barriers against slavery composed of natives, led and 
instructed by Europeans, in order to supplement the maritime barriers formed 
by your cruisers.186  
His proposal was a radical one and if enacted would represent a complete alteration of British 
anti-slave trade policy – a shift which would clad territorial expansion in the guise of 
humanitarianism.  
What followed Lavigerie’s rousing agitation was yet another question from MacNeill in 
parliament. This time the question he directed to Salisbury was simply what the government 
intended to do to stop the slave trade in central and eastern Africa.187 Although not admitting 
any increase in the traffic, Fergusson’s reply revealed both Salisbury’s strategy and his 
reluctance to commit additional funds to slave trade suppression: ‘The Slave Trade should be 
more completely checked when the British and German East African Companies administer 
the coast under their Concessions from the Sultan.’188 According to Salisbury’s representative, 
it was:  
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…obviously impossible for Her Majesty’s Government to follow the Arab slave-
traders into the interior of the continent, but good results may be anticipated 
from the opening of trade routes by powerful Companies and from the 
increasing difficulties of exporting the slaves.189  
Salisbury’s reliance upon private companies in executing imperial policy objectives stood in 
contrast to his liberal predecessor and would, as will be detailed in chapter five, inform his 
policy toward the evacuation of Uganda three years later.190  
In August, the BFASS sent Salisbury what became one of the Society’s most important 
resolutions, it signalled an appeal to a tradition and aligned the question of anti-slavery with 
that of national prestige. On the back of the Lavigerie meeting, the resolution urged that:  
it devolves upon England, from the position which she has always held with 
regard to this question, to take the initiative in obtaining a consensus of the 
Powers of Europe to carry out […] such measures as shall secure the extinction 
of the devastating Slave Trade.’191  
Upon receipt of the resolution the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir 
Thomas Villiers Lister drew up a memorandum that considered the policy response. Although 
he found it ‘an invidious task to explain the objections to any chivalrous movement having a 
philanthropic object,’ Lavigerie’s suggestions for an ‘Anti-Slave Trade Crusade’ gave him little 
choice but to deem them both ‘impossible’ and ‘absurd.’192 The practical details of the 
Cardinal’s proposal were to impose a ban on the importation of firearms into Africa and to 
recruit a detachment of a hundred Europeans to physically stop the trade. Whilst the weapons 
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embargo later became official policy, the plan to despatch ‘100 Belgians with £40000 in their 
pockets […] to govern Africa’ seemed naïve to both Lister and Salisbury.193  
Despite his reservations against the ‘crusade’ Lister ended his memorandum by echoing the 
BFASS’s resolution for a conference of the powers:  
How far England as the founder of the Anti-Slavery movement can take part in 
the new crusade without encouraging schemes which are futile or mischievous, 
is the problem before us – a discussion with their Governments as to the 
measures practicable at the present moment would probably offer the safest 
solution.194  
Salisbury concurred in Lister’s analysis in that he thought government interference ought to 
be limited to the coast and that ‘this generation will have done its part, if it destroys the export 
slave trade.’ Further he instructed the British Ambassador to Belgium Lord Vivian to ‘sound 
the Belgians whether they would be willing to summon a conference of the Powers controlling 
the coast of Africa for this purpose.’195 Hence, as Suzanne Miers makes clear, it was upon 
Salisbury’s prompting that the Anti-Slave Trade Conference in Brussels was held the following 
year.196 The public attention and agitation that followed the great increase in the East African 
slave trade had thus resulted in concrete political action and it is these political implications 
that form the subject of the following chapters.  
It had been no coincidence that Lavigerie quoted Cameron. His careful choice of words 
actually betrayed a schism in the British anti-slave trade campaign. Whilst the BFASS was, out 
of loyalty to its Quaker roots, a strictly pacifist organisation, Commander Cameron who had 
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been engaged in naval suppression of the East African slave trade since 1872, did certainly 
not subscribe to this doctrine of non-violence. The BFASS’s insistence, under the leadership 
of its Secretary Charles Allen, upon moral persuasion, had led Cameron to form his own anti-
slavery campaign that year. Cameron had even confided to the Archbishop of Canterbury 
Edward Benson of a personal antipathy against the rivalling humanitarian: ‘Mr Allen will not 
show me open hostility lest a new and more active association than his should either sweep 
it away or swallow it up and therefore lest his post of Secretary should vanish.’197 It was this 
‘new and more active association’ that he sought support for from the Archbishop and which 
shortly after the Cardinal’s visit published a polemical booklet in the National Review entitled: 
‘Slavery in Africa. The Disease and the Remedy.’198 The account included long and graphic 
depictions of the brutality committed by the Arab slavers in East and Central Africa:  
Remember that these horrors are not of occasional occurrence, but are 
happening every day, every hour, every moment that we breathe. Remember 
that we are told that this infernal demon of slavery costs Africa every year the 
life-blood of two millions of her children.’199  
While ultimately not successful in usurping the BFASS’s position as Britain’s principal anti-
slavery organisation, Cameron’s testimony of ‘a formidable increase’ in the slave trade did 
influence Salisbury’s decision to institute the Anglo-German blockade of the East African coast 
in November of 1888.200 And as the following chapters will demonstrate, Salisbury decided to 
make good use of Cameron’s representations to justify the conclusion of the Anglo-German 
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Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890.201 Unlike the pacifist BFASS who only advocated 
legitimate trade and moral persuasion, Cameron’s more muscular recommendations of a 
territorial incursion fitted well with the results of the bilateral partition treaty. The timing of 
Lavigerie’s speech coincided with the transformation of William Mackinnon’s Syndicate into 
the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) and a relief expedition had been despatched 
to amalgamate the Equatorial Province of Emin Pasha with that of the British sphere.202 
Hence, the agitation for a territorial intervention had come at a time when Britain already had 
taken the tentative steps toward a final partition of East Africa, a process which would be 
completed within two years and in part accelerated by the anti-slavery focus raised by 
Lavigerie, Cameron and the BFASS campaigns.  
 
Conclusion 
To the British public and political establishment, the East African slave trade emerged from 
relative obscurity in the first half of the 1880s to one of general notoriety in the second. At 
the turn of the nineteenth century’s penultimate decade, veteran activists of the BFASS like 
Joseph Sturge might have been forgiven for thinking that the days of Wilberforce, Livingstone 
and the Clapham sect were long since gone. Instead, a renaissance of abolitionist fervour 
gripped the nation and contributed to forming a moral dimension and raison d’être to 
imperial expansion in Africa. Whilst the 1880s marked a feverish high-point in the European 
scramble for African territories, it also set the scene for the last great mobilisation of British 
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abolitionist public opinion. For politicians such as Granville or anti-slavery advocates such as 
Lavigerie and Cameron, the two went hand in hand. In their eyes, territorial acquisitions were 
simply useful means with which to end the slave trade that ravaged the interior of the 
continent and a ‘crusade’ was the tool of choice. No wonder then that it was Cameron and 
Lavigerie that Salisbury chose to refer to after concluding the East African partition in 1890 
and not the pacifist BFASS. For Britain, the anti-slavery cause was particularly evocative in 
that it represented a longstanding tradition and was associated with national prestige. Once 
the mantel had been taken up by the Frenchman Lavigerie, the British public and political 
establishment was not difficult to mobilise to guard and promote what was considered a 
highly respectable national cause.  
Both the East African slave trade itself and awareness of it outside an intimate circle of 
specialists had been in a state of slow decline in the decade leading up to the Anglo- German 
partition of 1885. Despite that the treaty Britain concluded with the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1873 
represented the most comprehensive act of abolitionist legislation enacted in East Africa thus 
far; it failed to completely eradicate the traffic. Since the institution of slavery remained a key 
component of the archipelago’s economic structure a smuggling trade emerged to replenish 
slave stocks. This trade continued relatively unabated by the efforts of the Royal Navy, but on 
a level that was too low to attract much in the way of metropolitan attention. By the early 
1880s this changed when a famine broke out on the East African mainland. Harrowing reports 
of widespread suffering and coupled with the evocative image of parents selling their children 
into slavery was enough to prompt limited press attention and laid the foundations for a 
British presence on the mainland that predated the German declaration of a protectorate in 
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1885. But more importantly, it was the decommissioning of the cornerstone of Britain’s anti-
slave trade policy in Zanzibar, HMS London, which forced a reconsideration of British tactics. 
Kirk’s proposal of an extension of the direct diplomatic supervision of the Sultan’s treaty 
commitments to the mainland and Granville’s endorsement of the scheme marked a radical 
departure from what had been British policy in the region for half a century.  Naval officers 
had throughout the 1870s lobbied for a consular presence on the mainland opposite Zanzibar 
similar to what had been adopted in the Portuguese possessions to the south, but their 
suggestions had been ignored by the Foreign Office. Mackinnon had similarly been rebuffed 
when he attempted to gain a concession from the Sultan of Zanzibar to develop his mainland 
dominions. No extension of British influence on the lines of the previous year’s annexation of 
the South African Republic was countenanced by Disraeli’s government, in fact Salisbury had 
personally sabotaged the plan. However, the most important aspect of Granville’s decision 
was the fact that Britain’s plans for a proto-partition of the mainland in 1884 came largely as 
a consequence of its anti-slave trade policy and not simply as a reaction to great power rivalry. 
Whilst the deliberations concerning British policy in East Africa over 1882-5 were largely 
internal to the government and various interested parties such as the BFASS and Mackinnon’s 
syndicate, this changed abruptly three years later and the issue of the East African slave trade 
positioned itself squarely in the centre of public debate. As this chapter has demonstrated, 
the slave captures made by the Royal Navy in 1888 were the highest in more than a decade; 
indeed it indicated a revival of the slave trade on par with a scale not witnessed since the half-
century prior to the 1873 treaty. This rekindling of the traffic combined with Lavigerie’s 
abolitionist campaign prompted a British policy response which eventually resulted in the 
Anti-Slave Trade Conference in Brussels, 1889-90. Hence, the East African slave trade 
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constituted a significant component in the chain of causation that led to the final partition of 
East Africa in 1890. But as the next chapter will show, the proximate cause of the process 
which replaced British informal hegemony with a direct territorial presence was the German 





‘Now or Never’203: The First Partition of East Africa, 1884-7 
 
The years 1884-7 marks in many respects the start of East Africa’s entry into modern political 
world history. It is within this short time-interval that events, executed through individual 
agency and sanctioned by two powerful states, that both largely determined the territorial 
scope of the partition and formally integrated the region within the European imperial system. 
The culmination of this initial partition was the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886. And it was 
from this crucible, this chapter asserts, that the geographical and, to some extent, institutional 
framework of both the colonial and later independent states would develop. Although greatly 
determined by the peripheral forces of imperial agency, the establishment of the British and 
German spheres of influence did not occur in a political vacuum unaffected by wider concerns. 
Powerful metropolitan factors also formed a backdrop to the events. For Britain, these 
included its long-established anti-slave trade policy and sub-imperial commercial interests.           
As the last chapter showed, the Sultanate of Zanzibar and its adjoining mainland dominions 
had since the Canning Award of 1862 formed part of Britain’s informal empire in Africa. A 
significant number of Indian traders resided in this regional entrepôt and gave Britain an 
indirect commercial interest in the Sultanate. It was an economic interest that eclipsed any of 
Zanzibar’s other trading partners.204 However Britain’s engagement with the region was not 
one limited to trade, it was the humanitarian anti-slave trade policy that in successive stages 
since the 1820-30s had taken pre-eminence. In addition to maintaining a naval anti-slave trade 
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squadron, a complex of treaties had been enacted in order to suppress the export of slaves 
from the mainland to Zanzibar and the Persian Gulf.205 For British policymakers the region 
served as a useful theatre in which to display their commitment to virtues the socio-economic 
elite perceived as identical to Britain’s moral character and international position.  
The appearance of Dr Carl Peters and his Society for German Colonization in the summer and 
autumn of 1884 and subsequent declaration of a German protectorate on the mainland ended 
Britain’s hegemonic position in East Africa.206 Despite the Liberal Foreign Secretary Earl 
Granville had decided to form a colony in the Kilimanjaro in October 1884,207 based on Harry 
Johnston’s treaties, the British move had come too late.  
The British reaction was hesitant as it needed to balance its imperial interests elsewhere with 
those of East Africa. Anglo-German relations in the years 1884-7 were dominated by British 
relations with Russia and the ‘Eastern Question’ which included the ‘Panjdeh incident’ in 
Afghanistan and French hostility toward Britain’s occupation of Egypt. The German Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck was the protagonist in this relationship and he exploited British imperial 
overstretch to German advantage; bartering diplomatic support for wide-ranging colonial 
concessions in Africa and the Pacific. 
 After a decade of successfully staying aloof from European intrigues, the 1880s drew Britain 
back into continental affairs. Bismarck’s mid-1884 Pauline conversion to a colonial policy was 
long undetected by the Foreign Office, but once recognised Whitehall used the German desire 
for territorial expansion as a quid for Germany’s quo. However in 1885, London needed Berlin 
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more than Berlin needed London; it was the year which saw the fall of Khartoum, French 
antagonism over Egypt and Britain edging toward war with Russia over Afghanistan. The result 
was substantial African territories, some of which in regions where Britain had strong sub-
imperial interests such as South-West Africa and East Africa, falling into German hands with 
the active co-operation of the British government.  
Yet, compared to other contemporary issues East Africa played a relatively minor role in the 
Anglo-German relationship. This ‘colonial affair’ did at sporadic intervals merit such attention 
as to be included in the new British ambassador to Berlin Sir Edward Malet’s private 
correspondence, but would inexorably take the form of an irritation.208 Bismarck expressed 
his annoyance with both the Sultan of Zanzibar and the British consul Sir John Kirk, both of 
whom he perceived to conspire against German pretensions.  
As it will be shown in this chapter, once the German presence was a reality, Britain’s policy 
would principally come to be formulated by a combination of private commercial interests 
and a cadre of diplomatic agents on the spot. In an almost prophetic vision, Frederic 
Holmwood, the Acting Consul General in Zanzibar, laid out what would become British policy 
over the following two decades in 1885; shortly after the German protectorate was 
declared.209 This despatch included both recommendations that Britain should secure the 
northern territories of the mainland and that it should commence construction of a railway to 
link the Victoria Nyanza with the coast. As Holmwood argued, the actions would not only 
ensure the rights of British subjects trading in the region and increase its commercial 
potential, but would also put a final end to the East African slave trade. These claims would 
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resurface regularly over the next eight years, most notably in Sir Gerald Portal’s report to 
Parliament in 1892 which will be detailed in the final two chapters.  
Peters’ incursion in East Africa signalled the start of two years of intensive Anglo-German 
diplomacy culminating in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886. The treaty’s proximate cause 
was not high politics, nor a carefully conceived British strategy, but the result of a private 
agreement between the two principal imperial agents: Carl Peters and William Mackinnon. 
This fact, as the current and further chapters will demonstrate, is crucial for understanding 
both how and why Britain eventually would hold Uganda and the remaining territories 
separating the interlacustrine kingdom with the coast.  
The historiography dealing with the 1886 treaty is largely lacking despite its overwhelming 
importance in determining the geographical pattern of the East African partition. This 
scholarly oversight has arguably in turn contributed to the well-established speculation that 
British policymakers were actuated by securing the Nile. By examining the negotiations 
between Peters and Mackinnon, it is evident that Britain were awarded the northern 
territories and by extension these territories’ hinterland containing the sources of the White 
Nile by chance, rather than through calculated grand strategy. Despite the award not covering 
the entirety of what later would become the British East Africa Protectorate, it covered 
enough to give Britain a realistic claim to the Nile watershed, six years before any mention of 
securing the river for strategic purposes was made. 
This chapter will first outline the pre-partition Anglo-German exploration of the mainland and 
then consider the British schemes for establishing a presence at Kilimanjaro during the 
autumn of 1884. Further it will examine the British reaction to the German protectorate and 
the circumstances which culminated in the first bilateral treaty of partition in 1886.    
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Prelude to Partition: Exploration of East Africa, 1848-84 
In the decades prior to the partition of East Africa, the region had been visited by a small 
number of predominantly British and German explorers. Although peripheral to the 
annexation proper, the explorers’ choice of routes either directly or indirectly influenced the 
geographical dispersal of British and German territorial claims. From the coast opposite 
Zanzibar there were three main caravan routes that led into the interior trading region which 
encompassed the Victoria Nyanza and Buganda: the northern route from the port of 
Mombasa; and the two southern routes from Pangani and Bagamoyo. Whilst German 
exploration focused on the southern section of the mainland, British efforts concerned the 
north and used Mombasa as a point of departure. This de facto north-south division of the 
mainland formed the basis of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886.210  
The first Europeans to trek beyond the immediate coastline were the German missionary-
explorers Johannes Rebmann and Johann Ludwig Krapf.211 They discovered Mount Kenya in 
1848212 and Mount Kilimanjaro the following year.213 Later in 1861-2, their compatriot Karl 
Klaus von der Decken attempted to scale the mountain, but was unsuccessful on both 
occasions.214 Concurrently the two Britons; John Hanning Speke and James Augustus Grant, 
who had set out from Zanzibar in 1860, explored the territories north and west of the Victoria 
Nyanza, visited Buganda and discovered in 1862 the source of the White Nile.215 A decade 
                                                          
210 Anderson, Memorandum, 13 September 1892, Confidential, FO 84/2258, TNA. 
211 Christine Nicholls, Red Strangers: The White Tribe of Kenya (London: Timewell Press, 2005), p. 3. 
212 Halford Mackinder, "A Journey to the Summit of Mount Kenya, British East Africa." The Geographical 
Journal 15, no. 5 (1900): 453–476. DOI: 10.2307/1774261 
213 Johannes Rebmann, "Bericht einer Reise zum Kilimandscharo," in Reisen in Ost-Afrika ausgeführt in den 
Jahren 1837-55, ed. Johann Ludwig Krapf (Stuttgart: Kornthal, 1858), pp. 456-505. 
214 Incidentally Karl Claus von der Decken was a friend of Dr Carl Peters’ father, and, it was according to Peters’ 
own account, his tales of exploration that had stimulated his interest for African colonisation. See: Perras, Carl 
Peters and German Imperialism, p. 14.  
215 Royal Geographical Society, Twelfth Meeting, Monday Evening, 11 May 1863, in Proceedings of the Royal 
Geographical Society of London 7 (3): 108–110. (London, 1863). 
77 
 
later, between November 1871 and August 1872, David Livingstone explored the regions 
south of the Victoria Nyanza between Ujiji and Unyanyembe.216 It was on an expedition just 
prior to this, on 15 July 1871, that Livingstone witnessed the massacre at Nyangwe where he 
reported that Arab slave traders had killed approximately 4-500 villagers.217 Reports of this 
event were among the factors that triggered the despatch of Sir Bartle Frere’s mission to 
Zanzibar and the Anti-Slave Trade treaty of 1873 with Sultan Barghash.218  
As the previous chapter made clear, Britain’s engagement with the region was gradually 
transformed during the 1870s; from an indirect, maritime influence to a more direct, land-
based. This included Henry Morton Stanley’s visit to the kingdom of Buganda in 1875 which 
laid the foundations of the civil strife that would embroil the kingdom in the 1880s.219 Since it 
was upon his prompting that missionaries from both the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and 
the French White Fathers arrived in 1877220 and 1879221 respectively. But these private British 
incursions also comprised William Mackinnon’s abortive 1877-8 attempt at gaining a 
concession from the Sultan of Zanzibar to establish a proto-colony on the mainland.222 
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Anglo-German Exploration and the North-South Division, 1882-4  
However, the exploration that directly preceded the partition took place between 1882 and 
1884. The German explorer Dr Gustav Fischer had between December 1882 and November 
1883 explored the East African highlands inhabited by the Masai. Fischer had chosen to pursue 
the central caravan route into the interior, so had set out from the coastal settlement of 
Pangani lying south of Mombasa in order to follow both the Pangani river and associated 
caravan routes into the Masai country. Upon returning to Germany, he had presented his 
findings to his patron the Hamburg Geographical Society. In the concluding remarks of this 
meeting held on 6 December 1883 Fischer estimated that:  
…the territories situated south of Kilimanjaro and between this and Mount 
Meru, viz. Chaga Land and the two Arushas, are well adapted for European 
settlement. In this climate, which is not too hot, these districts are watered by 
a network of small streams always containing water, and […] that an important 
trade could be developed with the Masai.223  
Apart from the presentation made to the Hamburg Geographical Society, Fischer’s findings 
were publicly exhibited in Hamburg the following January and a report of the meeting was 
published by the Royal Geographical Society in February 1884.224  
Fischer’s British counterpart Joseph Thomson had in 1883 been sent on an expedition by the 
Royal Geographical Society to explore the territories separating the Victoria Nyanza from the 
coast, in particular ‘to ascertain if a practicable direct route existed through the Masai Country 
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to the Lake.’225 Thomson set out on this expedition in February 1883 from Mombasa and 
followed the northern caravan routes through the territories dubbed Masailand.226  
In similarity with Fischer, Thomson found the region to be ‘a veritable Arcadia in respect of its 
charming scenes.’227 In Livingstone’s tradition and contrary to his more brash counterparts, 
the young Scot had adopted a restrained approach to the business of exploration and taken 
the motto: ‘He who goes gently goes safe; he who goes safe goes far.’228 Perhaps testament to 
this, Thomson had avoided Fischer’s mistake of skirmishing with the Masai which caused him 
to cut his mission short.229 Thomson had trekked beyond Kilimanjaro via ‘Ngare-na-Erobi,’ and 
arrived at the eastern shores of Lake Victoria on 10 December 1883, some 40 miles from the 
outlet of the White Nile, from which he returned to the coast via a northerly route bypassing 
Mount Elgon.230 In the district of Masawa he encountered a village ‘devastated by a coast 
caravan,’ testament to the on-going slave-raiding activities in the East African interior.231    
Upon his return to England in November 1884 Thomson’s discoveries in East Africa were 
jubilantly covered in the press. In an editorial The Times pronounced:  
Civilization would have been a physical impossibility for a population cursed 
with a native country of the sort Africa appeared to the imagination of Europe 
half a century since. It seems tho the most natural thing in the world for the 
smiling plains, the umbrageous forests, the valleys laughing with rills, and the 
snowcapt mountains Mr. Thomson has been traversing. He is an excellent 
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example of the class of pioneers wanted to set the work going.232    
 
‘Now or Never’233: A Foiled Plan, July-December 1884 
Nevertheless, the work which would lead East Africa into ‘the fold of civilization’ had already 
been initiated earlier that summer by a more unassuming candidate than a representative of 
the RGS; namely, Kew’s man on the spot Henry Hamilton ‘Harry’ Johnston. In May 1884 
Johnston had set out for Kilimanjaro to collect botanical specimens for the Royal Botanic 
Gardens at Kew.234 Later that year the 'rather too cocky'235 Johnston returned to England with 
treaty-forms signed by six chiefs of Taveta, the settlements lying just north of the peak.236 Just 
as Thomson, Johnston had also encountered the local chief Mandara and noted that he was 
‘very anxious for British protection, and has asked for a Union Jack.’237 
Before his departure from Kilimanjaro, Johnston had authored a letter to Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice, the Liberal Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In this letter of 10 July 1884, 
Johnston echoed Thomson and Fischer’s descriptions of the region as ‘eminently suited for 
European colonization’ and warned that it ‘within a few years’ it probably would fall to English, 
French or German control.238 
Receipt of Johnston’s communication sparked a debate among the policymakers of the ruling 
Liberal party and the Africa experts in the Foreign Office over the autumn of 1884. The offer 
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had evidently renewed attention for the land-based anti-slavery scheme Clement Hill had 
proposed in 1882.239 Granville wrote to Kirk for advice as to how to proceed and noted that:  
Mr. Johnston’s representations appear to Her Majesty’s Government to be 
worthy of consideration. His knowledge of the country, when he wrote, was 
recent, and his acquaintance with the natives necessarily imperfect; but his 
impression of the general qualifications of the country for European colonization 
could not be altogether erroneous, and if more mature experience should have 
confirmed his views it would be undesirable that an opportunity should be 
neglected of securing a hold over a territory adapted for British enterprise and 
favourably situated for striking a blow at the Slave Trade.240   
In his brief confidential despatch, Granville revealed the two most important considerations 
relevant to the liberal government’s policy toward East Africa: its commercial potential by way 
of European settler-colonisation; and, its suitability as a base from which to suppress the slave 
trade. The views were certainly in line with Hill’s 1882 proposal of changing the focus of British 
anti-slave trade policy from a maritime strategy to one of using 'agencies working onshore.’241 
Time was recognised as a crucial factor as Granville noted:  
I am specially to point out to you that at the present moment the attention of 
European Powers is directed to an unprecedented extent to the question of the 
formation of Settlements on the African coast, that action has been in recent 
cases prompt and secret, and that it is essential that a district situated like that 
of Kilimanjaro, if Mr. Johnston’s descriptions of it are correct, should not be 
placed under the protection of another flag to the possible detriment of British 
interests.242 
The Foreign Secretary had thus on commercial and humanitarian grounds committed Britain 
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to be a participant in the partition of East Africa in October 1884. 
Next, on Granville’s request Hill produced an extensive memorandum concerning the 
Kilimanjaro region and placed it in the wider question of African partition. His memorandum 
offers an insight into what leading Foreign Office mandarins considered Britain’s principal 
territorial interests in Africa at the dawn of the ‘scramble.’243 Over the coming two decades 
the geographical dispersion of British imperial possessions in Africa would largely reflect the 
early analysis made by Hill in the months leading up to the West African ‘Congo Conference’ 
in Berlin 1884-5. Hill argued that:  
The geographical position of the East Coast lays it more within the general area 
of our foreign policy than that of the West Coast. Our alternative route by the 
Cape to India may at any time make it important that we should have possession 
of, or at least free access to, good harbours.244  
Hill’s views were influenced by current developments in the surrounding regions, in particular 
the threat posed by the popular Islamic movement of the ‘Mahdi’ in the Sudan and the recent 
French annexation of Madagascar. The substantial Indian community that resided in Zanzibar 
was also cited in favour of Britain exercising a ‘preponderating influence’ in East Africa. Apart 
from the strategic considerations which evidently derived from concerns over the Cape sea-
route to India and not the Nile as is claimed by Robinson et al.,245 Hill considered the economic 
potential of the region to be substantial. Revealing his adherence to the contemporary belief 
in the economic benefits of suppressing the slave-trade, Hill stated: ‘Commercially, it has 
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made great strides in the ten years which have elapsed since the slave export was checked 
and an impulse given to legitimate trade.’ The range of economic factors cited included 
mineral wealth believed to be situated between the coast and the Victoria Nyanza, agricultural 
production capacity for both cattle and grains, a healthy climate with an abundance of 
sanatoriums for European agents, and that the local population would be more ‘industrious 
than most of the West Coast tribes.’246  
Hill ended his influential memorandum with a précis of what became official Britain’s Africa 
strategy at the dawn of the partition, a policy which was focussed on the Indian Ocean littoral:   
Is it not worth considering whether, in view of the European race for territories 
on the West Coast, and the consequent jealousies and dangerous rivalries, we 
might not confine ourselves to securing the utmost possible freedom of trade on 
that coast, yielding to other Powers the territorial responsibilities, so far as 
compatible with the maintenance of our existing possessions, and seeking 
compensation on the East Coast, where, to the north of the Portuguese 
dominions, we are at present, but who can say for how long, without a European 
rival; where the political future of the country is of real importance to Indian and 
Imperial interests; where the climate is superior; where commerce is capable of 
vast extension, and where our influence could be exercised, unchecked by the 
rivalry of Europe, in the extension of civilization, and the consequent extinction 
of the Slave Trade, for which we have so long laboured?247  
Hill’s mention of ‘Indian and Imperial interests’ were references to the sea-route to India via 
the Cape of Good Hope, and the imperial policy concern of anti-slavery, particularly since this 
region was the last remaining redoubt of any significant slave trafficking. The reflections were 
corroborated by Holmwood who also warned of the great public interest in East Africa that 
                                                          




had been raised in Germany after the return of Fischer.248 Holmwood had already at the time 
of Stanley’s expedition to Buganda in 1878 alerted the RGS of the region as a field for 
exploration. Financial limitations had however delayed any action until Thomson’s expedition 
in 1883.249  
As a consequence, Granville instructed Kirk in December 1884 confidentially to ask Britain’s 
client, the Sultan of Zanzibar, to extend his mainland dominions to include the territories 
encompassing Kilimanjaro. In reference to Chief Mandara’s earlier proposition of accepting 
British protection, Granville thought that: ‘it may not be unreasonable to suppose that there 
are others who, […] would equally welcome a Government which could put down the system 
of petty wars and attendant Slave Trade which now disturbs their country.’ However, any such 
extension of territory for the Sultanate was subject to a British caveat: ‘It would further be 
understood that the Sultan would proclaim the abolition of slavery throughout the whole 
district which would thus come under his control.’250  
Hill was then tasked with evaluating the feasibility of such an ‘Embassy’ to extend Britain’s 
client state, the Sultanate of Zanzibar, suzerainty over the tribes populating the immediate 
interior. Despite presuming the costs involved would be slight, Hill believed it would be most 
expedient to justify the expense to Parliament on anti-slavery grounds. But he added that: 
‘the commercial advantages would […] fully repay it. The capabilities of East Africa, when once 
the devastating slave-raids are put down, are immense.’251  
To Hill, the anti-slavery considerations were paramount, but neither Indian commercial 
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interests nor the strategic value of holding bases on the Cape-route to India was lost sight of. 
Regarding the additional burden indirect control of East Africa would place upon the British 
Empire, Hill ventured to believe that they would not be greater in the future than they 
currently were, and he was fully cognizant of Britain’s position as Zanzibar’s heir to the 
territories should the Sultanate collapse: 
There is a very large commercial connection already between it and India; the 
local trade is almost entirely in the hands of Indian subjects; we cannot refuse to 
protect them, and we are pledged irrevocably to the extinction of the Slave 
Trade. How, then, will our responsibility be materially increased by the addition 
of the healthiest, and, perhaps, the most valuable portion of East Africa to the 
dominions of Zanzibar? If that Power should fall to pieces, who must be its 
successor? Could we admit another occupation like that of Madagascar on our 
alternative route to India? Is it not better to forestall others by encouraging this 
very moderate, but most precious, extension of territory on the part of the Power 
whose natural, though it may be reluctant, heirs we may hereafter become?252  
What, however, is evident from the Foreign Office memoranda is that Britain had three main 
interests in the region which required a territorial presence via its client state Zanzibar: the 
sub-imperial economic concern for Indian commerce; the imperial humanitarian concern for 
anti-slavery, and; the imperial strategic concern for holding coastal ports on the Cape-route 
to India. Two of these derived from Britain’s position on the subcontinent, but certainly not 
via the proxies of the Nile, Nile Valley nor Egypt. Additionally it was hypothesised that 
suppression of the slave trade would unleash the commercial potential of the region and thus 
recompense any costs associated with annexation. Despite Kirk’s warning in November that: 
‘there are mysterious Germans travelling inland, and a German man-of-war is expected on the 




coast.’253 Hill prematurely declared: ‘at least there is no European Power yet at Kilimanjaro.’254 
The Foreign Office estimated a worst possible scenario would be being forestalled by France 
or Germany. On this basis Hill urged in December 1884 that prompt action should be taken; it 
was indeed ‘now or never.’255 
 
The German Protectorate, 1884-5       
The Foreign Office’s worst case scenario had however in the autumn of 1884 already been 
realised. Kirk’s cryptic report of ‘mysterious Germans travelling inland’ was in fact Dr Carl 
Peters and his associates of the German Colonial Association. Their decision to follow in 
Fischer’s footsteps, by using the southern caravan route into the Usagara, largely determined 
the geographical scope of the partition.256 
In January 1885 the British press had speculated about an impending German incursion; it 
was rumoured that a war ship carrying German diplomatic agents was despatched to Zanzibar. 
The rumours had prompted Granville to contact Bismarck about his intentions. But Bismarck 
had as late as 28 November 1884 given his assurance to Malet that: ‘Germany was not 
endeavouring to obtain a Protectorate over Zanzibar.’257 Despite these assurances, the British 
Ambassador Sir Edward Malet had noticed a deterioration in Bismarck’s attitude to Britain and 
speculated whether it was a calculated ploy: ‘Is this not due to the intention to maintain a 
grief against us to be used as an excuse at the opportune moment…?’258  
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The German Ambassador Count Münster’s reply to Granville was more ambiguous than 
Bismarck’s earlier response. Although he recognised ‘the services of the British Government 
in the suppression of the Slave Trade on the coast in the interest of humanity and civilization 
[as] notorious’ he was ‘unacquainted with the amount of direct influence which the United 
Kingdom and the Indian Government […] exercised over Zanzibar during the present 
century.’259 The mysterious naval vessel turned out to be the German frigate ‘Gneisenau’, 
which had spent nine weeks in Zanzibar harbour attempting to intimidate the Sultan through 
gun-boat diplomacy.260  
By the end of January 1885 Malet was again speculating over Bismarck’s intentions. Anglo-
French relations were now at low ebb over Egypt and Britain needed Bismarck to halt 
Germany’s support of France. The Chancellor was however reluctant, but Malet calculated 
that:  
Prince Bismarck would find a way to detach himself, if the bait were big enough. 
– He however, declines to say what that bait is, but I cannot help thinking that 
he wants us to offer something.261  
Bismarck had initially been unaware of Peters’ incursion into East Africa.262 But the news of 
Peters’ treaty-making had evidently reached him by the end of 1884 and he had decided to 
ratify them.263 Before he would finally show his hand to Gladstone’s government, Bismarck 
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spent the last weeks of December 1884 and the first two months of 1885 preparing the 
diplomatic ground for immediate British recognition. By maintaining a hostile attitude when 
Britain required his assistance, whilst simultaneously hinting that this hostility could be 
remedied by British concessions, Bismarck calculated that German claims in East Africa would 
receive few objections from London. 
On 3 March 1885, Kirk informed Granville of the German declaration of a protectorate over 
the territories west of the Sultan of Zanzibar’s mainland dominions.264  The following day the 
imperial 'schutz-brief' was published in The Times, with the announcement timed so as to 
coincide with the completion of the Berlin Conference.265 Details of the clandestine 
proceedings had emerged from the Frankfurter Zeitung. Peters and his German companions 
Count Joachim von Pfeil, Dr Karl Jühlke and the Austrian-national August Otto had purchased 
third-class tickets under assumed names and sailed from Trieste to Aden. At this British 
outpost they had boarded Mackinnon’s British-India Steam Navigation Company’s ship 
‘Bagdad’ for the last leg of their voyage to Zanzibar.  
They reached the Sultanate in October 1884 and some weeks later had set out for an 
expedition to Usagara, in the southern section of the Zanzibari mainland dominions, instead 
of travelling onwards toward the Transvaal which had been falsely rumoured. Perhaps as a 
reflection of the educated opinion which prevailed in Germany at the time of the 
proclamation; neither the Frankfurter Zeitung nor the National Zeitung expressed much 
support of, or belief in, the colonial venture. Having reported that both Peters and Jühlke had 
fallen ill whilst Otto had died, they proclaimed that the fate of the expedition was yet ‘another 
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proof that Europeans cannot survive the climate of this part of Africa’ and that the ‘late 
catastrophe will certainly not be the last.’266 Both papers argued that any schemes of German 
colonization should instead be focussed on West Africa and in particular the Upper Congo. 
Nevertheless, the annexed territory lay entirely to the south of the River Wami on the East 
African mainland, some eighty miles inland from the coast.267 As Kirk had previously informed 
the Foreign Office, the location of the German protectorate indicated ‘Dar [es] Salaam [as] 
requisite port.’268 Whilst Kirk’s analysis was correct, the German territories would remain 
landlocked until the Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty of 1890. Peters’ expedition had followed 
one of the main southern caravan routes that connected Zanzibar with Ujiji on the eastern 
shores of Lake Tanganyika. Once they had reached the table lands of Usagara, Peters acquired 
twelve ‘treaties’ with the indigenous population which were ratified by Kaiser Wilhelm I the 
following spring.269 Thus, the actions of a private group of Germans had forestalled Granville’s 
plans of extending British influence to the East African mainland via the proxy of Zanzibar. 
Their decision to pursue the southern caravan route, as the next section will show, formed the 
basis of the territorial north-south division laid down in the Anglo-German Agreement of 
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Britain’s Response: The Salubrious Highlands   
When news of the ratification reached the Foreign Office it unleashed a frantic response from 
Britain’s man on the spot in Zanzibar. Frederic Holmwood270 thought the German intrusion 
constituted a ‘grave danger’ to British interests and called for ‘serious attention’ to be given 
his proposals for ‘utilizing the healthy and fertile regions lying to the north of the German 
territory.’271 Apart from the fertile districts of Usagara which had passed into German hands, 
the most valuable lands in East Africa were perceived to be situated in the northern interior.272 
These were the salubrious highlands in the territories separating Mount Kenya, Mount 
Kilimanjaro and the Victoria Nyanza, and more importantly the regions littoral to the 
equatorial lake. Moreover, asserting British administration of these territories would, it was 
argued, also put a final end to the East African slave trade.273  
As the previous chapter made clear, the humanitarian-derived rationale was not empty 
rhetoric and Holmwood’s suggestions echoed those made by Hill in 1882.274 There had been 
an upsurge in the traffic during the winter months of 1884-5, with attention heightened over 
the question due to the sitting West African Conference in Berlin. Even Salisbury, whilst in 
opposition, had hinted that British anti-slave trade policy in East Africa might shift its focus to 
the interior. In November 1884, he had suggested to a deputation of the Anti-Slavery Society 
that their proposals for the legal assimilation of slave trading with piracy '...ought to apply to 
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great rivers and lakes' as 'before long the great African lakes might be opened to 
commerce.'275 In January 1885, an article detailed the capture of 180 slaves by the British 
cruiser HMS Osprey, and emphasised that 'the trade, so far from having ceased, as appears to 
be the idea in England, was still in full swing' and urged the annexation of East Africa.276 
Holmwood explained that the background for this great increase in trafficking was a result of 
the on-going famine in the region, and not a consequence of any fault of local authorities in 
executing Britain’s anti-slave trade policy.277 But despite the famine ending in 1884, reports of 
a ‘marked revival of the Slave Trade’ were received by London in August 1885.278   
Holmwood underlined his objection to any outright British annexation, which would be met 
by opposition from Gladstone’s government, but urged for ‘immediate action’ to be taken and 
sketched the outlines of a territorial presence borne out of a chartered company acting under 
the nominal auspices of the Sultan of Zanzibar.279 As will be detailed in the final chapter, 
Holmwood’s main proposal was the construction of a railway from the coast to the Victoria 
Nyanza. Such a railway, Holmwood argued, would:  
…offer a safe and advantageous deviation for the present trade routes, by 
opening up the mountain districts of East Africa and the sources of the Nile, a 
region far richer, more fertile, and incomparably healthier than any part of 
Tropical Africa, and the only one that is really adapted for the settlement of large 
colonies of Europeans; and, finally, if accompanied with the political measure, by 
completing the work which has so long been carried on, at such an immense 
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cost, by England in connection with her anti-slavery policy.280  
Holmwood thus proposed that Britain should secure the temperate territories north of the 
German nucleus protectorate and connect it to the coast with a railway. This course of action 
would address the composite policy-considerations Britain faced in East Africa; from 
protecting the interests of its British Indian subjects to suppressing the slave trade.  
  
A Liberal Welcome, 1885 
Whilst Gladstone’s cabinet outwardly praised Germany’s ‘civilising aspirations’ as long as 
Zanzibar was left ‘in peace,’281 the Foreign Office instructed Kirk to ‘ascertain, privately and 
unofficially’ whether the Sultan would consider re-awarding Mackinnon’s 1877 concession to 
the north of the new German protectorate.282 Concurrently Holmwood attempted to entice 
the cotton magnate and President of Manchester’s Chamber of Commerce, James Hutton283 
to realise the railway scheme; and, by implication, founding a British proto-colony.284  
Hutton was a close friend and business associate of William Mackinnon, who was now 
approached to re-acquire the concession he was sabotaged by Salisbury from gaining in 
1878.285 Mackinnon had considerable wealth due to his ownership of the world’s largest 
shipping company, the British-India Steam Navigation Company, and he had long maintained 
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an interest in East Africa. During the negotiations for the Anglo-Zanzibar Anti-Slave Trade 
Treaty in 1872, Mackinnon had established a mail-packet service between Aden and 
Zanzibar.286 The line was later subsidised by the Treasury on abolitionist grounds. Mackinnon’s 
friend Colonel Charles Euan Smith, who became Kirk’s successor as Consul General in 1888, 
had accompanied Sir Bartle Frere on his Mission to Zanzibar and enticed Mackinnon to 
contemplate the potential for establishing a business venture on the island.287 Mackinnon’s 
motives had however remained more nuanced than simply the pursuit of profit. Throughout 
the period he was involved in East Africa there was a considerable philanthropic aspect to his 
operations; he perceived legitimate trade as the most efficient way in which to suppress the 
slave trade and a British-led company the most capable vehicle from which to ‘spread 
civilisation’.288  
The British inquiry about a renewed concession went disregarded by the Sultan as he sent his 
general, the former Royal Navy lieutenant Lloyd Mathews to hoist the Zanzibari flag in Chagga, 
the next territory anticipated to be annexed by the German agents.289 At the end of May, 
Gladstone’s government again reassured Germany that:  
'Britain had no intention of opposing the German schemes of colonization in the 
neighbourhood of Zanzibar […] Her Majesty’s Government, on the contrary, view 
with favour these schemes, the realization of which will entail the civilization of 
large tracts over which hitherto no European influence have been exercised, the 
co-operation of Germany […] in the work of suppression of slave gangs, and the 
encouragement of the efforts of the Sultan both in the extinction of the Slave 
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Trade and in the commercial development of his dominions.'290  
However, Germany was also alerted to the fact that the British businessmen Mackinnon and 
Hutton had: 'originated a plan for a British settlement in the country between the coast and 
the lakes, which are the sources of the White Nile, and for its connection with the coast by a 
railway.'291  In an effort to avoid Anglo-German tensions over Zanzibar, Rosebery then serving 
as Lord Privy Seal,292 suggested that the boundaries of the Sultan's dominions 'might be 
settled by a Joint Commission,' a proposal accepted by Bismarck’s administration.293 Hence, 
once the German protectorate had been formally declared, the Foreign Office began tentative 
soundings in both Zanzibar and among the British business-networks to ensure that some of 
the mainland remained subject to British influence.     
 
Sovereign Status of Zanzibar and the Mainland Dominions 
By June 1885, Germany had extended its domains in East Africa to encompass Witu, a small 
protectorate subject to the German merchant brothers Gustav and Clemens Denhardt far to 
the north of Peters’ inland Usagara protectorate.294 Not only did this afford Germany a coastal 
foothold, it drove a wedge through the Sultan’s mainland dominions. In light of these radical 
events Kirk deduced that: ‘Zanzibar must soon break up or pass bodily to Germany.’ He 
telegraphed Granville to question whether the ‘British Government, in case of opportunity 
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offering, would now consider acquisition or local Protectorate of a district with a naval port.’295 
Malet had also recognised that the recent events marked a watershed moment for British 
policy in East Africa: ‘If we go in with Germany, we must be prepared to go in for a complete 
reversal of our previous policy with regard to the Sultan on the mainland.’ He also added a 
damning remark about his colleague Sir John Kirk: ‘…but I doubt it being possible to work it 
through the agent who has previously upheld the opposite system.’296  
Despite Sultan Barghash’s diplomatic offensive, Germany had little reverence for Zanzibar’s 
sovereign claims to the mainland.297 In a letter to the German Emperor the Sultan had 
specified his territorial claims as extending from Warsheikh on the northern Somali coast to 
Tungi Bay to the south and as far into the interior as the great lakes of Tanganyika and 
Nyassa.298 The man Prince Bismarck referred to as ‘the best horse in the diplomatic stable,’ 
namely the German Ambassador to the Court of St James, Count Paul von Hatzfeldt, dismissed 
the Sultan’s letter as ‘an insult.’299  
The irony that Peters, the man so eagerly defended by Hatzfeldt, only had managed to get to 
Usagara due to the sovereign letters of recommendation the Sultan had issued to his officials 
was lost on the German diplomat. In his opinion, the Sultan’s representatives on the mainland 
were not ‘Governors or other political officers, but commercial agents, who assist the Sultan 
in his commercial undertakings, and in addition trade in slaves.’300 No recognition was thus 
bestowed on the Sultanate’s claims to the mainland on grounds of contemporary international 
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law – a situation which could, according to the Head of the Foreign Office’s Africa Section301 
Sir Percy Anderson, easily have been avoided if ‘the Sultan had had the foresight to become a 
party to the Act of Berlin.’302  
In European eyes Zanzibar had, in terms of statehood, eccentric qualities and did not fit the 
conventional mould due its configuration as a caravan-based trading empire. The Sultan’s 
authority outside the coastal regions hence assumed an ephemeral quality corresponding to 
the movements of his subjects’ commercial ventures.  However, as Wilkinson argues, Zanzibar 
had nonetheless a far stronger de facto claim to the East African territories than any of the 
European Powers.303 It is probable that German policymakers perceived Britain’s insistence on 
upholding the Sultan’s claims as merely a policy of exclusion; whereby Britain positioned 
Zanzibar both as a client and a buffer state.  
However from this early date in the partition process, both the British and German 
governments appeared to subscribe to a doctrine of mutual solidarity and co-operation, in 
particular with regard to suppression of the slave trade and in preventing the spread of ‘Arab 
fanaticism akin to the Mahdi movement.’304 This co-ordination of Anglo-German efforts and 
policy, what Malet referred to as ‘England and Germany […] acting together on a complete 
understanding’305 is detailed further in the following chapter and supports Ronald Hyam’s 
theory that European governments were less in direct competition over territories, than 
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engaging in a ‘search for stability’.306 Both the doctrine and what were defined as 
contemporary British interests are however encapsulated in Anderson’s memorandum of June 
1885:   
The British interests are humanitarian and commercial. The first concern the 
Slave Trade, as regards which there can be no doubt that the substitution of 
German rule for Arab misrule would be a gain.307 
During Bismarck’s meeting with Rosebery in May 1885, the former expressed a nominal 
willingness to negotiate with Britain over the partition of East Africa; although current 
annexations and their unspecified western boundaries were off the table, which left little to 
determine.308  
A casualty of the major alteration of British policy toward East Africa was Kirk’s career. As the 
former chief assistant to David Livingstone and British agent at Zanzibar in various capacities 
since 1866, Kirk embodied Britain’s hegemonic ancien régime in the region.309 As such it was 
not surprising that, over the summer months of 1885, he assumed the role as the Sultan 
Barghash’s principal advocate in the Foreign Office. Kirk had lobbied vociferously to preserve 
the Sultan’s authority on the mainland and by implication the system of British indirect rule. 
Both the Sultan’s actions against the slave trade which it was argued a German annexation 
would undermine, and the altered sovereign status of Britain’s Indian subjects were brought 
forward as arguments for the maintenance of the status quo. 310 Although even Kirk conceded 
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that ‘the Sultan’s claims to the interior [were] undoubtedly weak’, he doubted in the prospects 
of finding a better alternative:  
…will any other nation do more? A European Colony is out of the question, 
except, perhaps, in the mountain districts inland from Mombasa, and as a 
possession the interior is of questionable value without the coast.311    
Berlin’s views on Kirk were made quite clear to Malet after his meeting with Prince Bismarck’s 
son Herbert.312 The chief formulators of Germany’s foreign policy had evidently perceived Kirk 
as a major stumbling-block in Anglo-German relations over Zanzibar and East Africa.313 The 
man that had done most in forging Zanzibar into the role of an Anglo-Indian satellite state 
‘retired’ the following year from his position as Consul-General. Apart from having voiced his 
contempt for Kirk, Herbert Bismarck informed Malet that: ‘…Germany denies the right of the 
Sultan to any territory on the Continent beyond a strip of coast and is only willing to examine 
the title of the Sultan to that strip.’314  
 
Anglo-German Relations over Zanzibar and Anderson’s Secret Intervention 
The General Election of June 1885 swept Gladstone’s government from power in favour of 
Salisbury’s first short-lived government. Salisbury favoured closer Anglo-German ties, 
declaring that 'a leading principle of the Conservative Party would be to reach and maintain a 
good understanding with Germany.'315 Bismarck sought at the time to entice Britain to join 
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the Triple Alliance, but Salisbury regarded a formal alliance with Germany as detrimental to 
British interests.316 
Apart from avoiding a continental war, British foreign policy objectives in which Germany 
played a key role were to maintain the territorial integrity of British India and to defuse 
tensions with France over Egypt. In both cases, Britain would profit from a close relationship 
with the newly emerged continental power, but a formalisation of ties could prejudice Britain's 
long-term security.317 This helps to explain Britain's pragmatic and welcoming attitude to 
German encroachments in East Africa: a proportion of the Sultan's mainland dominions were 
certainly expendable in the effort to maintain amicable Anglo-German relations. Additionally, 
another European power could share in the cost of executing Britain's anti slave-trade policy 
in the territories:  
This result must for a time at least be subversive of British influence, but 
civilization and humanity can hardly fail to benefit by the efforts of Germany to 
suppress the Slave Trade, and our Indian commerce, with security free of 
competition, ought to hold its own.318  
The slave trade had certainly not abated during the summer of 1885.319 Kirk believed the 
revival was a consequence of the Sultan withdrawing his troops from the mainland, so as not 
to afford Germany a casus belli. He added that he had ‘urged the Sultan to abolish the status 
of slavery in his dominions,’ but that the suggestion had not been heeded: ‘His Highness seems 
little disposed further to complicate his compromised position at the present time by adding 
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to his difficulties a social revolution.’320 The situation for the Sultan was certainly dire: the 
Germans had taken the rebel Chief Simba under their protection and had threatened Zanzibar 
with a ‘naval demonstration.’321 
As early as the second day of Salisbury’s new tenure in office, Malet reported of discussions 
with Herbert Bismarck regarding East Africa. The German administration had been favourable 
toward the British scheme and thought:  
…an understanding, rounding off the different territories, could always be come 
to between the two Governments in a friendly manner, as had recently been 
done on the West Coast.322  
Concurrently Salisbury had laid the foundation for the forthcoming boundary commission. 
France had sought to maintain the status quo with regard to safeguarding Zanzibar’s 
independence and had thus agreed to Germany’s condition for recognising the Anglo-French 
Agreement of 1862; that the precise territorial extent of the Sultanate would need to be 
determined through a survey.323   
However, by July 1885, it transpired that the Sultan, in fear of prejudicing his claims to 
sovereignty over the mainland, would not grant a new concession to the British businessmen. 
Hutton and a ‘half-hearted’ Mackinnon had also reconsidered their earlier enthusiasm, 
doubting 'in the likelihood of a railway paying for many years to come.'324 Despite these 
obstacles, Anderson had attempted to entice them with the economic prospects of eastern 
Africa, a personal intervention which might shed light upon Manchester’s reversal, what 
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Munro has described as ‘a puzzle’.325  
Anderson also entertained the views earlier expressed by Johnston and Holmwood that the 
interior region had great commercial potential. In a private meeting with Hutton at the Foreign 
Office, Anderson expressed that:  
…his personal opinion was that, if the tribes on the Nile lakes could be reached 
there was a greater opening for trade than among the Congo tribes, as the habits 
of the former would make them more likely than the latter to take European 
goods, and that the climate of the Kilimanjaro was apparently admirably suited 
for a European Settlement...326  
Hutton authored two weeks later a new letter to Salisbury on behalf of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce where he indicated its continued interest in East Africa. He desired 
another meeting to discuss how British interests could be safe-guarded against the ‘actions of 
any foreign Power’ and indirectly asked for financial support for the construction of a railway. 
Hutton pointed to the conclusions drawn by Holmwood, that such a railway would ‘develop 
the natural resources of the country in a way beneficial both to the natives and to the general 
trade of this Empire.’327  
Regardless of the diplomatic discussions in Europe, the German East African Company had 
over the summer and autumn of 1885 expanded its territorial remit unabated.328 Indeed, 
according to Anderson’s recollections seven year later: ‘German agents were annexing all that 
was valuable.’329 To local observers the process and legality of the treaty-making was ‘simply 
absurd.’ According to a local missionary of six years, Joseph Thomas Last, the native chiefs and 
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people would never sell any of their land to anyone on the simple basis that it was ‘…not theirs 
to sell, only to hold and use.’ To that effect Last quoted the local saying: ‘All the land is God's; 
we are not able to sell it.’330 Lasts’ statements were corroborated by his missionary colleague 
Dr Edward John Baxter who did ‘not suppose that they have purchased any land, as it is the 
custom here for people to cultivate anywhere they please, providing the Chief does not 
object.’331 
In October 1885, Anderson had again secretly intervened in the partition proceedings and met 
Johnston to discuss his treaties with the Chiefs of Taveta. Both expressed a keen interest in 
preventing the Kilimanjaro region from falling under German influence. The timing of the 
meeting was critical. Anderson advised Johnston ‘strictly in his private capacity’ that he should 
transfer his concessions to a suitable candidate and then notify the Delimitation Commission 
through Kitchener. Johnston had on Anderson’s advice chosen Hutton as beneficiary of his 
concession. As Herbert Kitchener, Britain’s representative on the Boundary Commission, 
would leave for Zanzibar only a week later on 6 November, it was important that Hutton 
communicated his intention to acquire the treaties immediately.  
Anderson had assured Johnston that his claims had already been ‘recognised by the Foreign 
Office as perfectly legal’ and that they would ‘receive due support from Her Majesty's 
Commissioner on the Zanzibar Delimitation Commission.’ Johnston reiterated that Anderson’s 
involvement be kept private and added a post script that Hutton should ‘write the letter in the 
capacity of President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce’ since he believed that this 
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would afford the claims greater authority in the eyes of their German counterparts.332  
Concurrently, Johnston authored an official letter to Anderson in which he outlined his 
communication to Hutton and attached the treaty he had entered into with the chiefs of 
Taveta.333 Anderson thought it ‘very useful as regards the Kilimanjaro question’ and that:  
Here is a Concession, quite as good as the ordinary African Commercial 
Concession, though not conferring sovereign rights, which Mr. Johnston can 
make over to any Company formed to take it up. It is the very thing we want – a 
Concession to a British subject anterior to the German Protectorate, and 
subsequent rush to Kilimanjaro.334 
On 3 November, the British commercial interests, represented by Hutton had decided to make 
use of Johnston's Kilimanjaro concession. He notified Johnston that he would take steps to 
form a syndicate, and invited Mackinnon to join him in immediately securing 'British rights' in 
the region.335 Both Anderson and his future son-in-law Johnston336 were however 
contemptuous of their mercantile counterparts Hutton and Mackinnon. Johnston thought:  
British merchants [to be] the most unreasonable of men nowadays [and that 
they] expect the Government to do everything for them, and see no occasion for 
private enterprise of their own. What they would like is for large territories like 
Kilimanjaro to be annexed, opened up, civilized, cleared, swept, and garnished, 
and then handed over to them to ply a profitable and ready-made trade.337  
Anderson added an ironic comment of his own: ‘The truth is, that we not only do not neglect 
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the Manchester interests, but have to stir Manchester up to look after its interests.’338  
Evidently the metropolitan commercial interest for East Africa over the summer and autumn 
of 1885 was one orchestrated by Johnston and Anderson. In particular, Anderson used 
Mackinnon and Hutton as pawns in order to gain a viable British claim to the Kilimanjaro 
region. His confidential scheme managed to position British commercial interests so as to gain 
the most from the delimitation commission’s proceedings and from Britain’s negotiations with 
Germany. Without this government official’s intervention and ‘chessboard mentality,’339 
British claims to this region of Africa would doubtless have stood in a much weaker position 
as German agents would have had free reign to seize a greater share of the mainland.  
 
The Zanzibar Boundary Commission: Delimitation of the Mainland 
On 10 December 1885, the three representatives from Britain, France and Germany 
commenced their work on the Zanzibar Boundary Commission.340 Over the course of 1886, 
the commission surveyed the Sultan's mainland dominions with the nominal objective of 
determining the extent of the Sultan's sovereignty defined by 'effective occupation' as laid 
down in the Berlin Act. The almost farcical proceedings of the commission’s work strained 
Anglo-German relations almost to breaking point.    
Kitchener reported that the French commissioner Patrimonio had eloped on a ‘secret mission’ 
only two weeks before the survey was due to commence‘…and that no one knew where he 
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had gone to or how long he was likely to be absent.’341 When he failed to re-appear, the local 
French consul Raffray was appointed as his substitute. Three months into the commission’s 
work, Bismarck’s government had become concerned with Raffray’s influence on Kitchener. 
Herbert Bismarck, who had sustained a bullet wound whilst serving in the Franco-Prussian 
war, thought Raffray was of the ‘Revanche school’ and intentionally sabotaged the 
commission’s work. In his conversation with Malet, the Chancellor’s son and recently 
appointed German Foreign Secretary, scorned Kitchener for being ‘under the thumb of M. 
Raffray’ and thought the cause of this behaviour was due to Kitchener having ‘… fought in the 
German war on the French side…’342 Malet, who was unaware of Kitchener’s youthful war-
time adventure in a French ambulance company, denied this accusation outright.  
Despite finding the German commissioner Dr Schmidt’s complaints as relayed by Bismarck to 
be ‘gossipy’ he advised Rosebery whether:  
…it might be possible to let Kitchener know that it was very desirable that he 
should be on very friendly terms with his German colleague and support him 
when his doing so did not clash with his duty to H.M.G.343  
Raffray was replaced by Lemaire in April after German pressure, and work on the commission 
was suspended until the new commissioner’s arrival.344 However, the tone had not changed 
when Malet reported that he thought that ‘Prince Bismarck is just at present rather out of 
humour with us.’ The ambassador attributed the chancellor’s dismay to:  
…the delays which have occurred in the signature of the Pacific demarcation 
declaration, to dissatisfaction at the proceedings of the Zanzibar Commission 
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and the Samoa difficulty. These are all colonial matters and I believe he attributes 
all the difficulties to Lord Granville.345 
Further complaints were received in late-April, when Bismarck characterised the commission’s 
work as a ‘farce’. The Sultan had allegedly moved the same set of soldiers around on the 
mainland to create the impression of having permanently garrisoned troops stationed at every 
significant village in the interior. It was reported that: ‘Dr Schmidt had observed that they were 
often the same soldiers, used as a minué soldiers in the theatre over and over again to look 
more.’346  
Bismarck suspected that British officials were responsible for the Sultan’s actions against 
Germany, in particular that Kirk had: ‘…attempted to thwart German interests at every 
point...’347 From Berlin the difficulties in East Africa were regarded so serious that it threatened 
to remove German support for ‘English policy on the Eastern Question.’348 The antipathy 
proved short-lived as Herbert Bismarck came, some three days later, under the ‘sudden 
conviction’ that the German company’s resources were unequal to the task of keeping order 
in ‘the newly acquired territory, and as Germany cannot give them assistance the only aid they 
have to fall back upon is the Sultan.’349 Regardless of this realisation that defused some of the 
tension between the two European states, the Zanzibari Sultanate would still only be left with 
a token strip of land along the coast.350   
Throughout the deliberations and in his concluding report, Kitchener accused the German 
Commissioner Dr Schmidt of sabotaging any equitable determination of the Sultanate's 
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geographical extent.351 It later transpired that Bismarck had negotiated an agreement with 
France which would only enable unanimous decisions to be recorded in the Commission's 
final report; in effect awarding a veto to the dissenting German representative. Despite 
Kitchener's protests, the Sultanate did not receive recognition for more than the East African 
coast line with a 10 mile strip extending from the coast including the islands.352  
 
The Value of Mombasa 
Bismarck had been right to worry about Kirk’s influence. The British Consul, had in October 
1885, considered the potential of Britain gaining a protectorate over Ushambala, a region 
situated north of the river Pangani. Kirk had also analysed the trade implications of the 
German intrusion on the mainland:  
…seeing that the Germans have placed themselves astride the main road now in 
use, by taking Usagara and the countries adjacent […] I am satisfied that no port 
on the coast can compare with that of Mombasa, in case it is ever seriously 
intended to construct a railway to the interior.353  
Just like Kirk and Holmwood, Kitchener had come to appreciate the value of Mombasa. All 
argued for the town’s strategic importance, since it was anticipated that Dar-es-Salaam, which 
the German Company leased from the Sultan, posed a security threat to the British presence 
in East Africa and the Indian Ocean; most notably the Cape route to India.354 Although the 
Admiralty did not share these views, the Intelligence Department of the War Office did.  
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In August 1886, a memorandum listing reasons for why Britain should secure Mombasa was 
produced; the principal grounds were defence of Britain's economic interests and of the 
Zanzibar telegraph cable ensuring communications with the Cape. The War Office also 
revealed some of Britain's contingency planning:  
In the event of war with France, the Mediterranean, and, consequently, the Suez 
Canal, will, owing to the prohibitory rates of insurance which would be charged, 
cease to be available as a commercial route; and almost the whole of our 
commerce with India and the Pacific must pass round the Cape.355  
Notwithstanding the absence of any comments regarding the strategic importance of securing 
the Nile, the presumption that the Suez Canal would be rendered useless for commercial 
traffic during a potential war with France certainly serves to weaken the Eypto-centric 
explanatory model.  
 
The Anglo-German Agreement, 1886-7 
Finally, the stage was now set for a major agreement between Britain and Germany over each 
nation’s territorial claims in East Africa. In January 1886 the German government issued a 
protest against the ‘British merchants’ Hutton and Mackinnon who sought a concession from 
Sultan Barghash.356 Whilst the German government objected to the activities of British private 
interests, no such restraint applied to their own private company which engaged in treaty-
making on the mainland. However the protests were only pro-forma; made in order to avoid 
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implicitly affording recognition to the Sultan’s sovereign claims to the Kilimanjaro.357 The 
German position was further clarified by Hatzfeldt in March. He noted that:  
The English Company was therefore […] free to secure its private rights accruing 
from the Treaty concluded by Mr. Johnston with the Chief of the Taveta district 
on the 27th September, 1884, by sending out agents.’ […] ‘… Dr. Peters, the 
President of the German East African Company, had meanwhile put himself in 
communication with the leaders of the English Company, and believed that an 
arrangement satisfactory to both parties was on the point of being concluded.358  
Mackinnon had been met with a proposal from Peters’ business associates for the sale of the 
so-called Mackinnon Road, a 70 mile road extending westwards from Dar-es-Salaam he had 
constructed with the abolitionist Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton (grandson of the prominent social 
reformer and abolitionist of the same name), in the late 1870s.359 Mackinnon had agreed to 
this transaction: ‘after ascertaining at the Foreign Office that the retaining of our rights to this 
road would be of no service to British interests in the altered state of our relations with 
Zanzibar.’360  
In the autumn of 1886, Peters travelled to Argyllshire to personally meet with Mackinnon at 
his Balinakill estate. The results of this meeting formed the basis of the Anglo-German 
Boundary Agreement of 1886. According to Peters' minutes Mackinnon thought:  
…it a necessary condition that the British Crown should have sovereignty over 
one part or the other of East African territory, in order to induce British subjects 
to invest their money in East Africa...361  
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The discussions proceeded to evaluate 'the geographical position of the country which Mr. 
Mackinnon would like to acquire for England' in which Peters recorded Mackinnon's reply as 
'he expresses the wish to take the northern part of the Kilimanjaro.' Peters' response and 
Mackinnon's subsequent reply to this is crucial:  
Dr. Peters does not think the German Company would like to cede a part of the 
Kilimanjaro district to the English, but he asks whether Mr. Mackinnon would not 
be satisfied with the provinces between Kilimanjaro and Tana, perhaps including 
the Kenia, which Mr. Mackinnon does not deny.362  
Peters had thus in August 1886 freely offered the northern territories to Mackinnon, which 
through the later bilateral treaty between Britain and Germany would form the basis of the 
British and German zones. 
In October, Bismarck expressed his hope that the Zanzibar question would be brought to a 
'speedy and […] satisfactory conclusion.' His intention was to send Dr Friedrich Krauel363 to 
London in order to negotiate the terms.364 By 26 October, Anderson and Krauel had come to 
an agreement sanctioned by the Foreign Secretary the Earl of Iddesleigh regarding the 
delimitation of the Zanzibari Sultanate, in addition to the British and German spheres of 
influence on the East African mainland.  
The Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions were recognised as comprising the islands of Zanzibar, 
Pemba, Lamu and Mafia, and the coastal zone as recommended by the Boundary Commission. 
The other important aspect to the Agreement was the determination of the line of 
demarcation separating the countries' respective spheres of influence in which Germany was 
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awarded the southern section and Britain the territories to the north.365 The Tana River was 
given as the territory's north-eastern boundary, whilst the Rovuma River bounded it to the 
south. No western boundary was stipulated.366 In a clarification made in July 1887, Salisbury 
promised the German government:  
...to discourage British annexations in the rear of the German sphere of 
influence, on the understanding that the German Government will equally 
discourage German annexations in the rear of the British sphere.367  
No promise however, was made to discourage British annexations in the rear of the British 
sphere. Indeed in Salisbury’s words, ‘England… would confine herself to opening up the 
territories lying to the north of the agreed line.’368 These territories included both the kingdom 
of Buganda and the Nile Valley.369 
The despatch was sent after German apprehensions were raised regarding the activities of 
Stanley. He had been engaged by the Emin Pasha Relief Committee of which Mackinnon was 
the greatest benefactor, to rescue Emin Pasha from Egypt's Equatorial Province, a territory 
lying directly north-west of Buganda.370 The German government feared that Mackinnon was 
using Stanley to obtain treaties from the chiefs situated to the south of the demarcation line; 
however Salisbury gave his assurances that any such actions would not receive support from 
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the British government.  
The basis of the bilateral treaty and, importantly how the ‘hinterland understanding’ would 
determine the partition of Uganda, was enumerated by Anderson in 1892: 
German agents were annexing all that was valuable. Their activity was checked 
by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886, by which a boundary was drawn. The 
guiding principle of this demarcation was a partition of the caravan routes to 
Uganda; the route reaching the coast at Mombasa was placed on the English, 
that terminating at Pangani on the German, side. Both parties recognized 
Uganda as a trade centre. The line was not carried beyond the eastern shore of 
Victoria Nyanza, consequently did not deal with the main portion of Uganda, 
which was, however, indirectly severed from German influence by the 
subsequent “Hinterland” understanding.371 
Anderson’s recollections mirrored those transmitted by the Foreign Office to the Universities 
Mission to Central Africa in 1888, and due to its historiographical significance the quote is 
included in full: 
…no useful step was omitted at the time of the demarcation to secure the 
largest possible field for the exclusive scope of English influence. At that date, 
however, it was impossible to obtain the trade routes both from Mombasa and 
Pangani. The German East African Company had then already developed 
considerable activity, and claimed to have relations with the coast tribes behind 
the 10-mile limit of the Sultan’s possessions, even near Mombasa, whereas the 
British Company had at that time shown no signs of activity. The compromise 
by which the Mombasa trade route to the interior went into one sphere, and 
that of Pangani into the other, was the best that was practicable after every 
existing interest had been carefully gone into in consultation with Sir John 
Kirk.372 
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Both quotes underline Britain’s reactive role and that the partition of the mainland was 
largely determined by the trade routes from the coast into the inter-lacustrine interior. As 
will be shown in the following chapters, the extension of Britain’s sphere of influence to 




The Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 was not the final act of delimitation of the East African 
mainland, but in terms of the partition it certainly was the most important. This bilateral treaty 
divided the landmass into two distinct spheres: a southern German zone; and, apart from the 
enclave of Witu, a northern British zone. These two nuclei regions were separated by a line of 
demarcation still extant today between modern Kenya and Tanzania. And although the 
boundary terminated at the eastern shores of the Victoria Nyanza, the so-called ‘hinterland 
understanding of 1887’ ensured that a de facto border was drawn across the lake to the Congo 
Free State. Hence, already by the conclusion of this agreement the kingdom of Buganda 
formed part of a British exclusion zone or ‘hinterland’ and was recognised as such by Britain’s 
regional rival Germany. 
Nevertheless, a retrospective focus on Buganda is misplaced since contemporary 
policymakers attached little importance to the kingdom, and the treaty had not been 
negotiated with this in view. Rather it had come about as a way to minimise the loss of regional 
influence to Germany, and indeed to execute Britain’s anti-slave trade policy on the cheap. As 
the previous chapter demonstrated, Britain had long enjoyed a hegemonic position in East 
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Africa. Via its client-state Zanzibar, Britain had maintained the commercial interests of its 
resident Indian subjects and through the co-opted political authority of the Omani-elite could 
implement its anti-slave trade policy through a treaty-framework. However this position of 
privilege had come to an abrupt end in 1885 when a German protectorate was declared in the 
Usagara region on the mainland opposite Zanzibar. 
Already during the six months that immediately preceded the German incursion, British 
policymakers had resolved to establish a mainland presence north of Kilimanjaro. With regard 
to Johnston’s proposal, Kirk and Hill’s 1882 scheme to suppress the slave trade through 
‘agencies working onshore’373 was revived. Indeed Granville thought that no opportunity 
should be neglected for securing ‘a territory adapted for British enterprise and favourably 
situated for striking a blow at the Slave Trade.’374 The same heightened European interest in 
African colonisation that had spawned the Berlin Conference also transformed British anti-
slave trade policy into both a means and an end to imperial expansion. 
Thus, by following the same southern route as their compatriot Gustav Fischer had done in 
the previous year, Peters and his men had, through coincidence, largely determined the 
geographical scope of the East African partition by the autumn of 1884. But since Germany 
desired British recognition of its territorial claims, the northern section of the mainland – in 
particular the lands traversed by the northern caravan route from Mombasa to the Victoria 
Nyanza and Uganda – was offered up to the principal agent of British imperialism in East Africa, 
William Mackinnon. And as both Anderson and Kirk had made him well aware, the financial 
success of the venture depended upon extending the territorial remit of the British sphere to 
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comprise the Equatorial Province and the inter-lacustrine interior. This view was based on the 
understanding that the great cost of territorial administration only could be shouldered by 
integrating these rich trading networks with the international economy through the port of 
Mombasa. Naturally a railway was central to these plans since it was the only mode of 
transport capable of rendering high-bulk produce from the interior marketable at the coast, 
or indeed of facilitating European settlement of the temperate highlands.    
In 1886, Kirk would write to congratulate Mackinnon at the conclusion of the Anglo-German 
Agreement. His words summarised both the new status of Britain’s influence in East Africa, 
but also the expectations that was entertained for territorial expansion toward the interior:  
Thus we have Mombasa under the Sultan and a free run inland to the Lake etc. 
but not Kilimanjaro. We have the best of any line for rail if ever one is made. We 
also have the Equatorial Province now held by the brave Emin Bey, well-governed 
and quiet to this day.375 
Although Kirk was right about Mombasa and the railway, as will be detailed in the following 
chapters, his declaration about holding the Equatorial Province was premature. By a 
coincidental sequence of events, the kingdom of Buganda took its place; and, despite its 
peripheral location within the British Empire, it assumed a highly contentious position in 
Britain’s political discourse over the early 1890s. As the following two chapters will show, the 
doctrine of Anglo-German governmental co-operation over East Africa continued to the end 
of the decade, whilst Britain’s client state Zanzibar would collapse and be formally 
incorporated into the British Empire.   
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Anglo-German Metropolitan Co-operation and Local Rivalry: The Blockade and the 
Prelude to a Final Partition, 1888-9 
 
By the summer of 1888, the political situation in East Africa had changed radically from what 
it had been only three years earlier. The Sultan Barghash had died in March and was 
succeeded by his brother Khalifa, whilst the mainland had by virtue of the Anglo-German 
Agreement of 1886 been divided into two British and German ‘spheres of influence.’ The 
Sultanate still held onto its last vestiges of mainland territories, the twelve mile coastal zone 
extending from Cape Delgado in the south to Juba in the north. Yet even these rump 
dominions were in August absorbed by the European colonial companies as concessions, 
despite de jure subject to Zanzibari suzerainty until the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar 
Treaty of 1890.376  
However the political circumstances in Europe had also changed. Germany had in the course 
of less than 100 days been ruled by three emperors – 1888 was the so-called Dreikaiserjahr - 
and the young emperor Wilhelm II who had acceded the throne in June had showed far more 
interest in pursuing a German colonial policy than his predecessors.377 As the first chapter has 
shown, the slave trade had increased to alarming levels in 1888 due to the collapse of Britain’s 
institutional framework of slave trade suppression, the basis of which was the co-opted 
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authority of the late Sultan. The successor had proved far less co-operative and led British 
anti-slave trade policy to rely on the use of force exerted by the naval squadron. The 
significant attention to the East African slave trade in Europe also placed pressure upon British 
and German authorities to at least be seen as to be taking some immediate action to counter 
the trafficking.  
The British Consul-General at Zanzibar, believed the new Sultan had seriously underestimated 
the power of the British and German colonial agents: 
…the Sultan and his advisers are unaware of the real extent and true scope of 
the Concessions that have been given to the two European Companies; the 
phraseology employed in the Concessions themselves; the inadequate 
translation into Arabic of unaccustomed English business idioms […] His 
Highness will ere long learn by practical experience that he has virtually ceased 
to wield any power at all upon the coast-line, but this lesson will not be learnt 
by him without much discontent and many heart-burnings.378  
In fact the ‘heart-burnings’ came to be equally shared between the Sultan and the German 
imperialists. The de facto cession of the coastline in August 1888 was the final straw for the 
discontent that had been brewing among the Omani elite resident in the mainland trading 
ports and sparked an insurrection led by the Arab chief and slave trader Bushiri bin Salim.379 
German authorities found it helpful to clad their suppression of this insurgency in the guise 
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of anti-slavery. By so doing the assistance of Britain was elicited since public opinion could be 
mobilised to compel the authorities into action.   
This chapter will examine events post-1888. The subsequent blockade of the East African 
coast instituted by Britain and Germany represented a continuation of the doctrine of co-
operation that had been in place between the two powers since the declaration of the 
German protectorate in 1885.380 However a complicating factor for the Anglo-German 
détente was the rivalry between the two colonial companies, particularly with regard to the 
miniature protectorate of Witu and its adjoining islands Manda and Patta, in addition to the 
allegiance of Emin Pasha in the Sudan’s Equatorial Province. Both cases comprised a dynamic 
that involved fierce peripheral competition which was fanned by metropolitan public opinion 
through media reporting, but received little in the form of official countenance from the 
British or German governments. Indeed the high profile of these issues and their lack of 
political support, are what Carl Peters’ political biographer Arne Perras argues was a key 
factor behind the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck by the young Wilhelm II in 1890.381  
The chapter will first explore the British involvement in the Anglo-German blockade of the 
East African coast-line and test whether the understanding of it purely as a public relations 
exercise divorced from anti-slavery concerns is correct. It will then compare the contrasting 
approaches to colonisation employed by the British and German colonial companies in an 
effort to understand why Bismarck’s government sought British military and political co-
operation. Finally, the chapter will investigate the local rivalry that took place between the 
British and German colonial agents over the Island of Lamu, off the coast of Witu, and the 
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competition between Mackinnon and Peters over Emin Pasha’s allegiance and the control of 
his Equatorial Province. Although it ultimately proved abortive, the latter was of great 
significance for determining both the scope and timing of the final partition of East Africa in 
1890.  
 
Toward an Anglo-German Blockade, 1888 
Following his discussions with Prince Otto von Bismarck’s son and Foreign Secretary Count 
Herbert Bismarck, and other officials in the German Foreign Office, by September 1888 it was 
clear to the British Ambassador Sir Edward Malet, that Germany would not withdraw their 
engagements from East Africa.382 The increasing opposition they had met from the local 
population and the little in way of economic returns the German colony had made in the three 
years of its existence had not swayed the nation’s determination to continue in its empire-
building in the region. Rather, British assistance was to be enlisted in an effort to increase the 
pressure upon the Sultan and against the mainland insurgents: 
The point for us to bear in mind is, that the Germans have put their hand to the 
plough, and they will persevere […] they rely upon our co-operation in the 
civilizing mission, which they consider that Germany and England have 
undertaken conjointly.383  
However the German Under-Secretary of State Maximilian Berchem was apparently also 
aware of the role played by the German Company in fomenting local opposition: ‘They appear 
                                                          




to acknowledge that the agents of the German Company are over active, and […] the 
Government was doing its utmost to moderate their zeal and make them cautious.’384 
This somewhat understated ‘zeal’ stood in marked contrast to the British approach to 
colonisation in East Africa.385 Whilst British agents relied on the co-option of local elites and 
existing power-structures, German agents had adopted a more direct approach. Shortly after 
the Sultan had doled out the mainland concessions in August, the Auswärtiges Amt recorded 
that ‘the whole extent of the East African territory appears to be in a state of feverish 
agitation.’386 In an attempt at understanding the reasons for this sudden uprising, Prince 
Bismarck had even consulted Leopold II, still at the time renowned for his African expertise 
and humanitarianism. Despite no insurrection having occurred, nor would occur over the 
following twelve months in the British sphere of influence, German officials put the blame 
upon both colonial companies, particularly the ‘very powerful’ IBEA. Berchem also alludes to 
the negative publicity the East African affair had caused Bismarck and he implores Salisbury 
to ‘work upon the press with a view to preventing disputes between our Companies and 
presses.’387 This issue of containment features prominently in Anglo-German correspondence 
over East Africa during the months leading up to Germany’s federal elections of 20 February 
1890.  
The final section of Berchem’s memorandum betrayed the German Foreign Office’s strategy 
for handling the situation. By spinning the insurrection as largely to do with the slave trade, 
Germany could manipulate the British press and public opinion to force Salisbury’s hand: ‘The 
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animosity against our Treaty arrangement is to be traced principally to the slave-dealers. This 
circumstance, if properly turned to account in influencing public opinion in England, would 
afford that public opinion a motive for co-operating with us.’388  
As a continuation of the Anglo-German co-operation doctrine, Salisbury ‘entirely agreed’ with 
Bismarck and committed Britain to assist Germany in what two months later, became a naval 
blockade of the East African coast:  
The English and German Governments have undertaken a civilizing mission on 
the East Coast of Africa, in which they can greatly help each other. It would be 
the height of madness if they were to throw away their strength in intriguing 
against each other, or in trying to filch advantages from each other.389  
The bilateral understanding between Germany and Britain was in particular facilitated by 
Herbert Bismarck who, by force of his position as Foreign Secretary had taken a leading role 
in colonial affairs. The younger Bismarck had become convinced that the insurrection was 
principally caused by Arab slave traders and that any strategy for establishing European 
control over the mainland would first involve suppression of the slave trade. In a meeting with 
Malet, he admitted that the disturbances on the coast was due to ‘a certain amount of 
mismanagement’ but that the principal cause of the insurrection was the fear of abolition 
entertained by the ‘Mussulman Chiefs.’ Once Britain and Germany was established in the 
region it ‘would prove a death-blow to the Slave Trade,’ hence the resistance mounted against 
Germany was simply the regressive elite concerned with maintaining the status quo. The first 
priority, in Herbert Bismarck’s mind was thus to remove their main source of strength and 
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revenue, namely the slave trafficking, in order to quell the resistance. Bismarck ‘would be 
very glad if Germany and England could work hand in hand towards this end.’390  
In October the German government had however come to a different conclusion altogether. 
In a review of the situation, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had thought ‘that the 
hoisting of the German flag in the dominions of the Sultan […] was a mistake, and that the 
rough treatment of the natives […] on the part of the German Company’s officials has mainly 
contributed to rouse the Arabs.’391 Despite the acknowledgement of German agency in 
causing the insurrection, the elder Bismarck still placed the majority of the blame upon the 
slave traders and perceived the politico-religious conditions in East Africa as analogous to 
those of the Sudan. To Bismarck the ‘mistakes of the German Company’s officials’ was simply 
used as a ‘pretext’ for the rebellion of ‘the slave-traders and Mussulmans against the work of 
the Anti-Slavery Societies and their efforts to introduce Christian culture. This spirit would 
resemble the one which caused the movement of the Mahdi.’392  
With the Chancellor’s review came also the proposal of a maritime blockade of the East 
African coast, a naval action that would be enforced con-jointly by Germany and Britain. 
Bismarck stressed the importance of working within the existing structures of authority 
centred on the Sultan – his proposal was to offer support to his rule, which at this point bore 
the resemblance of a puppet regime, against the so-called ‘fanatical and stranger-hating 
(“Fremden-feindliche”) Arab element.’393 Military expeditions on the mainland were ruled out 
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in favour of maritime action since: ‘Standing garrisons of European troops could be 
maintained in the interior only, if at all, by the heaviest sacrifice of men and money.’394  
Hence, Bismarck was in the 1880s keenly aware of the pitfalls of asymmetric warfare. 
Conventional European armies enjoyed few advantages when combatting native guerrillas 
and any engagement would lead to substantial casualties. The only alternative to a direct 
military intervention was a blockade which Bismarck proposed would extend from Kipini to 
the River Rovuma in order ‘to cut off all traffic with the insurgent coast districts, and especially 
that in slave-vessels, and the carriage of arms and ammunition.’395  
Although the insurrection had forced Bismarck’s hand, the Secretary of the Emin Pasha Relief 
Committee and subsequent IBEA agent, Sir Francis de Winton,396 feared for the consequences 
of any further ill-judged German action or indeed British participation. The old Africa-hand 
confirmed that ‘the rising of the natives against the German Company has not, up till now, 
extended against other white nations’. And he ‘hoped that the Germans will, in the future, 
avoid such actions as would bring about a general rising against the white man, for we might 
then have a similar state of affairs to that existing at Suakin and the Red Sea Littoral.’397 De 
Winton’s views were echoed by Salisbury who feared that ‘any naval measures Germany may 
wish to take, however innocent in name, will not be safe unless they are shared and controlled 
by at least an equal English force.’398 The Prime Minister also doubted in the sincerity of the 
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German abolitionist motives and suspected that the whole idea was an exercise in window-
dressing for the German public:  
The avowed ground of this measure is the renewed activity of the slave-traders, 
as evidenced in the movements on Nyassa, in the Soudan, and on the coast of 
Zanzibar. The real object is, probably, to provide a demonstration which shall 
persuade German public opinion that something is being done.399  
However, there was no consensus. Britain’s Consul-General at Zanzibar, Colonel Charles Euan 
Smith, warned against any British naval co-operation with Germany. He believed that the 
‘Arab and native public would view with an absolute distrust sudden and novel co-operation 
of Germany with ourselves in measures against Slave Trade’ and feared that they would think 
such action to be ‘secretly directed against [the] Sultanate.’400 Hence, it was not only Salisbury 
that doubted in the sincerity of the new-found German abolitionist agenda. To evaluate the 
matter comprehensively, Clement Hill drew up a memorandum which recounted the events 
which had led to the region’s disturbances. He shared in the views expressed by Salisbury and 
Euan Smith of the insincere ‘Johnny come lately’ German measures against the slave trade. 
Hill, whom Wm Roger Louis scorned as an ‘unimaginative bureaucrat’,401 thought the absence 
of a revolt in the British sphere was due to Britain’s long-standing humanitarian engagement 
with the region. In his view:  
…the knowledge which the Arabs had of English ways in dealing with 
Mussulmans and slavery and Slave Trade made them bow to the inevitable 
when they saw we were in earnest in 1872-73, and the great blow then struck 
at the slave-trading interests gave rise to nothing in the shape of a national or 
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religious movement. It was an English craze. England was, after all, the great 
supporter of all Mussulman races; the English recognized religious feeling; Allah 
willed it. The Germans altered all that. They are known on the coast by the 
name of “Enemies of God.” They are hated for their militarism and irreligion.402  
Attached to the memorandum was a document with the understated title: ‘Instances of 
German want of Tact on East Coast of Africa’ based on reports by the Church Missionary 
Society’s Archdeacon Farler. In it Hill listed five points which demonstrated how German 
agents either had committed atrocities against the local population or in other ways provoked 
antipathy. All the instances included either extra-judicial killings or disrespect for local 
customs and religion: ‘on one occasion a German tied a native to a tree and used him as a 
target for pistol practice.’403 This report was followed up a few days later with a less 
euphemistic ‘Memorandum on the Misdoings of the Germans’ by the Universities Mission in 
which the two first points of a list of seventeen included:  
1. Taking possession of lands and countries by absolutely sham Treaties, which 
the natives had nothing to do with, and did in any way agree to.  
2. Preliminary exploring parties shooting the natives on the slightest 
provocation with their revolvers, and sometimes in mistake shooting a man 
who had nothing to do with them.404  
Hill was concerned over whether the German ‘want of tact’ would also taint Britain’s 
reputation and hamper the IBEA’s work if it were to be ‘confounded with the German 
Company,’ but he could reassure his FO readership that ‘at present everything points to the 
distinction being maintained.’405 His memorandum concluded with advising against joint 
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naval action. Since Germany had not signed any mutual right of search treaties with any other 
powers than Britain, Austria and Russia it could not, in practical terms, police any other vessels 
than those of the Royal Navy. The result would thus be that ‘England would continue alone 
to do the Slave Trade repression, whilst she would be associated politically with the unpopular 
German.’ Instead of a blockade, Hill recommended that the forthcoming Brussels Anti-Slave 
Trade Conference ‘would be a better point of departure for any combined action against the 
Slave Trade, which would then be intelligible to the Arabs and natives, unpopular though it 
might be.’406 
The question over Germany’s action in East Africa was so serious that also the recently retired 
Kirk, at this point a member of the IBEA’s court of directors, was consulted. He also doubted 
in the efficacy of a blockade against the slave trade.407 To his mind it was ‘physically 
impossible’ to blockade such a long coast-line. The only option that could be realistically 
entertained was to ‘erect and hold military stations’ on the mainland. But even this ‘would 
have no effect on the inland Slave Trade, for slaves from Uganda or the Congo almost never 
reach the coast. The result of raids in the interior are absorbed in the continent itself.’ 408 
Instead Kirk suggested the abolition of slavery in Zanzibar and Pemba as the only real way in 
which to halt the slave trade. In his letter to Anderson, Kirk also included a letter from the 
Sultan of Zanzibar’s military commander General Mathews. Apart from stating that ‘the whole 
coast and interior is in a ferment’ Mathews told of almost farcical conditions among the 
Europeans at Zanzibar. For example, the administrator of the German East Africa Company, 
Ernst Vohsen, had ‘completely lost his head’ and did not ‘get on well’ with the German Consul-
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General, whilst the Italian contingent were ‘doing nothing but looking on, just as if they were 
stationed here for no purpose whatever.’ Mathews ended his letter on a personal note:  
Tell Lady Kirk Zanzibar is not what it was. Nothing but trouble, trouble, trouble 
since the Germans came here. No peace or quietness, nothing but bother. You 
are well out of it, Sir John. It now remains for Germany either to take over the 
whole coast by force and under military administration by the Government, or 
to give up the whole business and squash the Company.409      
Salisbury was not unmoved by the advice from the experts and recommended his German 
counterparts not to proceed with their plans for a blockade.410 However, only two days later 
on the 15 October, this British decision was reversed. Despite Salisbury having ‘strongly 
advised against the blockade’, Bismarck’s administration persevered. The Prime Minister’s 
resolution was thus: ‘if Germany persisted, England would, with the assent of the Sultan, join 
in the operation as an operation against the Slave Trade.’411 Three deserters from the German 
naval vessel ‘Möwe’ had reportedly been ‘killed and eaten’ by tribes the previous day, and 
the unfortunate incident had placed additional pressure upon German authorities.412 With 
Salisbury’s decision the blockade was a fait accompli, although it would not be imposed for 
another two weeks. The Island of Zanzibar itself however was not to be subjected to any naval 
action.  
The grounds upon which Salisbury committed Britain to the maritime blockade were two-
fold: firstly, by participating in the naval action Britain could exercise limited control of 
German actions in the region and impose an element of restraint, so as to prevent hostilities 
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spilling into the British sphere. Secondly, Salisbury’s government could not be seen as not 
contributing to an operation directed against the slave trade. Salisbury maintained his doubt 
of German sincerity in the matter and confided to Euan Smith that Bismarck’s ‘main object 
really is to announce a striking measure to satisfy his own public opinion’ rather than having 
undergone a Pauline conversion to the cause of abolitionism.413  
Regardless of either statesmen’s personal motives, the Anglo-German correspondence 
betrays the importance of public opinion in formulating policy. As the first chapter 
demonstrated, the East African slave trade had been subject to considerable attention over 
the summer of 1888. The naval reports received by the Foreign Office over the autumn 
months of 1888 did not indicate that the volume of the traffic had receded. In fact Admiral 
Freemantle reported in late September of an ‘unceasingly active’ trade and that his cruisers 
had intercepted five dhows carrying a total of 258 slaves.414 A month later a British naval 
officer was killed when boarding a dhow which held eighty slaves, hence at the time of 
Salisbury’s reconsidered decision to join the blockade there was substantial pressure upon 
the government to act decisively against the traffickers.415 
 The German press had been particularly scathing of its compatriots. Both the Berliner 
Tageblatt and the quasi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine had called for ‘new measures and 
new men.’ Indeed the latter had judged:  
the conduct of those German East African colonists, whose greatest energy 
consisted for a long time in toasting each other at dinners as national heroes, 
only to display themselves afterwards, when it became a question of doing 
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something on the spot, as incapable chatterers. The utter hopelessness of the 
situation in East Africa is now entirely admitted even by those who never tired 
of singing the praises of the tremendous advances of the German East African 
Company, and of the powers of organization of Dr. Carl Peters.416 
German abolitionist sentiment had also been stirred during the autumn of 1888. On 27 
October, an anti-slavery meeting had been held in Cologne which according to the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine had gathered ‘distinguished men of all classes of society and all 
political parties.’417 The meeting passed a resolution ‘that it was the common duty and task 
of all Christian nations to co-operate for the suppression of the abominable cruelties of the 
Slave Trade; and that, […] England and […] Germany [should] combine for that purpose.’418 
Hence, in the months leading up to the blockade Bismarck’s government had come under 
increasing popular pressure to deal with the rebellion that threatened Germany’s new empire 
in East Africa, and it was a force he translated into diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Britain.     
 
‘Hand in hand’419: A Blockade of the East African Coast, 1888-9 
On the 5 November, Salisbury gave formal notice of the blockade ‘against the importation of 
munitions of war and the exportation of slaves’ along the coastline of the Zanzibari mainland 
dominions.420 Predictably the formal notice blamed the slave trade for the institution of the 
blockade although Salisbury earlier had expressed scepticism of this as a mere pretext. But 
these doubts had seemingly vanished by November, when Salisbury, in a comprehensive 
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despatch to the German Ambassador, confided that: ‘there is considerable foundation for the 
belief that the apprehensions and the resentment of the slave-traders have been a potent 
cause of the disturbances which have taken place.’421 In similarity with Bismarck, Salisbury 
placed the events of East Africa in context with those of the entire region, ‘from Lake Nyassa 
in the south, to Suakin in the north’ and blamed the ‘slave-trading Arabs’ for their attempts 
at repulsing European colonialism.  
The abolitionist campaigns that had been increasingly prominent over the latter half of the 
1880s had evidently also influenced Salisbury’s decision to institute the blockade since he 
referred to: ‘the testimony of Mr. Cameron and of Cardinal Lavigerie combine to establish the 
fact that there has been a formidable increase in the activity of this hateful Traffic during the 
last few years’.422 This was the second time Salisbury had cited the abolitionist campaigners 
Cameron and Lavigerie to justify a policy decision, the previous year he had, as the first 
chapter showed, called for the institution of the Brussels Anti-Slave Trade Conference on the 
basis of their evidence.423 In November 1888, he similarly stated to Malet:  
there is no doubt whatever that the Slave Trade, both by land and sea, has 
recently undergone a considerable revival; and I think it probable that the 
circumstances has borne its share in the disturbances which have been so fatal 
to the German Company.424  
Other European nations such as Portugal, Italy and France were also induced to join the 
blockade, a call which was only partially heeded. Apart from the deployment of an Italian 
naval vessel, there was lacklustre interest for participating in the operation. Salisbury also 
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feared Germany was using the blockade to worsen Anglo-French relations. In a ‘most secret’ 
despatch to Euan Smith, Salisbury confided that ‘I am not free from the suspicion that 
Germany wishes to make a difficulty between us and France.’425  
Since France had not signed a right of search treaty with Britain, British cruisers could not 
intercept dhows flying the French tricolour. And the Arab slavers exploited this legal loophole 
by obtaining insignia from the French consulate; hence co-operation of France was viewed as 
critical for any effectual stop to the slave trade.426 Strictly in regard to counter-trafficking 
measures the German desire to stop all vessels including the French flagged ones was rational. 
Yet both French and British diplomats thought that any such seizure would be unacceptable 
to French public opinion and thus make it very difficult for the French government to yield a 
right of search.427 It was this potential scenario that Salisbury feared might ‘make a difficulty’ 
between Britain and France, a bilateral relationship already strained over the British 
occupation of Egypt.428  
Simultaneously with the institution of the blockade, the Sultan of Zanzibar issued a letter of 
introduction to his vassals for the IBEA’s administrator George Sutherland Mackenzie. He was 
about to take up the concession awarded to the British company and the Sultan’s generous 
introduction read:  
They wish to make roads, and to trade and to do you good. The English have 
always been our friends, and […] if they want anything from you, you will give 
it to them. If they wish to make any Agreement with you, you should make and 
sign such Agreement, and you should give them help and assistance, and men 
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to work if they require it. By doing this we shall be pleased. The English are our 
friends.429  
The letter to the Sultan’s mainland chiefs underlined the schism between the Sultanate’s 
relations with the British versus the German newcomers. The Sultan was clearly under the 
impression that he could retain some political influence by maintaining good relations with 
Britain and the IBEA, whilst any relinquishment to Germany represented a complete loss of 
both territories and face among the Arab community. No rebellion had taken place in the 
British sphere, nor did any occur for the duration of the blockade. 
On 29 November, the British and German admirals had decided that the blockade was to be 
commenced on the 2 December at noon and be declared in the name of the Sultan. By this 
time the Arab chieftain Bushiri-bin-Selim of Pangani had been identified as the leader of the 
insurgency.430 Although demonised by the Germans, his image among the British missionary 
community was more nuanced. Bishop Charles Alan Smythies of the Universities Mission to 
Central Africa was indebted to him for earlier having saved his life: ‘The credit of my safety 
from some violence is almost entirely due to Bushiri. He stood in the door and said he was 
answerable for the English missionaries, and unless they killed him they should not touch 
them.’431  
In early December, the focus of the rebellion against the German company had shifted from 
the coastal town of Pangani to the port town of Bagamoyo further south. Bushiri and his 2,000 
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men armed with breech-loading rifles and some small calibre cannon were rumoured to have 
established their head-quarters in the vicinity of the town on 4 December. Over the following 
two days Euan Smith reported of a ‘considerable amount of desultory and resultless fighting 
between the Germans and the native insurgents’ and added that ‘the latter, as usual, 
sustaining a heavy loss of life, while the former escaped practically unhurt.’432 The German 
soldiers had killed over a hundred insurgents and suffered only one casualty. Their tactics had 
included several naval bombardments and a nightly deployment of sailors to take the local 
fighters by surprise. Faced with an overwhelming force Bushiri retired his men to a village 
called Chem Chem five miles west of Bagamoyo on 7 December. However prior to this tactical 
retreat, atrocities had been committed against the members of an ivory caravan who had hid 
from the fighting. These actions contrasted with his earlier defence of Bishop Smythies:  
Bushiri and his men surrounded the house, took possession of the ivory, seized 
the leaders of the caravan, and gave the option to the remaining portion of 
joining their cause or being mutilated or killed. Many who refused to join are 
said to have been either killed on the spot or to have had both their hands cut 
off.433 
Contrary to Freemantle’s predictions of the blockade having only a negligible effect on the 
slave trade due to it not being the season of the south-west monsoon,434 a month into 
operations the German man-of-war ‘Leipzig’ had intercepted two dhows containing a total of 
192 slaves.435 Hostilities had also escalated with Bushiri having launched an attack on the 
other German base at Dar-es-Salaam in which a hundred of the slaves liberated by ‘Leipzig’ 
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were re-enslaved.436 Britain’s consul at Zanzibar reported an ‘incipient famine’ on the German 
coast which was worsening ‘from day to day.’437 The deteriorating conditions on-shore was 
mirrored in the German fleet which had suffered outbreaks of fevers.  
With these factors in mind, the German Admiral had telegraphed Berlin with 
recommendations for raising the blockade ‘on grounds of inefficiency’ and instead 
substituting it with a ‘strict blockade of Zanzibar and Pemba.’438 However the German 
government had gone even further and questioned whether also Britain would consider 
substituting the naval blockade with land-based military operations, since ‘control could be 
more easily exercised on land and with less cost than by blockading continually a coast 
extending over 600 miles.’439  
Salisbury was naturally reluctant to partake in any such scheme as it would both be very costly 
and risk making the IBEA a target for the native insurgency. Suspicions were also entertained 
that Germany would use the insurrection as a pretext to annex Zanzibar. In a premonition of 
the bilateral negotiations that resulted in the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty the 
following year Salisbury made it clear that ‘English opinion would not tolerate an 
abandonment of the Sultan of Zanzibar.’440 
The events on the ‘German coast’ stood in marked contrast to the British sphere. Freemantle 
remarked that ‘the whole north or English sphere is at present perfectly quiet; but at the 
south, where we have had to assist the Germans, there is sullen discontent, which is ready to 
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break out into active hostility.’441  In January, a spiral of violence unravelled yet again as the 
German mission station at Pugu fifteen miles west of Dar-es-Salaam was attacked. The result 
of the attack was the re-enslavement of the remainder of the slaves liberated by ‘Leipzig’ and 
a massacre: ‘three missionaries – two men and one woman – undoubtedly cut in pieces; their 
bodies have been seen.’442 The remaining four missionaries were kidnapped and held ransom 
– a public relations disaster for both the German Colonial Company, but as it turned out also 
for the insurgents and their leader – since from this point German public opinion prevented 
a de-escalation or retreat from the region.  
Euan Smith believed however that the Germans themselves were to blame: ‘German 
blockading squadron, while patrolling coast, ceaselessly bombard open country day and night. 
German Admiral told me this himself. It has roused the natives to absolute fury.’443 Indeed, in 
a ‘most secret’ despatch telegraphed to Salisbury only days later Euan Smith believed the 
‘absolutely unprecedented’ incident in which a female missionary was mutilated and killed as 
evidence of the ‘intensity of Arab hatred.’ The Consul feared that the insurrections on the 
coast and recently in Uganda were strengthening the resolve of the insurgents and that they 
believed it would ‘bring about the entire destruction of all Missions.’444  
Whilst the would-be German colonists were occupied in asserting their authority by militarily 
defeating the native insurgency, the IBEA had adopted a very different approach aimed at 
winning over hearts and minds. During his survey of the British sphere, the IBEA’s new 
administrator George Mackenzie had noticed the great number of escaped slaves harboured 
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at the mission stations.445 Mackenzie feared that the harbouring of ‘runaway slaves’ would 
constitute a growing source of friction between the Arab slave-holding community and the 
European missionaries, a grievance liable to break out into active hostility toward all 
Europeans including the IBEA. The distinction between the slaves held in bondage on Arab 
plantations; those freed by the naval cruisers and settled at Freretown; and those who had 
themselves sought refuge and emancipation with the missionaries, was not one made by all 
members of the Arab community. Mackenzie relayed an anecdote to highlight this to his 
friend Euan Smith:  
The freed slaves, it should be remembered, are worked on the Mission 
plantations, and an Arab naïvely remarked to me, “Sahib, the missionaries are 
just as great slave-holders as we are, the only difference is they take or get their 
slaves for nothing, while we have to pay for ours.”446  
The resolution arrived at by the IBEA was one of payment to stabilise the area through the 
manumission of 1,421 slaves held by the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the United 
Methodists Free Church of Sheffield (UMFC) and the German Evangelical Lutheran Mission of 
Bavaria at a cost of £3,500. The Treasury contributed £800 whilst the CMS and UMFC 
contributed £1,200 and £400 respectively; the IBEA covered the balance of £1,100.447 The 
missionary societies were after this outlay made to promise not to harbour any further 
runaway slaves.448 During his tour of the mainland placing ‘free papers in the hands of every 
individual at the mission stations’ Mackenzie was naturally warmly received: ‘people at once 
gave in their full and hearty support to the Company, and did everything possible by outward 
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and visible signs to show their delight at our coming.’449 Little ‘delight’ was shown in the 
rebellious German sphere, but the exigencies of popular imperialism forced Bismarck’s 
hand.450    
The German expansionist policy in East Africa was in large part the result of public opinion. 
During a debate on the ‘East African Question’ in the German Reichstag, Prince Bismarck 
expressed himself as ‘fully pledged’ to a forward policy in the region. He admitted an earlier 
scepticism but that he now had yielded ‘to the stream in favour of colonial undertakings.’ He 
explained his volte face thus: ‘Common opinion has given way four years ago so completely 
to this stream, that, in my opinion, it cannot recede, nor do I think it would regard any 
retrograde movement as practicable.’451 Bismarck’s speech also revealed some of the 
dynamics in Anglo-German relations over East Africa. The Chancellor’s opinion was at odds 
with that generally held among the policy establishment. Whilst many desired that Germany 
should act unilaterally, Bismarck perceived co-operation with Britain as crucial for a successful 
German colonial policy:  
…we have only advanced after coming to an understanding with England. 
Therefore I absolutely reject the thought that we should act against the Sultan 
of Zanzibar in opposition to England. We are absolutely agreed with the English 
Government in Zanzibar […] and go with it hand in hand.452  
Indeed Salisbury was also conscious of this driver of German foreign policy when commenting 
upon a possible £100,000 German grant-in-aid for ‘a native police’ force for use on the coast. 
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He damningly judged that: ‘They are anxious to do as little as possible on account of the 
expense, but they have a strong Chauvinist opinion to deal with, as ignorant as such 
movements of opinion usually are.’453 In late January, the Reichstag passed, with ‘a very great 
majority,’ a bill which both allocated 2 million marks to strengthen the German presence in 
the region and placed the control of Peters’ colonial company in the hands of the newly 
appointed Imperial Commissioner Hermann von Wissmann.454  
Freemantle reported in early February a steady deterioration in attitudes toward Europeans 
and that the violence had claimed its first British victim, Mr Brooks of the London Mission and 
‘fourteen of his porters’.455 The admiral suspected that the British missionary had been killed 
by foreign fighters that had come to support Bushiri’s insurgency, in particular ‘to some Oman 
slave-dealers who have recently arrived from Muscat, and no doubt are fanatics.’456  
Contrary to the claims made by the historian Suzanne Miers, the military operations against 
Bushiri was not entirely divorced from anti-slave trade policy.457 The Arab-leader had 
established ‘a slave mart near Bagamoyo’ and Freemantle thought slave trading would 
increase significantly if the blockade was raised. The slave prices on the coast were ‘very low’ 
and since the clove harvest had just begun at Pemba labour demand would make trafficking 
irresistible.458 Although the conditions on the coast improved a little in the following month 
they constituted a low point, since from the spring onwards the Germans met with more 
success in their counter-insurgency tactics.  
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The foremost indicator of this turn in Germany’s fortunes on the battlefield was Bushiri’s 
proposal of surrender. Apparently ‘influenced by fear of treachery among his coast followers’ 
Bushiri had secretly offered to surrender himself at the British Agency in Zanzibar if Euan 
Smith could ‘guarantee his safety and immunity from punishment.’459 According to Salisbury, 
the German government would be ‘glad if Bushiri disappeared’ but they could not give any 
‘formal assent to sparing his life’ because he had killed so many Germans.460 Salisbury even 
asked Euan Smith whether he could ask the Sultan if he could smuggle him to India and pay 
for his sustenance there,461 however nothing came of this proposal.462  
Meanwhile, the new German Commissioner Wissmann had recruited a small force of 650 
Sudanese soldiers at Cairo which he efficiently deployed in East Africa.463 Wissmann’s 
offensive, strengthened by imperial funds and fresh Sudanese recruits led over the following 
nine months to a gradual German victory over the Arab insurgents, and instead of a new life 
in India, Bushiri was caught and then executed by Wissmann and his soldiers on 15 December 
1889.464 In terms of liberated slaves the blockade had not been a great success. The Royal 
Navy intercepted a total of 238 slaves in 1889,465 which was a substantial reduction from the 
841 intercepted the previous year. The German Admiral wanted as early as January the 
blockade raised ‘on grounds of inefficiency,’ but due to the instability on the mainland it was 
continued.466 The question was however again raised in the spring when it was clear that the 
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insurrection was about to be defeated. Due to the low number of liberated slaves – only 66 
had been caught in the first six months of 1889 – and the fact that the prevailing winds were 
about to change and thus also become the ‘high season’ for slaver interception, Salisbury 
refused. There would have been little purpose in an anti-slavery blockade with such meagre 
results.467 
 By August, the German government again contacted Salisbury about lifting the blockade out 
of ‘financial reasons’. But Count Bismarck wanted to ‘finish it with a flourish’ which involved 
‘to induce the Sultan to abolish slavery by Decree upon the mainland, and to declare free all 
persons entering the Island of Zanzibar and Pemba after a fixed date, not affecting the status 
of those who are in the islands now.’468 This ‘flourish’ was duly enacted by the Sultan in a 
decree that stipulated ‘from the 1st November next, all slaves landed in any part of the 
country under his rule shall be free.’469 Hence, the blockade resulted in at least the nominal 
abolition of slavery in Zanzibar and Pemba since no further individuals could be made slaves 
and the institution would die with the death of those enslaved. It was hoped a more 
comprehensive international agreement against the slave trade would be come to at the 
Brussels Anti-Slave Trade Conference which was about to convene concurrently with the 
raising of the blockade.470   
This conference and the subsequent status of East African slavery and trafficking lies outside 
the scope of this thesis, but has been investigated in great detail by Suzanne Miers.471 Her 
research has shown that the East African slave trade continued, albeit at a very limited level, 
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well into the twentieth century. Indeed Arabian slave markets were in operation until the 
1960s.472 In Zanzibar the legal status of slavery was not abolished until 1897, whilst on the 
Kenyan Coast it lasted until 1909 when also the category of ‘concubines’ were subject to 
abolition, the remaining categories having been freed in 1907.473    
 
Anglo-German Territorial Rivalry: Witu, Lamu and Emin Pasha, 1888-9 
The other main aspect of Anglo-German relations over East Africa during 1888-9 concerned 
the territorial rivalry between the countries’ colonial companies. Whilst the British and 
German governments co-operated closely, albeit at times somewhat reluctantly in enforcing 
a naval blockade of the coastline, the IBEA and its German counterparts were engaged in a 
fierce competition over control of Witu, the island of Lamu and Emin Pasha’s Equatorial 
Province.  
Although the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 had divided the mainland into two spheres 
of influence, a German enclave lay within the northern British zone. The Sultanate of Witu 
had become a German protectorate in 1885 as a result of the explorers Gustav Denhardt and 
his brother Clemens having obtained a treaty with the local Sultan Ahmed ibn Fumo Bakari, 
otherwise known as Simba.474 As such the territorial rights to German Wituland did not belong 
to Carl Peters’ DOAG, but to a separate entity, the Deutsche Witugesellschaft (DWG). Outside 
Witu’s coastline lay a string of islands including Lamu which constituted the diminutive 
territory’s natural harbour, but these still formed a part of the Sultan of Zanzibar’s 
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dominions.475  In January 1889, a controversy arose when it became clear that: ‘the Germans 
[had] established a German post-office at Lamu, and […] hoisted a large German flag over 
it.’476 Apart from the violation of the Sultan’s sovereign territory, Euan Smith feared that a 
cession of these islands to Germany ‘would produce [an] insurrection there and along [the] 
British coast-line, and strangle [the] British Company.’477  
Anderson however was sympathetic to the DWG who ‘understanding the natives, has worked 
on the right lines’ and had avoided an uprising. According to the Foreign Office’s foremost 
Africa-expert:  
Lamu has always practically been the port of Witu, and it would be intolerable 
to the Witu Company to see a rival Company established there, collecting the 
dues, and managing the Administration. It would be like having a German 
Company established off Mombasa. 478  
Anderson suggested that, by mutual agreement, both companies should leave the island a de 
facto neutral territory.479 Salisbury concurred in part to Anderson’s suggestion, but 
embellished it by proposing to Bismarck that the issue be resolved through international 
arbitration.480 Since ‘Prince Bismarck was very anxious to avoid all friction between the two 
Governments’ he acceded to Salisbury’s suggestion.481 Over the following three months 
several international legal experts were considered for the job of arbitrator, but the choice 
fell upon the Belgian Baron Lambermont who accepted the offer in March.482 Importantly, 
this tentative sounding over a small island off Witu marks the start of the Anglo-German 
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Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty 1890. As the following chapter will show, the ‘Lamu arbitration’ 
was expanded to a general settlement of all outstanding territorial disputes between Britain 
and Germany.  
  
The British and German Emin Pasha Relief Expeditions 
Nevertheless, the jostling over the territory of Witu was a mere irritant compared to the far 
more important rivalry between Mackinnon and Peters over Emin Pasha’s allegiance. By the 
end of 1889, two rivalling European expeditions, clad in the guise of philanthropy, had been 
present in the interlacustrine region, both with the ostensible goal of rescuing the erstwhile 
Ottoman administrator. In 1885 the German-born Egyptian governor of Equatoria, Dr Eduard 
Schnitzer or Emin Pasha as he was known, had become cut off from Cairo due to the Mahdist 
insurrection.483 The Mahdists had consolidated their rule over most of the Sudan in the 
intervening years. But Emin’s Equatorial Province had escaped conquest and remained under 
nominal Egyptian control. Courtesy of his role as General Charles Gordon’s lieutenant, the fate 
of his administration was well-known in European circles, and by 1886, William Mackinnon 
and Frederick Hutton had established the ‘Emin Pasha Relief Committee’ with the stated aim 
of rescuing the Egyptian governor.484 The protagonist himself had however little desire for any 
rescue. In a letter to his friend the missionary and explorer Dr William Robert Felkin, Emin 
expressed his ‘extreme pleasure’ and gratitude for the ‘generous thoughts’ of Great Britain in 
despatching a relief expedition, but insisted that he would remain in the province with his 
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people. Emin’s twelve years in the isolated territory had made him relatively self-sufficient 
and the only assistance he required from Britain was stability in the kingdoms of Uganda and 
Unyoro, and ‘a safe road to the coast.’485  
 Although in part philanthropic, there is little doubt that there were considerable ulterior 
motives which led Mackinnon to organise an expedition to Equatoria, a region which was 
conveniently situated just north of what would later form the British sphere’s hinterland. 
Indeed he outlined his plans in a confidential memorandum aptly entitled: ‘Syndicate for 
establishing British Commerce & Influence in East Africa & for relieving Emin Bey’.486 By 
persuading Emin to amalgamate his province into that of his coastal concession, Mackinnon 
would control most of the valuable trading-networks of Central Africa.487 In fact by March 
1889, the IBEA claimed to have received ‘from Dr. R. W. Felkin, of Edinburgh, all the rights 
conferred upon him by Emin Pasha in respect of the provinces of Equatorial Africa under the 
government and control of the latter. These rights are contained in certain letters from Emin 
Pasha […] which confer upon Dr. Felkin the authority to arrange for the transfer of Emin Pasha’s 
province to any British corporation in which Dr. Felkin may have confidence, subject to Emin 
Pasha’s final approval.’488 
After the despatch of Stanley, a rivalling German Emin Pasha Committee was formed under 
the auspices of Carl Peters in 1888.489 As Peters had been convinced by his associate Karl von 
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der Heydt, the Equatorial province represented the ideal territory for his strategy of 
enveloping the British sphere. Indeed it formed a key component to his later vision of a 
German ‘Mittelafrika’.490 The German Colonial Company491 had in September 1888 passed a 
resolution that the policy of Germany was to extend its sphere to the region encompassing 
the Albert Nyanza and Wadelai.492 Count Bismarck viewed the plans with deep distrust. In a 
conversation with Malet he insisted that:  
the Government had already refused to have anything to do with it [and] the 
Chancellor intended now to go further, and to write to Prince Hohenlohe 
Langenburg, the President of the East African Company, and to Herr von 
Benningsen, one of its principal promoters, to endeavour to dissuade them 
from the enterprise.’493  
However it was evident that Bismarck’s government faced a challenge in communicating this 
restraint to a German policy establishment and public that was largely in favour of the 
expansionist agenda.  Testament to these popular sentiments was an article published the 
following month in ‘Bismarck’s semi-official organ’ the Norddeutsche Allgemeine which 
‘strongly advocated’ the proposed German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition.494  
Peters himself had already by October lost ‘the confidence of the German Government’495 and 
his resignation soon followed in January.496 It was on these grounds that Wissmann was 
dispatched ‘to supervise the action of the German East African Company’ before Bismarck 
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presented his East African bill to the Reichstag.497 Peters’ loss of favour had hardly come as a 
surprise to diplomatic circles; Euan Smith was scathing in his remarks of Mackinnon’s German 
counterpart:  
Dr. Peters’ name very often comes under discussion in connection with the 
agitation concerning East Africa that is at present taking place in Berlin. I have 
never heard him spoken of otherwise than as a pretentious but very energetic 
charlatan and “poseur.” I have no personal acquaintance with Dr. Peters, but the 
reputation he has left behind him in Zanzibar is the reverse of favourable.498  
Although Peters had resigned from the German East Africa Company, he did not disappear 
from the East African political scene. Rather, his resignation, or ‘leave of absence’ as he himself 
put it, came ‘in order to take over the leadership of the Emin Pasha Expedition.’499 Indeed only 
a month later Peters announced that he too would shortly form an expedition into the interior, 
traversing the British sphere.500  
The IBEA strongly protested this projected intrusion into their territory and made Salisbury 
aware that Stanley already had ‘accomplished the relief of Emin Pasha.’501 The German 
government’s response continued on the same lines: Peters’ activities would not receive 
‘countenance or support.’502 Peters had attempted to land his expedition at Lamu in March, 
but had been prevented by the Sultan. The German government’s policy toward the private 
venture had not thawed, according to Count Bismarck: ‘Dr. Peters was entirely discredited 
with the German Government, and […] they had nothing to do with the Emin Relief 
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Expedition.’ Quite on the contrary ‘they had been very glad that he should leave Germany, 
where he was embarrassing the Government by getting up meetings at various towns, at 
which he made high-flown and over-coloured speeches.’503  
Prince Bismarck even went so far as to prohibit Peters from arming his expedition, and cited 
the friendship of England to be infinitely more valuable than any new territories to be gained 
in East or Central Africa.504 In a later meeting between Euan Smith and Herbert Bismarck, the 
latter expressed his exasperation with the ‘unfortunate jealousies existing between the two 
Companies’ and that he agreed the German company should be entirely confined to the 
southern section of the mainland. Count Bismarck was said to be ‘…very sick and tired of 
Zanzibar complications’ and had little belief in the region’s economic potential. Indeed Euan 
Smith reported to Salisbury that he ‘gathered from his manner that he would be ready to go 
very far to meet any propositions you might think it necessary to advance, and that would 
result in a final solution to East African difficulties.’505 As it will be detailed in the following 
chapter Salisbury waited another six months before taking any heed of this advice, namely 
the negotiations which resulted in the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. In similarity with the 
agreement over the Lamu arbitration, the conversations between Euan Smith and Herbert 
Bismarck, in the summer of 1889, thus foreshadowed the following year’s bilateral 
negotiations in substance. In particular with respect to the north-south division of the 
mainland and from the fact that it was Germany that first suggested a comprehensive treaty. 
The Bismarck administration’s policy toward Peters and the German Emin Pasha Relief 
Committee garnered substantial negative attention among the German public who welcomed 
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Peters’ expansionist objectives. The jingoist publicity from the press was not abated by what 
was perceived to be bullying tactics employed by the British. Since the Anglo-German 
blockade on the coast was still in force, the Royal Navy had confiscated Peters’ arms and his 
steamer the Neera.506 That Bismarck nonetheless continued his policy against Peters in the 
face of so much popular opposition is testament to the true nature of Anglo-German rivalry 
in East Africa: it was a rivalry that derived from imperial agents in the form of the British and 
German companies. It was also a rivalry both governments attempted to contain, but which 
was prone to being stirred by jingoist sentiments among the press and general public. Despite 
Salisbury and Bismarck both being sensitive to public opinion and the lobbying from special 
interest groups, they were not willing to let a local conflict in the imperial periphery escalate 
so much as to jeopardise their bilateral relations.507 But this seemingly permissive policy 
toward Britain would come at a great cost to Bismarck who, as Perras argues, had mortally 
weakened his position in German politics partly over his opposition to Peters’ Emin Pasha 
Relief Expedition.508 
Finally, Peters landed on the coast of Witu in June and commenced his expedition the next 
month by following the Tana River into the interior via the Kenia Mountains.509 Despite its 
ostensibly obvious purpose, Peters’ motives in setting out into the interior were at the time 
somewhat unclear to British authorities. According to intelligence obtained by the new 
Consul-General, Gerald Portal, from his Agent at Lamu, R.T. Simons:  
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No one knows his object or intentions in proceeding up the Tana. The Germans 
here laugh at the Peters Emin Relief Expedition, and state Dr. Peters intends 
proceeding as far as possible, forming a new German Colony somewhere…510  
As the following chapter will demonstrate, Peters’ expedition spurred an unintended scramble 
between the IBEA and their German counterpart over the control of Uganda. It was a local 
rivalry that threatened Anglo-German bilateral relations. In an effort to defuse these tensions 
a general settlement of all outstanding colonial disputes was agreed – what became known 
as the Anglo-German ‘Heligoland-Zanzibar’ Treaty of 1890. 
 
Conclusion 
Two European colonial powers, one old and established, and the other a new-comer to the 
business of empire, had in East Africa been thrust together in close proximity. Complicating 
Anglo-German relations in this newfound neighbourliness was a combination of unwieldy 
men-on-the-spot and a jingoistic public opinion that forced the countries into a position of 
apparent competition. The political leadership in Britain and Germany were however both 
eager to defuse any notion of rivalry and conducted diplomatic relations on the most amicable 
terms, even as it turned out, to the cost of Bismarck’s political career. The most visible 
manifestation of this Anglo-German détente was the imposition of a joint naval blockade in 
1888. Although it was obvious that German high-handedness had incited Bushiri’s rebellion 
that embroiled it’s ‘sphere’ for the best part of eighteen months and that suppression of the 
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insurgency was the blockade’s main purpose, it would be disingenuous to suggest that British 
involvement was completely divorced from anti-slavery concerns.  
East Africa distinguished itself in the late 1880s within European public opinion as the last 
redoubt of any significant slave trafficking. The West African trade had long since been 
eradicated and so had slavery as an institution been abolished throughout the British colonies 
and most of the Western hemisphere. The issue had even been brought to the attention of 
Queen Victoria during the celebrations of her golden jubilee in 1887, which was testament to 
both the scale of the East African slave trade and the status of anti-slavery as a respectable 
and noble pursuit.511 In an elaborate memorial presented to her by the British and Foreign 
Anti-Slavery Society, she was congratulated for her own and her ministers’ efforts to end the 
slave trade, although the work was ‘still very far from being complete.’ In particular it was the 
‘desolating Slave Trade in Central and Eastern Africa which the noble-hearted Livingstone so 
earnestly drew attention to’ that the BFASS had singled out as the last remaining field for 
Britain’s efforts. According to the memorial the East African slave trade was:  
…still carried on with almost undiminished vigour, and the necessity exists for 
continued vigilance on the part of the Anti-Slavery Society, in order to influence 
public opinion and the Governments of the civilised world on behalf of the 
thousands carried off into captivity and Slavery to supply the demand 
throughout the Mohammedan countries of the East.’512 
The campaigns that followed in 1888-9 did certainly ‘influence public opinion’ in a way that 
must have exceeded even the BFASS’ most optimistic expectations. The revival of the slave 
trade in 1888 to pre-1873 levels accompanied by the agitation of the BFASS, Lavigerie and 
                                                          




Cameron conspired to rekindle the almost century-long abolitionist sentiment in the British 
public. Once the outrages of the East African slave trade had become common knowledge, 
the moral impetus for the political establishment to act became irresistible. The new-found 
notoriety of the trade presented both a challenge and an opportunity to British policymakers. 
On one hand it required a potentially significant outlay of funds to redouble the naval efforts 
to halt the trade; on the other hand it gave politicians and interested parties such as the 
Imperial British East Africa Company the opportunity to justify their colonisation of the region 
as a calculated measure against the slave trade.  
Some of the first practical consequences of this revamped commitment to anti-slave trade 
policy were the call for a second conference of the European powers concerning Africa. The 
Berlin Conference’s successor, what was termed the Anti-Slave Trade Conference, was held 
over the autumn, winter and spring of 1889-90 in Brussels. But the campaign’s most imminent 
effect was the imposition of an Anglo-German blockade of the East African coast. The 
blockade lasted a year from November 1888 and succeeded in reducing both slave trafficking 
and arms trading, but first and foremost indigenous resistance to German colonisation. As 
Miers drily remarked, the Germans ‘had early appreciated the propaganda value of stating 
their aims in humanitarian terms.’513 The weight of Britain’s long-term abolitionist 
commitment forced it into colluding with Germany’s counter-insurgency, clad as a mutual 
effort against the slave trade. Whilst the sincerity of German motives were questionable, the 
British motives were more nuanced. The joint naval action offered an unprecedented 
opportunity for the Royal Navy to monitor the entirety of the coast and French concessions 
finally afforded a limited right of search of vessels flying the tricolour, which were exactly the 
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ones guilty of carrying the most slaves. Despite these efforts, British cruisers intercepted far 
fewer slaves during the blockade than what it had in the year prior to it, but this was in part 
compensated for by Germany’s cruiser ‘Leipzig’ who liberated almost two hundred slaves 
during the operations.   
Yet, it would also be all too simple to dismiss the humanitarian justification as mere rhetoric. 
Politicians such as Salisbury were very much aware of the threat the actions of slave-raiders 
posed to the economic development of African colonies. In particular the Prime Minister 
referred in 1890 to the favourable effect on trade that the abolition of slave trading had had 
on West African commerce in the years following 1815.514  So even taking a cynical view of 
British motives, suppression of the slave trade could be construed as a self-interested rational 
economic choice.  
As regard to the territorial rivalry between the IBEA and their German counterparts, the main 
geographical areas of contention were the Island of Lamu directly outside Witu and the 
Equatorial Province of Emin Pasha in Southern Sudan. Whilst the former was quickly resolved 
by an agreement to forward it to an international arbitrator, the latter morphed into a major 
domestic problem for Bismarck and, although a complete failure for all parties involved, 
resulted in determining the scope of the East African partition. How it came to determine the 
geographical scope of the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890 will be the 
subject of the following chapter. The lengths to which the Bismarck administration distanced 
itself from Peters’ popular Emin Pasha Relief Expedition demonstrated his commitment to 
Anglo-German co-operation over East Africa. It also illustrates this chapter’s contention that 
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the rivalry between the two nations was not of an inter-governmental character, but derived 




The Second Partition of East Africa: British Imperialism by Proxy, 1889-90 
 
It was the second Anglo-German Agreement, the ‘Heligoland-Zanzibar’ Treaty of 1890 that 
determined the geographical scope of the East African partition. In return for the small island 
of Heligoland, Britain gained German recognition for a protectorate over Zanzibar, the cession 
of Witu and extension of its sphere of influence to comprise Uganda; in addition to further 
German concessions in eastern western and south-western Africa.515 The Sultanate of 
Zanzibar, what Britain’s Ambassador at Lisbon Sir Robert Morier only thirteen years earlier 
had described as one of the ‘four great landlords’ of the African continent together with 
Britain, Portugal and Egypt, had thus been formally incorporated into the British Empire.516  
Yet Zanzibar’s transition from a client-state to protectorate is not what has drawn the 
attention of most imperial historians who have examined the treaty’s role in the partition of 
East Africa. This privilege has largely been the preserve of the kingdom of Buganda which 
straddled the north-western banks of the Victoria Nyanza. It had over three centuries 
emerged as one of the most sophisticated and powerful polities in Central Africa, but by the 
1870-80s its position had come under threat from both external and internal forces.517  
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Threatened by Egyptian expansion from the north, the kabaka Mutesa had come to rely on 
Arab traders from Zanzibar for modern arms and ammunition, a presence which had also 
introduced Islam.518 Henry Morton Stanley’s encounter in 1875 prompted the CMS to 
despatch missionaries to Buganda, the first of which arrived on 30 June 1877.519 Only two 
years after the appearance of Protestant missionaries, ten French missionaries from the 
Catholic missionary society of the White Fathers based in Algiers arrived.520 When the kabaka 
Mwanga II ascended the throne upon the death of his father in October 1884, a systematic 
persecution of the growing numbers of Christian converts was instigated.521 It was also upon 
his orders that the Anglican Bishop James Hannington was executed en route from Zanzibar in 
October 1885. These politico-religious tensions between the Christian, Muslim and traditional 
factions in Buganda had in 1888 culminated in a coup d’état, an event which heralded the 
beginning of a civil war that continued into the early 1890s.522  
Whilst this chapter contends that this instability formed one of the most important reasons 
for why the kingdom was incorporated into the British sphere of influence in 1890, the 
dominant explanatory model has linked this expansion in East Africa with a geostrategic 
concern for Egypt and the Nile Valley. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher’s Egypto-centric 
proposition523 was seemingly a natural inference mostly derived from circumstantial 
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geographical evidence. In particular the alleged strategic importance of the River Nile which 
extends from the Victoria Nyanza to its delta by the Mediterranean. Due to Egyptian 
agriculture’s reliance on the river for irrigation, it was argued that British policymakers 
thought it imperative to secure its entire length, from the delta to its source. Egypt had 
assumed strategic importance for the British Empire, both as a base for the Royal Navy in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and as an international waterway since the Suez Canal provided the 
shortest navigable route between Britain and India. As the theory suggests, a succession of 
governments, most notably those led by Salisbury, would not let a rivalling European power 
establish itself in the Nile Valley and imperil Britain’s grip on Egypt by damming or deflecting 
the Nile.   
Such a general strategic explanation of the scramble renders intelligible not only why British 
policymakers were so preoccupied with a region of the world which had negligible economic 
value, but also why the map of Africa at the end of the partition was ‘coloured red’ in an 
almost unbroken line from Cairo in the north, to Cape Town in the south. Thus the explanatory 
model draws its strengths from the benefit of hindsight, and a bird’s eye view of late-Victorian 
imperial expansion, placing the partition of East Africa in a wider framework of imperial 
security centred on British India.   
But it is therein, through these rough grained generalisations and neglect of temporal 
sequence, that the model also finds its greatest weaknesses. Chapter two has demonstrated 
that long before the 1890 bilateral treaty with Germany, the Anglo-German Agreement of 
1886 and the adjoining hinterland understanding of 1887 had positioned the districts 
containing the Upper Nile within the British exclusion zone. Arguably, the initial treaty’s 
significance has been understated by the Egypto-centric historiography as no discernible 
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interest was displayed for Egypt at this time. And as this chapter will demonstrate, the IBEA’s 
protectorate over Uganda was obtained by the actions of a man-on-the-spot and ratified by 
Mackinnon in lieu of the lost Equatorial Province; none of which had been directed by either 
Salisbury or the ‘official mind’ of the Foreign Office.  
In order to comprehensively challenge once more the Egypto-centric interpretation of the 
Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty, this necessarily long chapter – the crux of the 
thesis – outlines three main arguments. Part one will show that the IBEA’s expansion into 
Uganda had resulted from imperial agency and economic expectations,524 not a consequence 
of grand strategy directed from London. Building on John Darwin’s path-breaking research.525 
Part two will scrutinise the evidence and assumptions underpinning the Egypto-centric model 
with a view at demonstrating that its basis is false: both in documentary terms, but also by 
virtue of the sequence of events and policy-decisions. Part three proposes a new 
interpretation of the treaty’s motives: a complex of factors, in which the cost-effective 
execution of Britain’s anti-slave trade policy; containment of local rivalry; and the acquisition 
of the regional trading port Zanzibar, feature most prominently.    
 
Part One: Uganda, the Men-on-the-Spot and an Unintended Treaty, 1889-90 
The IBEA had in June 1889 dispatched Frederick Jackson into the interior to avoid being 
outmanoeuvred by Peters’ Emin Pasha Relief Expedition.526 Jackson’s caravan reached the 
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company’s station Machakos 250 miles from the coast and proceeded from there in August, 
for the purpose of consolidating the IBEA’s influence within the British sphere.527 The 
company’s agent Sandys had received a similar set of orders from the directors to ‘forestall 
any attempt by Dr. Peters to annex the north bank of the Tana’. Thus he also organised an 
expedition aimed at treaty-making with the local chiefs.528 Stanley was reported to be in the 
vicinity of the Victoria Nyanza at this time with Emin Pasha, but after his farcical rescue of 
Emin, the expedition had descended into shambles.529 By September, Jackson had reached 
the territories of Usoga directly east of Uganda and his mission had been renamed the 'Stanley 
Relief Expedition’.530 
Jackson’s proximity to the Kingdom of Buganda in the autumn of 1889 was thus, in terms of 
colonial expansion, perfectly - albeit unintentionally - timed: Mwanga had been deposed by 
the Muslim faction and his half-brother Kalema held the throne.531 Mwanga, supported by the 
Christian factions, was in September 1889 understood to be 'eager to have the assistance of 
the English to replace him.'532 The Scottish missionary Alexander Mackay wrote concurrently 
letters to Mackinnon advocating annexation, however due to the long delay in 
communications neither Mackay nor Mwanga’s letters arrived until December. In Mackay’s 
view, securing the IBEA a protectorate over Uganda would mean holding the Victoria Nyanza 
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and the 'only market for ivory and for disposal of barter goods in all this vast region’. The other 
component to his argument derived from local strategic concerns:  
If Buganda continues to be in the hands of hostile Arabs, your Company will 
never be able to effect anything that signifies within the whole region of the 
Victoria Nyanza. The Equatorial Province is meantime lost. In lieu of it, and 
much better than it, lies Uganda, which must become a Protectorate of the 
Company unless you mean to have it your most powerful enemy. Now is the 
time for action, and for acquiring the right to hold the finest land in all East 
Africa.533  
Mackay’s words were echoed by Stanley as he returned from his Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, 
recommending: 'the conquest or the entire subjugation of Uganda to English interests' and 
the immediate construction of a railway from Mombasa to the Victoria Nyanza.534 
Jackson arrived at the company’s outpost Mumias on 7 November where he found a ‘long and 
rambling’ letter from Mwanga dated 15 June in which the ousted kabaka pleaded for his 
assistance.535 If Jackson could ‘be good enough to put [Mwanga] on [his] throne’ he would in 
return receive ‘plenty of ivory,’ ‘do any trade in Uganda’ and all he would ‘like in the 
country’.536 In addition there was a letter from the CMS’s Reverend Edward Cyril Gordon, 
which is also cited in Jackson’s memoir:  
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Mwanga is willing to offer you the most favourable terms he can for future use. 
We think that if you help him now you will be able to ask what terms you like, 
as they are in great distress.537 
However with the help of the Irish trader Charles Stokes and the Christian faction, Mwanga 
had by October managed to defeat Kalema and his Arab allies and reconquered his position.538 
Jackson proceeded to formulate a new letter to Mwanga to clarify the situation. Yet from his 
new vantage of power Mwanga was ‘in no immediate need of assistance’.539 In the IBEA’s 
efforts to secure paramountcy in the Equatorial Province the company’s directors had 
explicitly excluded Jackson from venturing into Uganda.540 So despite the fact that ‘Mwanga 
had offered almost all the Company could wish,’ Jackson, with 500 men armed with breech-
loaders at his disposal, could not offer Mwanga any assistance, since: ‘he could do nothing 
without further instructions from home, as he had been ordered not to get into Uganda.’541 
Nevertheless prior to departing Mumias for Mount Elgon, Jackson sent Mwanga ‘one of the 
Company’s flags, with the intimation that his acceptance of it would lay upon the Company 
the obligation to come to his assistance as a protecting power.’542  
Mwanga’s luck turned yet again when he was defeated by his brother Kalema’s allies in 
November 1889. On the advice of both Christian factions Mwanga wrote on 1 December a 
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new letter to Jackson in which he accepted his terms.543 Although no formal treaty of 
protection was signed, it was later recorded that the implication of Mwanga’s acceptance was 
tantamount to 'practically coming under the Protectorate of the country'.544 Jackson himself 
did however not discover that Mwanga had sanctioned his proposal until his return to Mumias 
in March 1890. 
By January Mwanga had reconquered his capital Mengo. Arab letters that had arrived in 
Zanzibar bore a definitive message: ‘Uganda is spoiled; all Arabs are killed. The place and 
country is now in the hands of Mwanga and the Europeans.’ The ‘downfall of Arab power’ was 
said to be ‘absolute and complete’.545 In March a letter dated 11 January from Stokes 
corroborated the earlier reports. Mwanga had ‘declared himself a Christian’ and used the 
allied Christian faction to vanquish the Swahili Arabs.546  However the Foreign Office was still 
unsure as to exactly which Europeans had assisted him. There were even reports suggesting 
that ‘the Belgians have been foremost in aiding Mwanga, and that the Belgian flag is flying at 
the capital of Uganda’.547 The reports seem to have caused little concern in the Foreign Office 
and Salisbury issued no orders to take control of the country.  
The IBEA was however not the only contender for Mwanga's favour. Peters, who headed the 
German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, arrived at the Bugandan capital Mengo in February 
1890 after having the previous month discovered both that Emin already had been rescued 
by Stanley and Mwanga’s letters in the IBEA station in Mumias. With only Buganda remaining 
as a potential field of colonisation, his intention was to sign a treaty of protection with the 
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kabaka.548 But Peters was unsuccessful and the only treaty signed was a ‘treaty of friendship’ 
between Buganda and Germany which committed the former to the principles of the Congo 
Act.549 Peters left Buganda in March 1890 and would, upon reaching the coast in June, discover 
that his efforts to further German territorial interests into the interior north of the British 
hinterland had been futile. 
Hence, the IBEA’s initial incursion into Uganda had come as a result of the failure to establish 
control of the Equatorial Province due to the collapse of Emin’s regime following Stanley’s 
rescue; whilst the decision to engage in talks with Buganda’s exiled ruler had been one taken 
solely by the IBEA’s man-on-the-spot Frederick Jackson in contradiction to his orders to avoid 
Uganda. Therefore, it is thus fair to conclude that this initial contact and treaty had not come 
about as a result of the IBEA’s nor indeed Salisbury’s alleged designs for the region.    
 
The Race for Uganda, 1890 
By the spring of 1890, a race was afoot for the control of Uganda. Bismarck’s resignation 
heralded uncertainty about German policy for the region; in particular whether Germany 
would move away from the doctrine of co-operation that was described in the foregoing 
chapter, and adopt a more expansionist stance. Peters had been unsuccessful in obtaining a 
Ugandan protectorate due to poor timing. As opposed to Jackson, he had met Mwanga after 
his victory when the kabaka had enjoyed a position of relative strength. Emin had arrived at 
Zanzibar on 3 March, and much to the regret of the IBEA, he had by April taken up service 
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with the Germans under Major Wissmann.550 With Emin in the service of Germany, 
Mackinnon could no longer realistically entertain any hope of amalgamating the Equatorial 
Province with that of the British sphere. However courtesy of Jackson’s unintended treaty, 
nearby Uganda assumed the status of a consolation prize.   
In early March, there were rumours that Wissmann was planning a large expedition into the 
interior to secure Uganda for Germany. Euan Smith speculated that the German Imperial 
Commissioner would use the rivalry to his advantage; specifically whether Wissmann would 
offer support to the Catholic ‘Wa-Fransa’ faction and thereby eject British influence. He 
warned that: ‘If Uganda passes under German influence, [the] British Company has no future 
before it.’551 The consul’s analysis was an economic one; he believed the IBEA’s financial future 
was linked to the exploitation of the rich trading networks of the inter-lacustrine region and 
not to the barren coast and its immediate hinterland. If Germany took control of Uganda, the 
privately funded and hitherto highly unprofitable IBEA would be left with little but the largely 
unproductive and sparsely populated territories of East Africa. This was a prospective future 
which offered little but financial ruin for the company.  
Nevertheless, the rumours of Wissmann’s expedition were only five days later contravened 
with intelligence reports suggesting that Berlin had issued ‘stringent orders’ that ‘Wissmann 
would have to abandon for the present all designs on Uganda.’552 The reports were followed 
on 21 March by news from Berlin: Bismarck had resigned as German chancellor.553 His 
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retirement heralded uncertainty for Germany’s East African policy.554 The German Consul-
General had been convinced:  
that the conduct of East African affairs would now be taken charge of by His 
Majesty himself, and that German enterprise in these latitudes would either be 
pushed with a wholly unexpected impetus, or would be suffered to collapse.555  
The British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Edward Malet, had in February made it clear that the 
Emperor was an ‘ardent supporter of […] colonial policy’ which would presuppose the new 
direction assumed by German policymakers in regard to East Africa.556 Despite the Emperor’s 
explicit reassurances that German foreign policy would ‘continue absolutely on the same lines 
as heretofore’ the aftershock of the iron chancellor’s fall was felt in distant Zanzibar.557 Since 
on the same day as Bismarck’s resignation, Wissmann had reassumed the preparations for his 
expedition and requisitioned 500 porters from the Sultan.558 The Imperial Commissioner’s 
plans were however thought to be independent of the German Consul-General and it was 
unclear whether the new government would sanction any future treaties gained by an 
expedition into the interior.559  
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The German expedition planned to set out on 20 April under the leadership of Emin to gain 
treaties from the tribes surrounding the Victoria Nyanza and Uganda.560 Euan Smith was 
persuaded that: 
The future of English interests in Central Africa depends on our immediate 
action in regard to Uganda, whose King is now ready to ally himself with first 
comers, believing his present position wholly insecure unless supported by 
white men.561  
In order to forestall the German plans, he recommended the immediate appointment of an 
officer to act as ‘Her Majesty’s Consul for the North Victoria Nyanza and Kingdom of 
Uganda.’562 ‘His early appearance upon the scene of action…’ he argued ‘would be a great 
desideratum at the present juncture of affairs.’563 Thus, through official diplomatic means 
Uganda would be secured by the British Empire.  
However, in complete contradiction to any suggestion of an imperial grand strategy to 
safeguard Uganda, Salisbury refused Euan Smith’s suggestion, notifying him that: ‘it is not 
advisable in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government to appoint at present a British Consular 
officer to reside in Uganda.’564 Surprised by recent events, Salisbury had sought to verify and 
learn the ‘exact nature’ of the IBEA’s intentions of ‘securing paramount influence in 
Uganda.’565 The company later informed him that ‘a special caravan’ under the leadership of 
Captain Frederick Lugard had been sent ‘with the utmost dispatch’ for the purpose of 
‘concluding a Treaty with Mwanga and promising him the support of the Company’.566 Hence, 
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a local scramble for Uganda had taken place in the spring of 1890, entirely divorced from any 
geo-strategic considerations.  
 
‘The great trade markets of Central Africa’567: Uganda, the Upper Nile and Imperial Interests, 
1890 
Prior to the company’s despatch of Lugard, both the IBEA and the Foreign Office experts 
considered an expansion into the interior important only in relation to the viability of Britain’s 
position in East Africa. At this juncture, the plight of the CMS missionaries was hardly 
mentioned, which stands in stark contrast to political deliberations and public campaigns 
organised by the society in regard to the proposed evacuation of Uganda in 1892. As will be 
demonstrated below, the bilateral negotiations of May 1890 resulted from Anglo-German 
friction over the small German protectorate at Witu and its adjoining islands Manda and Patta. 
This local arbitration was later expanded to a general settlement of outstanding colonial 
disputes.   
The developments in East Africa and the impending negotiations with the new German 
Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, led Salisbury to order a memorandum to be drawn up in order to 
evaluate the status quo with regard to Anglo-German territorial disputes in Africa. On 24 
March, Anderson presented his memorandum which listed thirteen separate issues. He 
believed Britain stood a good chance of winning all the issues pending in East Africa which 
included the islands of Patta and Manda, and the right of the IBEA to ‘conclude Treaties 
behind Witu’.568 The Foreign Office had interviewed key stakeholders to inform government 
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policy in the region. These included the former Consul to Zanzibar Sir John Kirk (at this point 
an IBEA director), the current Consul-General Gerald Portal and IBEA’s chairman William 
Mackinnon.  
Kirk had attached such importance to the consolidation of the British sphere that he had 
advised the government to relinquish Zanzibar altogether in return for a German cession of 
Witu to Britain.569 The advice was a surprising one, seeing that Kirk was perhaps the individual 
that had done the most to mould Zanzibar into a British client state.570 Regardless, the Foreign 
Office chose to ignore Kirk’s advice, construing his analysis and conclusion of inevitable 
German supremacy over the region as flawed. Anderson doubted both the Reichstag’s 
continued appetite for funding their costly East African colonial venture, or that British public 
opinion would allow for a cession of Zanzibar to Germany.571 However should Britain have 
made concessions to Germany in Zanzibar it would be expected that this would lead to the 
cession of Witu and leave the entire northern sphere British.  
In concluding the East African section of the memorandum, Anderson speculated about a 
scenario in which Germany kept Witu. In such a case, the region separating the Tana River to 
the south and the Abyssinian border to the north would fall to German hands in the event of 
a final delimitation. This arrangement would entail Mackinnon giving up his claims to ‘Lamu 
and Kismayu, […] Patta and Manda, and his Treaties north of the Tana, behind Witu’. 
Anderson noted that: ‘Sir W. Mackinnon would assent to this, but would require something 
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more, and reasonably, for the Nile Basin is properly in our “Hinterland.”’572 Hence, Anderson 
confirmed that the region of the Upper Nile, which included Uganda and potentially the 
Equatorial Province, was already within the British hinterland and as such not subject to 
negotiation. Mackinnon would be willing to accept that Germany kept Witu only as long as he 
received a substantial reward such as the Kilimanjaro and the port of Tanga.573  
Mackinnon took the opportunity to impress upon Salisbury the achievements of his company 
in the British sphere. In the two years since it had received its royal charter, the IBEA had 
constructed infrastructure such as telegraph wires, inland stations and was operating 
steamers on the Tana River. More was planned such as placing steamers on the Victoria 
Nyanza and laying 30 miles of light railway track from Mombasa.574 But he also warned that 
he considered the German company a mortal threat to the IBEA and by extension the British 
presence in East Africa. Unless this threat could be neutralised, he hinted that the company 
might consider retiring: 
If we can be assumed of your Lordship’s support against German 
encroachments, we can continue to prosecute our enterprise with vigour and 
energy. Otherwise we feel that in the face of the embarrassment and 
difficulties which continuous hostile German action and fresh German claims 
raise, it may become a question for the grave and earnest deliberation of the 
Directors how far they are justified in proceeding with an enterprise which has 
so much to discourage it.575 
In similarity with Kirk and the Foreign Office, Mackinnon expressed his fears of being 
enveloped by German spheres to both the north and south.576 Mackinnon did little to hide his 
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animosity to his German counterpart and cited one of Peters’ self-proclaimed actions in East 
Africa:  
In his own letter, published a short time ago in the German press, he stated 
that he had shot the Sultan of the Gallas, that he had caused the British flag to 
be handed down and burnt in the presence of the tribe, and had taken over 
the goods deposited in this Company’s station.577  
Although the story is liable to have been exaggerated, Peters’ recent violent actions during 
his expedition up the Tana River, in which he attempted to forestall Mackinnon in securing 
the Equatorial province, afford credibility to his anecdotal evidence.578 In his letter, 
Mackinnon also put forward a veiled threat of the company evacuating East Africa, leaving 
the British sphere vacant to German exploitation or, in the event of state intervention, adding 
to the financial burdens of the British government:  
we feel that the actions of the Germans in endeavouring to surround us with 
their territory is forcing us into a position of extreme gravity, which renders it 
questionable whether we are justified in expending more of the money 
entrusted to our charge without some clear understanding that the interests 
of the Company and its shareholders shall be safeguarded and protected by 
Her Majesty’s Government.579  
Mackinnon’s argument is important for understanding why the British government was eager 
to sanction the IBEA’s claims in Uganda. Without it, the company was likely to fail and the 
expensive responsibility of exerting effective occupation over East Africa would instead fall 
upon the government.  
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Only a week after the circulation of the Foreign Office memorandum, Charles Euan Smith, the 
British Consul-General to Zanzibar, also seized on the opportunity to influence the impending 
negotiations. He pressed upon the Prime Minister the importance of the IBEA securing the 
interior and ‘the great trade markets of Central Africa.’580 According to the Consul, the IBEA 
should immediately:  
…change its line of policy, to strive after the line substance which awaits them 
in the interior instead of attempting to grapple the shadow which eternally 
eludes them upon the coast581  
Just like Kirk and Mackinnon, Euan Smith was persuaded that the German company seemingly 
had ‘unlimited power to draw upon Imperial German resources’ to develop its East African 
sphere. The spending power was ostensibly substantial: ‘For every rupee the British Company 
spend in Zanzibar the Germans spend at least two thousand.’ It was an impossible situation 
for the IBEA, already struggling financially, unless it sought out the allegedly lucrative markets 
for trade in the inter-lacustrine region.  
If Britain was not to completely lose its position in the region to Germany, radical changes 
would have to be made to the company’s policy. Indeed Euan Smith had unambiguous advice 
for Mackinnon: 
…they should gird themselves to the task and decide on the construction and 
immediate commencement on a large scale of the railway from Mombasa to 
Victoria Nyanza and that they should at all costs, without one moment’s 
unnecessary delay, make their position unassailable in Uganda and upon the 
Lake.582  
                                                          





The Consul trivialised what would be such an ambitious scheme’s principal stumbling block, 
namely the considerable cost of financing a 600 mile railway traversing a desolate region of 
Africa.583 Euan Smith obviously subscribed to the orthodox wisdom, hitherto professed by 
Anderson and Holmwood,584 that it was the interior region that represented the IBEA’s 
economic future. The earlier the company could secure its position in Uganda and connect it 
with the coast, the sooner it could turn a profit and thus secure Britain’s position in East Africa. 
Euan Smith hints at the race which was at the time afoot for control of the interior:  
Now that the Germans have cast their eyes upon Equatorial Africa as the 
battlefield for future supremacy, it is in those regions, to a certainty, that the 
battle will have to be fought. The British Company therefore, must recognize 
this fact without delay and having recognized it must decide to accept or to 
retire from the conflict.585  
This line of reasoning is divorced from the substantial historiography which suggests British 
policymakers were actuated by the strategic imperative of securing the Nile to protect Egypt. 
Whilst there was a push for the interior, it came about for economic reasons: the River Nile 
or the Upper Nile Valley were simply geographical designations and not objectives per se. 
Despite what is alluded to by Ronald Hyam, no mention was either made of the Mahdist 
threat in the Sudan nor of the CMS presence in regard to Uganda.586 The internal Foreign 
Office deliberations were entirely focussed on what expansion would mean in commercial 
terms.  
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The British Consul concluded his letter to Salisbury with a postscript: ‘I believe Mr. Rhodes 
would at any time be prepared to accept any responsibilities in connection with Mombasa, 
the Victoria Nyanza and the Kingdom of Uganda.’587 Euan Smith was probably correct in his 
presumption. Rhodes offered two years later to hold Uganda for a ‘relatively minor annual 
subsidy’, although his offer would be denied by Rosebery as he considered it an ‘evasion of 
our responsibilities,’ indicating that the occupation of Uganda was an imperial concern for the 
government.588 
At the beginning of April, Malet met with Count von Berchem, Caprivi’s Undersecretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. Berchem categorically denied the press speculations of a German 
plan to use the expedition headed by Emin to encroach on the British sphere.589 Emin was 
confined to operate entirely within German hinterland. Berchem further thought it advisable 
to reopen the negotiations over Witu with a view of enabling the IBEA to purchase it from the 
German company, as this would avoid further friction between the chartered companies.590 
Salisbury had evidently been convinced by Berchem’s assurances since he proceeded to deny 
Euan Smith’s suggestion of despatching a diplomatic official to Uganda. At the end of April, 
the IBEA announced that they had ratified the agreement between Jackson and Mwanga of 
December 1889. Consequently their agent Mackenzie declared: ‘that Uganda and the 
countries dependent on it are now included in within the sphere of influence of the British 
Company.’591 It was in this period of heightened tension over the interior and, as the following 
section will show; over Witu and the adjoining islands of Manda and Patta, that it was agreed 
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to settle the disputed African territories diplomatically through bilateral discussions in 
Berlin.592  
 
Part Two: Witu and the Prelude to Partition, 1889-90 
Based on a treaty with the local chief Ahmed ibn Fumo Bakari, Germany had declared 
‘Wituland’ a protectorate in May 1885, shortly after those of Carl Peters’ Society for German 
Colonisation’s territories in Usagara.593 Whilst the majority of Germany’s East African holdings 
were situated in this southerly region courtesy of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886, Witu 
was a political and geographical anomaly. Held by the brothers Clemens and Gustav Denhardt 
through their Deutsche Witugesellschaft (DWG), it was an enclave that was entirely separate 
from Peters’ venture.  
The miniature protectorate had long been a bone of contention for the IBEA, especially since 
the British company had maintained an ambition of consolidating its territorial holdings in an 
unbroken line between the rivers Umba in the south to Juba in the north.594  As was shown in 
the foregoing chapter, Salisbury and Bismarck had already in January 1889 agreed to 
arbitration over the island of Lamu just off the coast of Witu after the German Witu Company 
had, contrary to the provision of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886, annexed it.595  
When Witu had been expanded in October 1889 to comprise the Somali port of Kismayu, the 
IBEA had complained to Consul Euan Smith that they ‘are desirous of establishing the most 
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friendly relations with them to the south, but this can only be when they cease to hamper and 
weary us to the north.’596 Indeed the company’s director George Mackenzie could only 
foresee: ‘endless worry and annoyance to the Foreign Office, the Zanzibar Consulate, and the 
Company […] if these disputes are not finally and promptly settled’597  
Euan Smith met the former German Foreign Secretary, the Ambassador Paul von Hatzfeldt in 
November, and had brought an offer from the IBEA. The company were: ‘willing to 
compensate the Witu Company for their outlay […] if the German Government will withdraw 
their Protectorate over the Sultan of Witu’.598 From what he had gathered from his 
conversations with Hatzfeldt, Euan Smith speculated whether the German government was 
mediating a new policy toward East Africa. It included the assumption of direct control over 
its chartered companies and the absorption of Zanzibar into a European colonial empire. 
Another calculated aspect to this policy was:  
…the intention so to develop the situation at Witu, and within the newly-
declared Protectorate, as to render the position extremely difficult and 
disagreeable to the British Government and to the English Company, and so to 
bring about the compulsory offer of a sufficient quid pro quo in order to insure 
the complete withdrawal of the Germans from the north.599  
And lastly; ‘[t]hat such compensation is hoped for in the direction of South Africa, and with 
reference to the new Charter granted to the South African Company.’600 Evidently, Euan Smith 
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speculated whether Germany was using Witu simply as a pawn to induce British concessions 
elsewhere.  
Already by the summer of 1889, the German authorities had lost its hope for any substantial 
economic rewards in East Africa. It had only been the expansionist German public opinion that 
had kept the government from evacuating the region. According to Euan Smith, who had met 
Count Herbert Bismarck, the German foreign secretary reportedly:  
…believed that the commercial value of East African enterprise was altogether 
fictitious; that it was by no means the El Dorado expected; but that he had to 
consider German public opinion, however wrongfully informed it might be.601  
These sentiments were certainly not exclusive to German policymakers. Seemingly 
exasperated by the unrealistic economic expectations a jingoistic public opinion had 
entertained for East Africa, Salisbury had in the following spring echoed the younger 
Bismarck’s pronouncements to Malet almost verbatim: 
To some minds just at present, both in Germany and in England, the interior of 
Africa in the line of the great lakes occupied the position & offered the 
attractions of the El Dorado of the 16th century, I do not think such anticipations 
were grounded upon fact, & these feelings would probably melt away as 
practical experience increased.602 
The other important aspect Euan Smith had gauged from his discussions which he 
communicated to Salisbury, particularly with regard to the ‘Lamu arbitration’,603 was that  
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Bismarck: ‘would be ready to go very far to meet any propositions you might think it necessary 
to advance, and that would result in a final solution to East African difficulties.’604 
As the Anglo-German negotiations of May 1890 revealed, the territories surrounding Lake 
Nyassa was the region which ‘the Emperor had set his heart.’605 But any exchange of Witu for 
a district which had been subject to such heavy involvement by British missionaries was 
completely unacceptable to the British government. The expectation of the British public’s 
negative reaction to such a scenario was enough to immediately exclude it from any serious 
contemplation. In fact, Britain would rather let Germany keep Witu than relinquish ‘the 
country in which Livingstone had died.’606 This underlines the importance of the 
memorialisation of Livingstone in the decades after his death;607 the sentimental attachment 
to this ‘imperial martyr’ was indeed sufficient to influence the geographical scope of the 
partition.  
Between October and December 1889, the IBEA continued its extensive lobbying campaign to 
rid itself of its German competitor in Witu. It was during this frantic campaign that the 
company first launched the argument that its position in East Africa excluded any other power 
from holding the Nile basin.608 However, as Anderson made clear five months later, the ‘Upper 
Nile’ had throughout the proceedings remained within the British hinterland, irrespective of 
the power which held Witu.609 This Nilotic argument would resurface again in another 
campaign, but not until 1892 when the IBEA had depleted its financial reserves and were in 
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urgent need of government assistance to maintain its occupation of Uganda as is detailed in 
the following chapter.610 
Its countermoves were also transmitted to the Foreign Office over the following weeks: the 
company had entered into treaties with all the chiefs between the Juba and Tana Rivers.611 By 
securing the Witu hinterland, it could effectively envelop the German protectorate at Witu, 
but this required both the British government’s sanction and recognition by Germany. It even 
emerged in November 1889 that the IBEA had initiated negotiations with the German 
Wituland Company over the sale of the latter’s rights and assets.612 This private solution 
proved however to be short-lived, for three weeks later the German Company informed the 
IBEA that the German protectorate could not be withdrawn, which precluded a sale.613    
In December 1889, Salisbury contacted his German counterparts and suggested the disputed 
territory of Witu and the adjacent islands of Manda and Patta should be subject to 
arbitration.614 The following February, Hatzfeldt met Salisbury at his estate in Hatfield to 
discuss East African affairs, and suggested expanding the negotiations to include other 
outstanding colonial matters.615 Yet when the German ambassador suggested that the IBEA 
should immediately be forced to relinquish the concession it had gained from the Sultan to 
administrate the islands of Manda and Patta (situated just off the Witu coastline), Salisbury 
refused. Hence, no changes would be made until the negotiations had taken place. More 
importantly, Germany had, following its own suggestion, expanded the remit of the 
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discussions and by way of arbitration committed to a general settlement of its colonial affairs 
in Africa.616  
The question of these seemingly insignificant islands of Manda and Patta was raised again on 
20 February 1890. The geographical proximity of the islands to the German protectorate, 
according to the head of the German Foreign Office’s Colonial Department Dr Friedrich 
Krauel, formed an ‘impediment’ to the development of its trade.617  However the main issue 
at hand from Bismarck’s perspective was that the ‘unexpected occupation’ of the islands by 
the IBEA had ‘given rise to strong expressions of feeling in the German press, and had led to 
articles insulting to himself for permitting it.’618  
Apart from the negative press this garnered for the German government, just prior to the 
1890 election, Bismarck was concerned that Kaiser Wilhelm II disapproved of his permissive 
policy. As Malet put it, Bismarck ‘…had an Imperial master who was a more ardent supporter 
of the Colonial policy than he was himself.’619 Bismarck did also recognise Salisbury’s ‘difficulty 
in dealing with the question in consequence of the necessity of keeping on good terms with 
certain Parliamentary supporters’.620 And he was keen to stress that the ‘importance of 
friendly relations between England and Germany was of far greater moment than the 
ownership of Manda and Patta.’621 But it was exactly on this issue that he hoped Britain could 
consider ‘German susceptibilities’ in dealing with the question.622 The evidence presented in 
this chapter thus lends further credence to the theory that Bismarck’s moderate colonial 
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policy contributed to his downfall in March 1890: both due to his non-support for Peters’ Emin 
Pasha Expedition, as posited by Arne Perras,623 and also over the small islands of Manda and 
Patta. 
 
The Second East African Partition: Anglo-German Negotiations, 1890 
The bilateral negotiations that resulted in the Anglo-German Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty 
commenced in May 1890 upon German initiative. Indeed, Hatzfeldt had been ‘impressed with 
the importance to the two countries, of a general settlement on a broad basis, which would 
appease and avert the jealousies and rivalries now unfortunately existing.’624 It was the two 
countries’ respective Africa experts that would lead the discussions: Anderson and Krauel.625 
Both were well acquainted, having both been delegates at the recently concluded Anti-Slavery 
Conference in Brussels.626 Anderson had been given a set of instructions which included 
stipulations that the Germans should be induced to sell Witu to the IBEA and if they were 
unwilling, that the matter should be referred to judgement by an arbitrator. Of the thirteen 
points to be raised, the question of the ‘East African “Hinterland”’ figured a rather lowly 
number eleven. Upon this point, Salisbury had instructed Anderson that: 
The claim on our side to be that the line of latitude for us in the north should 
run from Kilimanjaro, not from Kavirondo, and that we ought to hold the whole 
of the Nile watershed; to the south that we must hold the territory to the west 
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of the Stevenson road.627  
Salisbury added that: 'The discussion [was] to be opened on this basis, and the Germans to be 
drawn to show their hand.'628 Implicitly, Salisbury did not attach an overarching importance 
to the Nile. It was neither a foremost priority, nor was it a definitive demand. The negotiations 
were merely to be opened on a basis in which the British side indicated an interest for 
territories that included the Nile watershed. Perceived in this light it may be argued that the 
‘Nile watershed’ was simply used as a convenient geographical point of reference, rather than 
as an explicit expression of Salisbury’s unwavering interest in the Nile per se.  
However since both parties had informally agreed to separate the British and German spheres 
into a northern and southern zone, Anderson suggested at the opening of the negotiations 
that their 'work would be facilitated by settling at once points which were not contended; 
regarding the 'Hinterland' Agreement of 1887 in this light.' It was thus consented in:  
Germany's having the east coasts of the Nyassa and Tanganyika, whilst it is 
agreed to by them that a line of demarcation shall be drawn to the Congo State, 
west of Victoria Nyanza, along the 1st parallel of south latitude.629  
Hence, Uganda was among the first territories secured by Britain owing to the fact that it was 
not disputed by Germany. The hinterland doctrine ensured that the territories north-west of 
the Victoria Nyanza belonged within the British sphere; a natural consequence of the earlier 
1886 Agreement which was somewhat clarified in regard to adjoining hinterlands in 1887. It 
was also a result of the independent actions of the IBEA, which had, crucially, not been 
directed by the Foreign Office. The matter was kept secret,630 even from the party with the 
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greatest stake in the proceedings, the CMS. A week later, its secretary George Hutchinson, 
urged Mackinnon to secure Uganda out of concern for the society’s missionaries:  ‘I am 
anxious that Lord S[alisbur]y should declare the entire Uganda Kingdom including its 
tributaries as within English influence.’631 The CMS’s tentative lobbying was a premonition of 
its heavy involvement in influencing public opinion upon the occupation of Uganda in 1891-2, 
which is a matter that is considered in detail in chapter five.   
Mackinnon's designs on the interior comprising the regions to the west of the Victoria Nyanza, 
and potentially by extension the ‘Nile watershed,’ had been unknown to Salisbury until 
February 1890.632 The German ambassador Hatzfeldt had presented him with copies of 
Mackinnon’s letters to Stanley. The correspondence had taken a circuitous route: Bushiri’s 
men had likely seized them from one of the IBEA’s messengers and Herrmann von Wissmann 
had in turn confiscated the letters upon apprehending the Arab insurgency’s leader Bushiri 
bin Salim in December 1889,633 whereupon they had been transmitted to Berlin. In addition 
to revealing Mackinnon’s desire to annex parts of the German hinterland, the letters also 
made clear what Salisbury considered Mackinnon’s ‘intensely hostile animus’ toward the 
Germans, and the grounds on which he had despatched the Emin Expedition:  
[t]he important part of them is that which reveals Sir W. Mackinnon's designs 
on what the Germans would call their "Hinterland". It may serve to explain the 
Emin Expedition.634  
The letters illustrate why the British and German governments thought it expedient to come 
to a settlement over the African partition: since the rivalry between the two countries’ 
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respective agents was spiralling. It was a rivalry that could potentially stir up public opinion 
with its associated negative consequences for Anglo-German relations.635 Additionally, in 
contravention of the orthodox historiography, it demonstrates that Salisbury had not directed 
the IBEA into the region comprising the Nile watershed; the Emin Relief Expedition came as a 
result of Mackinnon’s own initiative, and Salisbury had not even been privy to Mackinnon’s 
expansionist agenda.  
The conclusion of the negotiations resulted in German territories being entirely confined to 
the southern section of the mainland and the British to the north. This was in line with the 
views Count Herbert Bismarck had expressed already in July 1889.636 Moreover, it led to 
Zanzibar being incorporated as a British protectorate. No such honour was bestowed upon 
the territories held on the mainland, including Uganda and the Nile watershed. Thus 
Salisbury’s decision not to declare Uganda a protectorate simultaneously with Zanzibar is 
wholly inconsistent with the Nilotic explanatory model. Should he have attached such 
significance to defending the source of this river, he surely would have afforded the region 
protectorate status. Instead, it merely formed part of a British ‘sphere of influence,’ the lowest 
rung in the British Empire’s territorial hierarchy and only recognised as such by Germany. 
Testament to the prevailing sentiment among British business circles and public opinion is 
Salisbury’s portrayal in one of London’s most popular satirical magazines. Before the results 
of the negotiations had been announced, Salisbury had held a speech at the Merchant and 
Taylors’ Company in London where he had termed Africa as a 'most embarrassing and 
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inconvenient continent'.637 Salisbury’s apparent reluctance to expand the empire in East Africa 
had attracted criticism and the prime minister was, rather undeservedly in light of the treaty’s 
results, lampooned in the weekly magazine Punch.638 For German concessions in Africa, 
Britain would in return cede the north-sea island of Heligoland to Germany.639 Although an 
expression of the principle of do ut des as Anderson remarked immediately prior to the 
negotiations, it had been very much in Britain’s favour.640 
 
Part Three: The Partition of 1890 and the Inconsistencies of the Egypto-centric Explanatory 
Model 
Thus, as the chapter already has established, the extension of the British sphere of influence 
to comprise Uganda was principally a result of sub-imperial agency and economic 
expectations. Salisbury recognised the expansion in order to maintain the financial viability of 
Britain’s commercial and humanitarian policy-tool in the region. Equally, the negotiations 
which culminated in this partition was a consequence of the Salisbury and Bismarck 
administrations’ efforts at defusing the local rivalry over Witu and attendant public agitation, 
and had been planned long in advance of the latter’s resignation. Yet, historians have 
positioned the Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty of 1890 within an Egypto-centric paradigm 
of geo-strategy.  
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The documentary basis of this interpretation, what Darwin termed ‘astonishingly slender’,641 
rested on Gwendolyn Cecil’s uncited assertion that Salisbury became preoccupied with the 
Nile Valley during the autumn of 1889;642 the correspondence of Britain’s proconsul in Egypt 
Sir Evelyn Baring; and lastly, Salisbury’s statements to the House of Lords in July 1890. In 
addition to this, a new theory has emerged which suggests British authorities were actuated 
by ‘water imperialism’ in their ostensible quest to hold the Nile and thus annex East Africa.643  
The principal assumption underpinning the strategic model is the geopolitical primacy of 
Egypt and, by extension, the Nile Valley. An inconvenient aspect to this Egypto-centric 
interpretation is the cross-party consensus to evacuate Egypt that remained evident 
throughout the 1880’s. While this desire was more keenly expressed by the Liberals, 
Salisbury’s two administrations had both in 1885 and in 1887 dispatched Sir Henry 
Drummond-Wolff to Constantinople in order to negotiate the terms of a British evacuation 
with the Sublime Porte.644 The incentive was undoubtedly strong: if Salisbury could rid Britain 
of the Egyptian millstone he would normalise Anglo-French relations and loosen his 
dependence upon German diplomatic support. However, both diplomatic missions failed to 
achieve a Turkish ratification due to the heavy pressure exerted upon the Porte by France and 
Russia. Since neither approved of the clause which gave Britain a right of reoccupation should 
renewed disturbances arise in Egypt.645 
The ‘right of re-entry’ was important to Britain as its main policy objective was to restore 
Egyptian finances. This would enable the country to pay off its debts to the European 
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bondholders and ensure political stability; as Salisbury expressed to the House of Lords in 
1885: ‘finance is really the question of the first importance […] nothing can be done until a 
satisfactory balance-sheet is established in Egypt’.646 Once the Porte had failed to ratify the 
treaty, Salisbury decided to await the situation, but this did not imply a decision to effect a 
permanent occupation, rather ‘to sit still and drift awhile’.647 Indeed his under-secretary of 
state for foreign affairs, Sir James Fergusson, expressed to Parliament as late as February 1891 
that the government: 'have given ample proofs of their intention that their occupation and 
their direct influence in Egypt shall not be permanent.’648 Hence, it is beyond doubt that 
Egyptian security concerns were divorced from the decision to enter into the Anglo-German 
Agreement of 1886 since Salisbury was actively seeking a British withdrawal from Egypt at the 
time.  
However, Robinson et al. argues that by the autumn of 1889, Salisbury’s policy with regard to 
Egypt and the Nile Valley had, allegedly, completely changed; and this volte face led him to 
arrange for what became the Heligoland Treaty of 1890. Robinson et al.’s principal causal 
connection between this newfound concern for the Nile valley and the partition of East Africa 
was the letter Britain’s resident at Cairo had sent Salisbury in December 1889. It suggests 
Baring had been convinced of the necessity of securing Egypt’s water supplies: ‘Whatever 
Power holds the Upper Nile Valley must by the mere force of its geographical position, 
dominate Egypt.’649 It is further suggested that Salisbury attached particular importance to 
Baring’s advice and that it was on this basis that the prime minister contacted his German 
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counterpart the following week to arrange for an arbitration to take place over East Africa. 
Thus, Robinson et al. links Baring’s ‘Sudan policy,’ otherwise known as his proposal to re-
conquer the Sudan, with the westerly expansion of the British sphere in East Africa to 
comprise Uganda.650  
Whether Salisbury, by the end of 1889 suddenly had changed his mind about the occupation 
of Egypt and by extension the Nile Valley including Uganda, as argued by Robinson et al., is 
extremely doubtful. A sudden preoccupation with the Nile Valley, what Darwin terms a 
‘Pauline conversion’,651 would certainly have constituted a radical departure from his 
previous held views and policies. In December 1888, he had scorned those in favour of a 
forward policy in the region as a ‘curious collection of fanatics who believe that by some magic 
wave of the diplomatic wand the Soudan can be turned into a second India.’652 Not to mention 
his curt characterisation of Baring’s military advisers’ suggestion of Turkish troops occupying 
the Red Sea port of Tokar in March 1890:  
I would not be too much impressed by what the soldiers tell you about the 
strategic importance of those places. It is their way. If they would be allowed full 
scope, they would insist on the importance of garrisoning the Moon in order to 
protect us from Mars.653  
And, as the former section made clear, even Mackinnon himself had not been aware of his 
agent’s illicit rendezvous with Buganda’s exiled ruler in November 1889, much less 
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Salisbury.654 Nor had Salisbury been privy to Mackinnon’s expansionist agenda for the 
Equatorial Province until February 1890.655 Hence, Salisbury’s suggestion of arbitration with 
Germany over Witu and the islands of Manda and Patta in December 1889 had not derived 
from concerns over Uganda: his suggestion implied no ulterior motives, they were quite 
simply an effort to resolve the local dispute concerning Witu and the adjoining islands.656 It 
was the Germans who, later in February 1890, desired to expand the arbitration into a general 
settlement of all outstanding disputes over African territories between the two countries, out 
of concern for public opinion in the run-up to the election.657 
 
The Limits to Sir Evelyn Baring’s Nile Valley Doctrine 
Notwithstanding the body of evidence which has been presented in this and previous 
chapters which demonstrates that the linkage made between Baring’s ‘Sudan policy’ and the 
partition of East Africa was incorrect, it was also a misquotation of Baring’s correspondence. 
Indeed, Baring never suggested that Britain should occupy Uganda in order to secure the Nile 
Valley, as was alluded to by Robinson et al. Baring even issued a few months’ later explicit 
warnings against any such expansion.658 What he had referred to was the Nile’s south-eastern 
affluent, the Atbara River, and not the White Nile which takes its source from the Victoria 
Nyanza. Italy had at the time threatened to occupy the city of Kassala, through which ran the 
Atbara River, and Baring had been convinced that an Italian occupation of the city would 
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damage Britain’s prestige in Egypt.659 Indeed, Baring elaborated his Nile argument in two 
passages by specifically excluding the Equatorial Province and by implication Uganda: ‘that 
the Government which rules the delta of the Nile should also hold the banks of the river, if 
not to its source, at all events for a long way up its course.’660 And when he mentioned the 
‘stigma’ attached to the British government for its loss of the Sudan to the Mahdist 
insurrection, he argued:  
it would eventually be possible to bring back the greater portion, if not the 
whole, of the Soudan to Egyptian rule, - not, indeed, the Egyptian rule of former 
times, - but to an improved Egyptian domination acting under English control 
and guidance.’661  
Baring reiterated in March 1890 his antipathy toward any conquest of territories south of 
Khartoum, such as the Equatorial Province: 
The great mistake of Ismail Pasha was that, before he had learnt to administer 
efficiently the delta of the Nile, he endeavoured to extend Egyptian territory to 
the centre of Africa. It will be wise to accept a warning from his experience.662  
If perceived in light of the ongoing private scramble for Uganda and the deliberations over 
whether the government should sanction the IBEA’s forward policy in the region, Baring’s 
stance was completely the opposite of what Robinson et al.’s has interpreted and claimed it 
to be. In fact Baring warned the government against an expansion into Uganda.  
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A reply to Baring’s alarmist telegram in reference to Kassala was not forthcoming from 
Salisbury until Baring had used the same Nile-related arguments in regard to the port of Tokar 
on the Red Sea. But in his brusque response Salisbury demonstrated that he was not acutely 
concerned with the Nile Valley:  
As far as I can see matters, I should say that until you have money enough to 
justify you in advancing to Berber you had better remain quiet. When that time 
has arrived, you may possibly go to Khartoum, and you may possibly 
contemplate the railway, from Berber to Suakin. Such measures may be 
necessary for the purpose of protecting your Nile Valley against the dominion 
of any outside Power; and if you have any money to throw away, or any money 
to justify an expenditure which would not yield an immediate return, the 
operation may not be without profit. After that time, when you are masters of 
the Nile Valley, you may as a matter of pure luxury, extend your dominion to 
the Red Sea.663  
Hence, from a close examination of the correspondence on which the Nilotic explanatory 
model rests, it is clear that neither party advocated British domination of the Nile Valley from 
the delta to the Victoria Nyanza. From Salisbury’s eventual reply it can be gathered that the 
Nile was at best lowly ranked on his list of territorial priorities. Baring’s telegrams were 
concerned with the territories immediately to the south and south-east of Egypt proper, in 
particular the cities of Khartoum, Kassala and Tokar; he plainly excluded Uganda and the 
Equatorial Province as instances of overreach.  
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The Nile and ‘Water Imperialism’ 
Terje Tvedt’s article is testament to how the orthodox historiography has persisted by 
reinventing itself. It is certainly the most recent incarnation of the Egypto-centric 
interpretation of the East African partition, although traditional grand strategy is replaced 
with economic motives.664 Tvedt contended that British policymakers were actuated by what 
he termed 'water imperialism' and desired to secure the Nile in order to boost Egyptian cotton 
production. Critics, however, might speculate whether this analysis is yet another example of 
the post hoc interpretations of the East African partition, coloured by the jostling over the 
Nile water supplies that has taken place between the countries along its banks during the 20th 
and 21st centuries. Tvedt attempted to circumvent the primary material's deafening silence 
by implicitly asserting that the volume of historiography per se is proof enough of Britain's 
designs on the Nile.665 The novel interpretations are based on reports produced by the 
Egyptian civil service. However, these are neither suggestive let alone conclusive as to 
London's motives in regard to Uganda or the remainder of East Africa.  
Whilst it is correct that it had been the hydrologist Colin Scott Moncrieff who inspired Baring’s 
Nile-deflection warnings to Salisbury, the advice was given in regard to the Atbara River – the 
tributary which together with the Blue Nile were responsible for the annual Nile floods – and 
not the White Nile which flows from the Victoria Nyanza.666 William Willcock's comprehensive 
publication of 1889 entitled 'Egyptian Irrigation',667 contains no reference to potential dam 
construction south of Egypt whatever, despite presumably detailing every aspect of Nile 
hydrology from the Victoria Nyanza to the Mediterranean known at the time. If deflection or 
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blockage of the Nile was considered a real and likely scenario by British policymakers in 1890, 
leaving out any mention of this possibility in a book such as Egyptian Irrigation which was 
published the preceding year was a peculiar omission to make by one of the leading experts 
in the field. Some four years later, Garstin's foreword to his subordinate Willcock's report on 
perennial irrigation of Egypt of May 1894, makes clear that any dam construction south of 
Aswān was considered nigh impossible on economic grounds due to the lack of limestone.668  
Salisbury’s sanction of the Mackinnon Agreement between the IBEA and the Congo Free State 
is also inconsistent with any personal designs for securing the Nile. The treaty between 
Mackinnon and Leopold II ensured the IBEA a lease of a corridor of land behind the German 
sphere, whilst in return gave the Congo Free State territorial access to the Nile’s western 
basin, later dubbed the Lado Enclave.  
Although Rosebery later repudiated the validity of this agreement on the grounds that the 
chartered company did not possess the legal privileges necessary to ‘bargain away Imperial 
rights,’ the fact that Salisbury first thought the treaty ‘unobjectionable’, questions whether 
he was foremost concerned with the Nile.669 Also, since France enjoyed succession rights as 
Leopold’s heirs to the Congo Free State in the likely prospect of the king’s bankruptcy, the 
agreement would have acted as a door-opener to a far more formidable rival in the Upper 
Nile region.670 Thus it is unlikely that Salisbury would have sanctioned this agreement if he 
perceived the region and river itself as of vital geo-strategic or economic significance. 
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The Post-Hoc Defence Assumption 
The final strand of evidence which has been cited to support the Egypto-centric hypothesis is 
Salisbury’s statements to the House of Lords on 10 July 1890, prior to Britain’s formal 
ratification of the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty. Despite the favourable terms of 
the territorial agreement, it had attracted criticism for its cession of Heligoland to Germany. 
Queen Victoria had been particularly critical of the exchange and the precedent it set:  
It is [a] very serious question, and bad precedent which I don’t like. It is a shame 
to hand such very loyal people over to the unscrupulous German Govt. We shall 
propose to give up Gibraltar &c next. Nothing will be secure. I will not give my 
consent, unless feeling of the inhabitants consulted, and their rights 
respected.671  
In his defence of the treaty, Salisbury argued that the small archipelago situated three-hours 
sailing from Cuxhaven and populated by 2,000 Frisians represented little of strategic or 
economic value to Britain.672 The aspect of the speech which has been cited in support of the 
Nile-thesis was Salisbury’s statement that:  
The advantage of the acquisition of Witu is that it cuts off any rivalry in this 
respect, and that, save for the Italian dominion over Abyssinia and its 
dependencies, we have no rivalry to fear from any European civilised Power 
until we reach the confines of Egypt.673 
Further, Salisbury is likely to have made a reference to both the Mahdists and the IBEA since 
he stated: ‘But the advantage of limiting our rivalry to an Asiatic or African tribe is one which 
those who are engaged in these enterprises appreciate very highly.’674 Instead of ‘candidly’ 
                                                          
671 Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 9 June 1890, Vol. 45, No. 88, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House 
672 Hansard, HoL Debate, 10 July 1890, vol 346 cc1258-92.  
673 Robinson et al. Africa and the Victorians, p. 299 and Hansard, HoL Debate, 10 July 1890, vol 346 cc1258-92. 
674 Hansard, HoL Debate, 10 July 1890, vol 346 cc1258-92. 
193 
 
displaying his adherence to ‘Nile Valley Doctrine,’ as argued by Robinson et al,675 Salisbury 
might have made the rhetorical decision to focus on the concrete reward of the familiar Nile-
region in his speech. This is likely to have made his resolution to exchange European 
Heligoland for the somewhat obscure territory of Witu more palatable to an assembly of 
politicians largely unacquainted with the region, rather than the more abstract potential for 
an economic reward for the IBEA in Uganda or possibly Equatoria. Hence, he retrospectively 
invoked the familiar Egyptian question with the decision to consolidate and extend the British 
sphere in East Africa in order to better defend his choice to cede Heligoland to Germany. 
A prominent adherent to the Nile-hypothesis, the historian George Neville Sanderson cited 
Robinson et al. and the correspondence between Salisbury and Malet as prima facie evidence 
for these strategic motives: 
The effect of this arrangement will be that, except as far as the Congo State is 
concerned, there will be no European competitor to British influence between 
the 1st degree of S. latitude and the borders of Egypt, along the whole of the 
country which lies to the south and west of the Italian Protectorate in Abyssinia 
and Gallaland. England will further assume, with the consent of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar (which has been given), the exclusive Protectorate over that 
Sultanate, including the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba; and this assumption 
will be made with the full concurrence of Germany.’676 
Sanderson contends that: ‘Salisbury emphasised the value of excluding all European 
competition’ between Uganda and the borders of Egypt in his justification of the Anglo-
German Agreement of 1890.677 However, in his letter to Malet, Salisbury never ‘emphasised’ 
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this fact.678 Without perceiving the text through the prism of ‘Nile Valley Doctrine’ it might be 
argued that it merely was a matter of fact statement about the practical effects, in 
geographical terms, of the agreement 
Following this, Sanderson questions the absence of Nile-related motives in the Anglo-German 
correspondence:  
In the negotiation with Hatzfeldt the real importance of this region was not 
however explicitly revealed – the word “Nile” does not even appear in the 
published German documents. Nor did the project of bases, as initialled on 17 
June, contain any specific reference to a British sphere in the Nile Valley or even 
to the Nile Valley at all.679  
The answer to this alleged conundrum might be that the contemporary policymakers 
attached less real importance to the Upper Nile than did the later historians interpreting their 
motives. Since on close reading of the parliamentary debates of May and July 1890, a very 
different picture emerges of the priorities British politicians perceived in relation to Britain’s 
colonial policy in Africa: indeed, a focus that reflects the results of the ‘Heligoland-Zanzibar’ 
treaty. Whilst the region surrounding the Nile watershed is hardly mentioned, attention was 
focussed on the archipelago of Zanzibar; it was this newly declared British protectorate, which 
was hailed as Britain’s strategic lynchpin in East Africa. The former Indian administrator and 
Liberal MP for Worcester Sir Richard Temple dubbed the island, apart from the British 
Dominions, ‘the sixth most important strategic point in the world, the other five being 
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Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong Kong, and Singapore.’ The cession of Heligoland for Zanzibar was 
in his eyes not merely a ‘quid pro quo’ but ‘an island worth to us ten thousand Heligolands.’680  
When the region encompassing Uganda and the Nile watershed was then broached, it was 
not because of its allegedly pivotal role for imperial defence, but in economic terms. The 
Liberal MP for Whitby, Ernest Beckett, made this aspect clear when he drew attention toward 
the great discrepancy between British support of the IBEA and the German governmental 
support of its colonial company:  
Mr. Stanley pointed out that our English Companies cannot compete with the 
German on equal terms […] if there is to be any more surrender he should 
"advise the British East African Company to retire altogether and give it up as a 
bad job.”681  
Implicitly, should the British sphere of influence not have been extended westward to 
comprise Uganda, Britain’s principal policy-tool in the region would be forced to evacuate 
East Africa. The Conservative MP for Liverpool, William Lawrence, later elaborated the point: 
‘This Treaty is not only to be looked on as beneficial to the East African Company, but to the 
whole country, as it opens up a route for trade to the Nile.’682 Whilst admittedly these remarks 
were not expressions of official government policy, they did reflect the correspondence of 
the Foreign Office and other stakeholders of Britain’s engagement with East Africa antecedent 
to the 1890 Agreement. Indeed, the few instances in which Uganda had received a mention 
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in Parliament over the two years prior to the debates concerning the ‘Heligoland Treaty’, was 
in relation to commerce and Britain’s suppression of the slave trade.  
Moreover, the former political agent at Zanzibar and Conservative MP for Hackney, Sir Lewis 
Pelly, mentioned the IBEA’s designs on the East African interior in a House of Commons 
debate in December 1888:  
What was called Lake Victoria Nyanza was really an inland sea, being some 120 
miles long by 80 wide. The Company intended to put steamers on that inland 
sea, and thus create an interior commercial circle, from the circumference of 
which they could develop trade in all directions through the centre of Africa. 
They would thus soon get in peaceful communication with that much dreaded 
Uganda Land. The Company's determination was to attract and conciliate, and 
to trust to commerce and the civilizing influence of improved transit. They 
hoped eventually to introduce a train.683 
Pelly had formed part of Sir Bartle Frere’s mission to Zanzibar in 1873 and in similarity with 
Kirk and Mackinnon owed much of his career to ‘Frere’s powers of patronage.’684 Both as a 
director of the IBEA and as Mackinnon’s friend it would be reasonable to suggest that Pelly 
was well-informed of the company’s strategy in East Africa.  
 
The Contemporary Importance of Anti-Slave Trade Policy 
The other aspect to Salisbury’s speech which Robinson et al. failed to mention despite it 
immediately followed his remarks about the Nile, was his emphasis on how Britain’s 
protectorate over Zanzibar would assist in halting the slave trade:  
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the closer our influence over the Government of the Sultan becomes, the more 
we may hope we shall succeed in that great effort for which this country has 
sacrificed so much—the effort to destroy the slave trade and gradually to 
extirpate domestic slavery.685 
These words echoed the pronouncement Salisbury had made directly upon conclusion of the 
treaty:  
The direct control and extensive influence which this arrangement will confer 
upon Great Britain will furnish a powerful assistance to the efforts which are 
being made for the suppression of the maritime Slave Trade, as well as for the 
extirpation of slavery itself.686  
Should the mention of the Nile be taken at face value, it would follow that Salisbury’s remarks 
about the benefits to Britain’s anti-slave trade policy be equally accepted as a guiding motive. 
This, however, is simply dismissed by Robinson et al as ‘hoary generalities about the slave 
trade.’687  
As the first chapter demonstrated, the East African slave trade reached levels in 1888 not 
witnessed since the mid-1870s. Public attention over the matter was raised throughout 
Europe courtesy of Cardinal Lavigerie’s campaign and the Anti-Slave Trade Conference in 
Brussels had just been adjourned. It is unlikely that this concern should have been an 
irrelevant factor for British policymakers when debating the annexation of that very region, 
in which Salisbury thought ‘all the living slave trade, all the slave trade which is now actually 
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in operation’ was taking place and which was […] fed by the Arab traders from Pemba and 
Zanzibar’688 
Such dismissals have however been commonplace in the post-war literature concerning the 
partition of Africa.689 But Richard Huzzey arrives at the opposite conclusion in his recent 
publication concerning the British Empire and slavery.690 Setting out to test whether anti-
slavery ideology really was a deciding factor in preventing a British evacuation of Uganda in 
the early 1890s, Huzzey concludes that this humanitarian impetus was not a mere ‘decoy’, 
but conversely constituted a key consideration.691 
Indeed Salisbury made his reasons for pursuing anti-slave trade policy clear in a despatch to 
Malet in November 1890, a rationale that was derived from economic concerns rather than 
out of moral considerations:  
…I can hardly conceive that it will be doubtful that expenses incurred for the 
purpose of preventing Slave Trade, and the slave raids which support it are 
expenses useful for commerce. By the light of the information which we now 
possess, and which has been set forth by Lavigerie, by Cameron, and by Stanley 
and others, we can entertain no doubt, not only that the suppression of slave 
raids is useful for commerce, but that it is a condition of commercial progress 
so indispensable that without it all other expenditure will be in vain. We know 
that devastation, depopulation, the destruction of villages and of cultivations, 
the scattering and extermination of the inhabitants, mark the course of an Arab 
slave-raiding expedition; and that there are large districts in Africa, measured 
by hundreds of square miles, which formerly bore a teeming population, and 
which, under the hands of the slave-raider, have relapsed into the condition of 
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a desert. It is evident that, while this scourge exists, any progress in cultivation 
or in the development of resources is impossible: and these are the foundations 
on which a more extended commerce must of necessity be built.692   
Salisbury proceeded to illustrate his point by referring to the ‘marvellous effect’ abolition had 
upon commerce in West Africa following Britain’s control of the region after 1815. The figures 
Salisbury cited were Lord Castlereagh’s estimates that the value of Britain’s trade had 
increased in value from £80,000 to £1,000,000 annually. He added that: ‘It would not be 
difficult to multiply the illustrations of this kind, but the point will hardly be disputed.693  
As the following chapter will demonstrate, Uganda assumed a controversial position in British 
politics in the early 1890s, largely inconsistent with any Nilotic policy-objective. Salisbury 
would not lend military or any significant financial support to the IBEA to aid their occupation 
of the kingdom. The country would be held by Frederick Lugard, who reached Uganda in 
December 1890 and garrisoned Kampala Hill with a 'quite insufficient force.'694 Instead of a 
strategic policy tool there is much evidence to suggest that Salisbury viewed the IBEA largely 
as a philanthropic venture.695 Indeed, Salisbury generously described the IBEA as being:  
…far more purely philanthropic than any of the other [British chartered 
companies]. Its object, I believe, has been to deal a deadly blow at the slave-
trade, the destruction of which has been, along with our own commercial and 
material progress, the animating impulse of English policy in those regions for 
nearly a century696  
But it was not just in public speeches that Salisbury had made these statements. He had 
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repeated this view to the Treasury in December 1890 when he referred to the IBEA as 
‘actuated rather by philanthropic’ motives.697 This charitable aspect was not only reflected in 
the Royal Charter it had obtained in 1888,698 but also by the composition of its court of 
directors.699 Although Marie de Kiewiet, who authored one of the most authoritative accounts 
about the IBEA, found that ‘no single interest – neither commerce nor philanthropy nor 
empire – dominated the court’, she also drew attention to the fact that three of the IBEA’s 
principal backers ‘Brassey, Buxton and Burdett-Coutts were leading British humanitarians.’700 
In her estimation:  
[t]he I.B.E.A. Company belonged less to the period of Joseph Chamberlain and 
the new imperialism than to the period of David Livingstone and the great 
discoveries.701  
The Vice-President, Lord Brassey, was a ‘former liberal MP who had devoted his parliamentary 
career to a campaign for higher wages for the working man; [Sir Thomas Fowell] Buxton was 
active in the Anti-Slavery Society and the Church Missionary Society; [William] Burdett-Coutts 
followed the Baroness in promoting a great variety of humane causes.’702 Also Anderson 
candidly observed this non-commercial aspect in 1892: ‘There is no question that the objects 
of the founders of this Company [IBEA] were primarily humanitarian, though it was hoped 
that it might pay its way.’703 
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Salisbury’s remarks concerning both the Anglo-German treaty and about the IBEA are telling 
as to his motives for East Africa. It might be argued that he perceived the territory as a region 
in which Britain could execute its anti-slave trade policy on the cheap; as a theatre in which to 
demonstrate his commitment to a long-standing British policy objective, the eradication of 
the slave trade and potentially the institution of slavery itself. Thus with no expense to the 
British tax-payer, the cost of suppressing the slave trade, through policing and legitimate 
trade, would be borne by Mackinnon’s chartered company.704 This also serves to explain his 
ambivalence in dealing with the region. That no protectorate had been declared can only be 
reconciled with the prevailing idea that Uganda and the mainland was not perceived to 
constitute any significant geo-strategic or commercial region of interest to the British Empire. 
Conversely, East Africa represented a potential liability to the Treasury should the IBEA fail. 
The only way in which to ensure the company’s financial future was through expansion, 
especially to a region which was thought to hold valuable trading networks; namely the Great 
Lakes-region which contained the Nile watershed.705   
 
Conclusion 
The circumstances in which the IBEA acquired a protectorate over the kingdom of Buganda in 
1889 represent a classic example of how individual agency or a man-on-the-spot could 
influence the scope of imperial expansion during the scramble. In direct contravention to 
what has been claimed in the Egypto-centric historiography, the IBEA’s extension of its sphere 
of influence was not so much a result of the Foreign Office’s ‘official mind’ nor of Salisbury’s 
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alleged designs for the interior, as the coincidental actions of one single individual. This 
imperial agent had even acted against his explicit orders which precluded him from venturing 
into the kingdom. Hence, not even Mackinnon had been privy to Jackson’s rendezvous in 
Central Africa, and certainly not Salisbury; any communications from Uganda took at least 
three months to reach the nearest telegraph station at the coast.706 
Although the political instability that had engulfed Uganda since the late-1880s, had made it 
susceptible to external influence, the IBEA would not have obtained a treaty with Mwanga 
had it not been for the coincidental timing of Jackson’s appearance, in particular at an time 
in which the deposed ruler sought assistance for reinstatement to his throne. This is 
demonstrated by the simple fact that Peters, who arrived only some weeks after Jackson’s 
departure, was unsuccessful in his corresponding attempts at obtaining a treaty since 
Mwanga already had regained his position and thus negotiated from a vantage of power.  
Salisbury’s decision to arrange for arbitration over the disputed territory of Witu and its 
adjoining islands Manda and Patta in December 1889707 – what over the following six months 
evolved into a general Anglo-German settlement of all disputed territories in Africa including 
Uganda – were, as such, wholly divorced from Baring’s anxieties over the Nile Valley. Salisbury 
had not even been aware of Mackinnon’s designs on the Equatorial Province until February 
1890.708 Indeed the uncertain route of arbitration would also have been an unlikely choice for 
a British prime minister actuated by vital geo-strategic concerns. As the treaty’s title implies, 
the most significant aspect of the bilateral agreement was the exchange of Heligoland for the 
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important trading hub Zanzibar, which, contrary to Uganda, was declared a British 
protectorate. 
From both the internal deliberations of the Foreign Office and of Mackinnon’s 
correspondence to Salisbury, it is evident that the expansion into Uganda resulted from the 
economic expectations this imperial milieu entertained for the interior regions that 
comprised the great lakes, the Upper Nile and the kingdom. Mackinnon had secretly 
attempted to gain the allegiance of Emin Pasha709 and so to amalgamate the IBEA’s sphere of 
influence in East Africa with that of the Equatorial Province in the Southern Sudan. However 
this plan was foiled when Emin enlisted with Mackinnon’s German rivals. In lieu of the 
Equatorial Province was Jackson’s treaty with Mwanga and the extension of the British sphere 
of influence to include Uganda. 
Courtesy of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 and the hinterland understanding of 1887, 
Uganda and the territories surrounding the Nile watershed belonged within the British 
exclusion zone. This is both evident from contemporary maps710 and the fact that Uganda 
featured among the ‘points which were not contended’711 during the Anglo-German 
negotiations of 1890. Following from this status, Uganda were among the first territories 
subject to partition since it was not disputed by Germany.    
Thus Salisbury sanctioned this extension of the British sphere in order to ensure the economic 
survival of the IBEA. As a proxy for British imperial rule, it constituted Britain’s principal policy-
tool in the region and a bankruptcy would either force the government to assume direct 
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control or forfeit British influence in East Africa. Either scenario posed an unappealing option 
since a British protectorate directly administered by the Foreign Office implied a considerable 
expenditure for the Treasury; whilst a withdrawal would prove unpopular to a potent 
constellation of economic and humanitarian interest groups, and an imperially minded public 
opinion.  
Firstly, East Africa had throughout most of the nineteenth century been one of the principal 
theatres in which Britain could demonstrate its commitment to anti-slave trade policy; and 
by the late 1880s the Arab-Swahili led slave trade had reached levels not witnessed in over a 
decade. While the conclusion of the Anti-Slave Trade Conference in Brussels maintained that 
efforts still should primarily be directed by naval suppression of the trafficking, it also bound 
the signatories to engage in land-based countermeasures. Thus by preserving the IBEA’s 
financial position through expansion into the inter-lacustrine interior, the British government 
could execute its anti-slave policy ‘on the cheap’ since the company’s royal charter was 
expressly awarded on the grounds that it would ‘tend to the suppression of the slave trade.’712 
By halting the trade inland, or at its source, the naval squadron’s workload would be reduced 
whilst both the responsibility and heavy expenditure of executing this policy would be placed 
with the imperial proxy, safely away from imperial coffers and direct government 
accountability.  
Thus the IBEA served the dual purpose of both acting as a cost-saving measure and for 
deflecting criticism over governmental failure to efficiently stamp out the slave trade, one of 
the most prominent and influential humanitarian causes of the Victorian age. But this would 
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only succeed if the company itself could survive, which was an unlikely scenario should it have 
been confined to the coast and not expanded into what was perceived to be the rich interior 
that comprised Uganda. The point was summarised in the words of Euan Smith: ‘If Uganda 
passes under German influence, [the] British Company has no future before it.’713    
This alternative interpretation of British expansion is validated by Anderson’s seminal 
memorandum of September 1892. Drawn up during the deliberations over whether Britain 
should relinquish control over Uganda, it affords a brief summary of the reasons why British 
policymakers and the IBEA thought it imperative to expand into the kingdom in 1890. 
Whereas recognition is made of the strategic position of Uganda for the conquest of 
Equatoria, Britain’s principal architect of policy toward Africa, only two years after the events 
occurred, did not in a single instance in his comprehensive and confidential memorandum, 
construe Uganda as relevant for the defence of Egypt. Instead, Anderson underlined ‘the 
importance of Uganda as a trade centre’ and as ‘an important factor in the anti-slavery 
struggle.’714  
However, as the next chapter will show, the IBEA’s occupation of Uganda did nothing to 
improve the company’s earnings. That the company managed to retain its position in the 
kingdom over the following two years was certainly not owing to Salisbury’s agency. Whilst in 
1892 this once obscure imperial outpost was elevated to the centre of a national publicity 
campaign orchestrated by some of the most influential pressure groups of the age.  
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The Retention of Uganda: The Continuity of Anti-Slave Trade Policy, Pamphlet Wars and 
Public Opinion, 1890-93 
 
‘The kingdom of Uganda is probably the most important and most highly civilized of any native 
state in Africa.’715 These were the generous words chosen by Staff Captain Hubert Foster to 
introduce the topic of his memorandum, drawn up as a result of the extraordinary attention 
lavished on it in the autumn months of 1892. Uganda had come to occupy the forefront of 
British public and political attention as a consequence of the Imperial British East Africa 
Company’s decision to withdraw from the kingdom, only two years after Uganda had been 
incorporated into the British sphere.716 It was during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century that Britain’s engagement with East Africa was transformed from one of exercising 
informal influence to that of assuming full executive powers. This formalisation of British rule 
resulted from a culmination of separate factors that had both spurred and haunted 
policymakers dealing with the region throughout the 1880s. Namely, the balancing act 
between a reluctance to commit scarce imperial funds and strategic resources, on the one 
hand, against the vested interests of missionary societies and chartered company; public 
opinion; anti-slave trade policy and the legal obligations Britain had undertaken at Brussels in 
1890. 
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Britain had in East Africa repeated its Indian experiment of imperial rule by proxy, albeit at a 
far more rapid rate. Whilst the East India Company had successfully served its interests on 
the sub-continent for over two centuries, its Victorian equivalent on the East African mainland 
lasted little more than half a decade.717 What had proved so successful in western and 
southern Africa was a complete failure in its eastern sphere. In fact, only four years after the 
IBEA had been granted its royal charter in 1888, its funds had been depleted. It was this acute 
liquidity shortage that forced upon Westminster a choice of whether to supplant the 
company’s administration or to relinquish British influence in the kingdom altogether.  
The public and political debates that arose after the IBEA decided to extinguish its occupation 
of Uganda for the second time in 1892 sparked what the historian D.A. Low termed ‘a very 
remarkable movement in Victorian public opinion.’718 Aside from its importance in influencing 
the future decision of declaring Uganda and the mainland territories a British protectorate, 
the campaigns and debates offers a glimpse into how late-Victorian society perceived and 
justified imperial expansion.  
Since the historiography of the British annexation of East Africa has overwhelmingly 
construed the partition in strategic terms, most analyses have overlooked the wealth of 
imperial interests that mobilised in a fevered campaign to prevent a retreat from the newly 
acquired ‘pearl of Africa.’ As the former chapter has demonstrated, the extension of the 
British sphere of influence in East Africa to comprise Uganda was not a result of strategic 
concerns. Since historians have attached such central importance to these supposed strategic 
imperatives, little scholarly attention has been devoted to an analysis of the various other 
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interests relevant to policymakers in the Uganda debates. By eliminating strategy and 
recognising that Britain had few other vested interests in the kingdom apart from its 
missionaries, it can be argued that the debates regarding the retention of Uganda offers a 
unique insight into contemporary British attitudes to empire. Indeed both the scope and scale 
of public engagement over the ‘Uganda Question’ during the early 1890s serves as a limited 
retort to Bernard Porter’s thesis of the ‘absent-minded imperialists’.719 
From the conclusion of the Heligoland Agreement of July 1890 and until the fall of Salisbury’s 
Conservative government in August 1892, little official interest was shown to East Africa. The 
IBEA’s financial resources proved over this period to be inadequate when put to the task of 
administering a region twice the size of modern Germany. The company itself estimated that 
its cost of holding this region was £85,000 p.a. whilst it garnered only £35,000 in revenues,720 
only Uganda itself cost £40,000 and returned a meagre £8,000.721 Marie de Kiewiet 
speculated that the substantial costs of occupying Uganda derived not so much from the 
directors’ grand designs for the kingdom, but from the dynamics that existed between the 
spendthrift Lugard and Francis de Winton.722 But irrespective of financial imprudence, for a 
relatively small, private company such a state of affairs was untenable over the longer term. 
Without either a substantial reduction in expenditure or a corresponding increase in 
revenues, the occupation would lead to the company’s bankruptcy. With no support 
forthcoming from the government to remedy the situation it was decided to evacuate Uganda 
– the most costly of all the IBEA territories, due to its associated transportation costs – on two 
occasions: August 1891 and May 1892. It is the public debates and internal Foreign Office 
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discussions pertaining to these junctures that will be the subjects of analysis in this chapter, 
to discover the motives that lay behind the policy-decisions.  
Building on the previous chapter’s argument, this chapter will initially investigate the policies 
of the Salisbury government toward the IBEA’s administration of Uganda and will 
demonstrate how these policies run directly counter to the orthodox strategic historiography. 
For crucially, if the retention of Uganda within the British sphere of influence was perceived 
as critical for the security of Egypt, the fact that Salisbury did not intervene to prevent the 
IBEA from evacuating the region runs directly counter to this explanatory model. Secondly, 
the internal debates of the Foreign Office concerning the IBEA evacuation will be analysed 
with the aim of highlighting the factors that are deemed important to the key formulators of 
British Africa policy such as Rosebery and Anderson. Thirdly, the spectrum of factors 
considered by the Gladstone cabinet will be enumerated and Rosebery’s role as gatekeeper 
and midwife to the cabinet’s Uganda policy will in particular be highlighted to show that 
strategic concerns were entirely absent from the deliberations. Fourthly the chapter will 
consider the public relations campaign launched by the company, the British and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society and the Church Missionary Society in 1892 and consider their role in 
influencing British policymakers, public opinion and indeed the historiography.   
 
Reluctant Imperialism: British Policy toward the IBEA’s Occupation of Uganda, 1890-2 
On 26 December 1890, Kabaka Mwanga II of Buganda signed a treaty with Frederick Lugard 
which placed the kingdom under the protection of the IBEA. After he reached Uganda in 
December 1890, Lugard had relieved the company’s agent Gedge and garrisoned Kampala Hill 
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with a limited number of troops. Despite the ‘quite insufficient force’ which the IBEA had 
deployed in the country, the criterion of effective occupation as laid down by the Berlin Act 
of 1885 was fulfilled.723 Both German and Italian recognition of British claims to the region 
had already been obtained during the six months which preceded Lugard’s treaty. Only France 
remained as a viable threat to British paramount influence in Uganda and the territories 
surrounding the Upper Nile.  
However, in complete contravention to the orthodox historiography which affords Uganda 
pride of place in the imperial grand strategy of Salisbury’s government, little official interest 
was exhibited for the guarantor of British paramountcy in this allegedly critical region. On 
behalf of the company, the British Consul-General to Zanzibar, Charles Euan Smith, had asked 
for a loan of ‘a limited number of Indian troops for a limited time: or failing this to grant a 
small subsidy for a limited time in order to enable them to consolidate their position and 
enforce the anti-Slavery policy of Her Majesty’s Government.’724 Already at this early date, 
suspicions were entertained that the IBEA’s resources were ‘inadequate to meet any fresh 
demands’ and that government subsidies were required if to render the British position in 
East Africa ‘invulnerable.’725 However any proposals of direct governmental involvement in 
the region or of financial support to the company were rejected by Salisbury: ‘The H. of C. 
[House of Commons] would scoff at the idea of a subsidy.’726  Euan Smith, went as far as to 
interpret Salisbury’s disinterest as outright hostility to the company and questioned whether 
it ‘must now sink or swim by its own efforts’ and urged that ‘a radical change seems necessary 
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all along the line.’727 This exchange of correspondence which came only six months after the 
conclusion of the Heligoland Treaty was a premonition of Salisbury’s laissez faire attitude 
toward the region.   
 
The Brussels Act and Humanitarian Lobbying 
Instead of a vehicle with which to secure British control of the Nile, the IBEA was perceived 
by British policymakers as a commercial and philanthropic venture; present in East Africa, in 
part, to fulfil the treaty obligations Britain had acceded to at the Brussels Anti-Slave Trade 
Conference. The conference, which originally was proposed by Salisbury himself in 1888, had 
taken place in Brussels over the autumn, winter and spring of 1889-90.728 Anderson and Kirk 
had represented Britain at this meeting of 17 Powers with varying levels of interests in 
Africa.729 On 2 July 1890, the ‘General Act for the Repression of the Slave Trade’ was 
concluded, but due to delays in ratification, the treaty stipulations did not come into force 
until 1892.730  
In similarity with the West Africa Conference held in Berlin five years earlier, the Brussels 
Conference placed an impetus on the European powers to extend their imperial control to 
the interior of the continent.731 It marked a watershed in the execution of Europe’s anti-slave 
trade policy as the suppression of slave trafficking was transformed from a largely maritime 
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endeavour, to that of land-based operations on the mainland or ‘place of origin.’732 This 
radical alteration of focus is evident from the Act’s first article, section two and three which 
held that: ‘the most effective means of counteracting the slave-trade in the interior of Africa 
[is the] gradual establishment in the interior […] of strongly occupied stations [and] the 
construction of roads, and in particular of railroads, connecting the advanced stations with 
the coast’733 
The implication for all signatory states was that their land grab in Africa became honour 
bound, sanctioned by the solemn humanitarian and moral ideals of anti-slavery. What had 
until the late 1880s been predominantly ‘an English craze’,734 was appropriated as policy by 
other European states with interests in Africa. The Brussels Act obliged Britain, under 
international law to maintain a territorial presence in East Africa, one of the last regions which 
were subject to large scale slave trading. Whilst this obviously could be disregarded by 
accomplished practitioners of realpolitik such as Salisbury, it did offer a legal baton to a varied 
selection of pressure groups interested in the preservation of a British presence in the region.  
Indeed, to put into effect the stipulations of this conference – ‘the noblest of political 
achievements in modern times’735 – was an issue Salisbury was frequently reminded of by the 
lobbying activities of pressure groups. A petition dispatched by the BFASS in December 1890 
is testament to the widespread interest this garnered among missionary, anti-slavery and 
temperance societies across Great Britain at the time. Fifteen different groupings signed the 
memorial which urged the foreign secretary to do his utmost to ensure that all major powers 
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ratified the treaty:  ‘not, only for the extension of Christian civilisation and of legitimate 
commerce in Africa, but for the extinction of two of the greatest curses which still afflict 
mankind…’736 Despite the absence of slave trading in Uganda, the kingdom was subject to 
strong missionary interests, particularly the CMS which had maintained a presence in the 
kingdom since 1879. 
Since the mid-1880s, Buganda had been the scene of fierce factional rivalry between the 
nominally Protestant followers of the CMS, dubbed the Wa-Ingleza, and their Roman Catholic 
counterparts, the converts of the French White Fathers - the Wa-Franza. The schism between 
the two Christian denominations and the Muslim section of Bugandan society had sustained 
a protracted civil war that had simultaneously undermined the position of the Kabaka and 
the Bugandan state. And it was this instability that had led the British, via their proxy agent, 
the IBEA, into Buganda in 1890 as a military and political force. But the advent of Lugard in 
December of that year failed to calm the tense relations between the two opposing groups. 
In fact the conflict escalated into war on two occasions until August 1892. Hence, the plight 
of the missionaries became central to government deliberations over the fate of the IBEA 
administration. Should British political power be withdrawn, then it was feared that both the 
British missionaries and their Protestant Wa-Ingleza followers would be massacred. But as 
will be demonstrated, the missionary issue was not one that captured the attention of 
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Salisbury’s government, but rather that of his liberal successor in the Foreign Office, Lord 
Rosebery.   
 
Salisbury’s Implicit Policy of Evacuation from Uganda, 1891-2 
Despite the unrest brewing in Uganda, Salisbury pursued a policy toward East Africa over the 
remaining eighteen months of his second premiership which was marked largely by inertia. 
The only exception to this disinterest was the suggestion to subsidise a survey of the region 
to facilitate the construction of a railway from Mombasa to the Victoria Nyanza. The Uganda 
Railway as it was known had been identified as a sine qua non to the retention and 
development of both Uganda and the wider region (and is an issue that will be considered in 
detail in the following chapter). 
Pressured by the cost of occupying Uganda, the IBEA had by August 1891 resolved to evacuate 
the country by the end of the year. In contrast to its German counterpart, the IBEA did not 
receive much in the way of state support for its colonial undertakings. The company itself 
estimated the coast of garrisoning Uganda came to £40-50,000 p.a. and already by August 
1891, sixty percent of its initially subscribed capital had been expended on this largely fruitless 
occupation.737 It was supposedly only a temporary expedient in which the company was to 
‘restrict its operations to the coast’ until sufficient funds had been raised to reinstate the 
occupation of Uganda.738 On grounds that the abandonment was only temporary, Salisbury 
instructed the company not to make its decision public.739 Wary of public opinion he candidly 
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minuted that the company’s orders to evacuate Uganda ‘would not look well if published.’740 
When perceived in the light of the following autumn’s uproar, Salisbury proved to be far more 
adept at anticipating the explosive effect the abandonment of Uganda had on the public 
feeling than Gladstone’s successor cabinet. But Salisbury’s reluctance to intervene is also 
indicative of how little he valued Uganda. Had the country really posed, in Salisbury’s mind, a 
pivotal geo-strategic territory for Britain’s hold on Egypt and by extension the route to India, 
then surely a £40,000 subsidy would not have prevented an intervention.  
Since Salisbury was reluctant to offer anything more than a survey party for the railway, the 
company looked to the other significant interested party, the Church Missionary Society for 
financial support. Although the CMS was obviously only a religious and philanthropic body, it 
had wealthy backers which the company could benefit from. Already on the 9 September, 
Mackinnon had met with Bishop Tucker and other CMS representatives on his estate and 
informed them of Lugard’s orders to withdraw.741 Tucker, perhaps not unsurprising, as he 
served as the Bishop of East Africa, had taken a particularly dire view of Lugard’s impending 
retreat. But it was reported that also the nominally impartial former Consul-General to 
Zanzibar, Charles Euan Smith, had ‘concurred […] in the serious view which [Bishop Tucker] 
took of the consequences to the Mission which might follow the withdrawal of the 
Company.’742 There was unanimity in the expectations of these ‘dangerous consequences,’ 
but before committing any funds the CMS meeting resolved to formulate a memorial to 
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Salisbury in order to ’earnestly request the assistance of the Government.’ But as nothing had 
come of this, the CMS was left to its secondary resolution, namely an ‘appeal for money.’743    
The IBEA confidentially promised it would contribute £20,000 if the CMS could raise the 
remaining £20,000 so that it could sustain its occupation for another year.744 This, it was 
hoped, would tide the company over for enough time to enable the government to intervene, 
compelled by its ratification of the Brussels Act. As long as the IBEA could construct a railway, 
the company would be profitable and Uganda secured.745 In the CMS’s ‘urgent and special’ 
appeal for funds which it had circulated to a select few ‘God had given the means to help’, 
the opinion of the society’s leaders Tucker, Kennaway and Hutchinson was unequivocal:  
The burden of developing British East Africa and protecting British interests 
and preserving peace is left in private hands, and the progress of civilization, 
the security of the C.M.S. Mission, and the honour of the British name, are in 
peril for the lack of adequate funds.746  
By November, the required amount had been raised – what was described as ‘never a more 
wonderful exhibition of the power of the grace of God’.747 So the IBEA could sustain its 
occupation for another twelve months. 
Yet only six months later, on the 17 May 1892 the IBEA again gave notice to Salisbury’s 
Government of the company’s intention to evacuate Uganda by the 31 December ‘owing to 
the excessive costs of transport and other consequent difficulties of communication with the 
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interior of Africa.’748 The company’s message came as no surprise to Salisbury. In February he 
had received a warning from the new Consul-General to Zanzibar, Gerald Portal, that ‘their 
financial position is very shaky indeed.’749 According to a conversation Portal had had with 
the IBEA director William Berkeley, the company was operating with an annual loss of £50,000 
and there were few signs that its revenue would increase in the foreseeable future. Portal 
also remarked that the IBEA was unable to raise any further capital to cover the shortfall, thus 
making it reliant upon a government intervention.750 Indeed, Portal had at the end of 
February again notified Salisbury about this ‘very serious question’ and stated that he had: 
‘written a letter to Percy Anderson on the subject of the rapidly approaching break-up of the 
E. African Co.’751  
Salisbury’s reply to IBEA’s resolution to again abandon Uganda was brief and again offered no 
opposition. He acknowledged the company’s decision and made but a single remark. Namely 
upon a set of orders that had been issued to Lugard - the company’s agent was upon his exit 
not to allow any ‘surplus arms or ammunition’ to get into the hands of the local population 
that had been loyal to the IBEA. This, it was held, was ‘contrary to the spirit of the provisions 
of the Brussels Act.’752 Hence, Salisbury had in May 1892, again sanctioned the IBEA’s policy 
of abandoning Uganda. Indeed, rather than issuing any plea to reconsider the company’s 
decision, his reply was analogous to asking a guest to close the door on the way out. Just as 
he had done in the autumn of 1891, he did neither in 1892 lend, nor promise to lend, any 
financial or material support to safeguard the company’s occupation.753 Moreover, Salisbury’s 
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reply was a letter which Gladstone later used as evidence of the Salisbury government’s 
complicity in an attempt to persuade Rosebery to change his opinion on the Uganda question:  
…they prove that the decision of the Co. to withdraw to Dagoreti was fully 
accepted by the late Ministry – Lord Salisbury; letter of May 26 in answer to 
one of May 17 is, both from its date & its matter, a well considered document, 
& leaves the question a settled evacuation. (a settled question).754  
Indeed, the Foreign Office’s letter to the IBEA of September 1892 further corroborates 
Salisbury’s policy of evacuation: ‘The final determination of your Directors to evacuate 
Uganda on the 31st December next which was notified to the late Government and accepted 
by them in May last…’755 
Why this official acceptance of the IBEA’s decision to evacuate Lugard’s administration from 
Uganda is so significant, is that it runs directly counter to the dominant historiographical 
narrative; of the strategic explanatory model of the East African partition. Since the 
interpretation affords Salisbury particular agency in both acquiring and holding Uganda, 
allegedly to safeguard Egypt, his decision to sanction an evacuation of the country already in 
1891 and 1892 invalidates the model. The decision to evacuate was taken despite Uganda was 
being under the potential threat of a French annexation, due to the preponderance of the 
Catholic Wa-Fransa faction and of the French succession rights to the neighbouring Congo 
Free State. Salisbury did not attach enough importance to Uganda to warrant his government 
allocating an annual subsidy of £20-40,000 required for the IBEA to sustain its occupation.756 
In conclusion, had imperial considerations of such geo-strategic significance as Egypt and the 
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Suez Canal really posed as key factors in the government’s deliberations over Uganda, then it 
is unlikely that such a relatively small sum would have prevented Salisbury’s administration 
from ensuring the continued presence of the IBEA in the kingdom.   
 
A ‘Damnosa Hereditas’757: Rosebery and the Uganda Debates, Aug. – Sept. 1892 
After Salisbury’s defeat in the 1892 general election over the question of Irish Home Rule, 
Gladstone formed his fourth and last government on 15 August. Since July, Gladstone had 
pleaded with a highly reluctant Archibald Primrose, Lord Rosebery, to again serve as his 
foreign secretary. The popular Rosebery had repeatedly rebuked these invitations and had 
cited his ‘family and fortune’ as grounds for refusing the offer.758 Writing from the ‘Yacht 
Christine off Poolewe’, Rosebery confided to Gladstone that:   
For more than a year past – during the whole period that I have spent in 
retirement – my constant preoccupation has been to extricate myself from 
politics. For public life I have ceased to feel either taste or aptitude, and my 
one pessimistic wish is to retire into private life, and the most private. 759 
Despite these initial protestations he ‘kissed hands’ with Queen Victoria on 18 August.760 As 
will be detailed below, his initial reluctance is however important to consider in light of his 
dissent on the Uganda question, and in particular why the remaining cabinet chose to 
acquiescence to his insistence.   
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At the very top of the new foreign secretary’s list of priorities in the autumn of 1892 were the 
‘ticklish […] and […] pressing business’ of the Uganda troubles and the announced evacuation 
of the country by the IBEA.761 Reports of an alleged massacre possibly instigated by the 
company’s agent Frederick Lugard, had circulated in British newspapers some months 
earlier.762 Due to the delay in receiving news from the landlocked kingdom, the events which 
were said to have occurred in January were not in the press until late-May. Salisbury’s 
government had even faced questions in the House of Commons from the Irish nationalist 
MP Sir Thomas Esmonde. The response offered little more than to await Lugard’s forthcoming 
despatches.763 It transpired later that Lugard had taken the side of the Protestants in the civil-
war between the Wa-Ingleza and the nominally Catholic, Wa-Fransa factions, in which he had 
exacted upon the latter a crushing defeat.764 But the three-month delay in communications 
was not only inconvenient for the receipt of news. The IBEA had announced it would withdraw 
from Uganda by the 31 December, which meant that any potential counter-orders to prolong 
the occupation would have to be issued by 1 October.765 
Testament to Rosebery’s strong views in favour of retention, he commissioned a range of 
memoranda about the subject only days after he had assumed office.766 According to Under-
Secretary Phillip Currie, his superior wanted an ‘impartial statement’ which he could present 
to his cabinet colleagues.767 The War Office produced the first of the memoranda, which in 
essence were a brief history of Uganda and a précis of British interests in the kingdom.768 The 
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thirteen typed pages presented by Staff Captain Hubert Foster contained no mention of 
Uganda’s significance with regard to the Nile or Egypt. Which itself would have been a 
remarkable omission by the WO’s Intelligence Division should Nile deflection and Egyptian 
security really have posed as an important factor in deliberations over Uganda. Instead, it 
focused its attention on the civil strife that had embroiled the kingdom since the late 1880s.  
The second and third memoranda were compiled by the Anglo-Egyptian army. Predictably 
Major Reginald Wingate of the Egyptian Intelligence Department focussed on what, 
ostensibly, would be the consequences for Egypt in the event of a British withdrawal. He 
believed that any European state holding Uganda could easily re-conquer the former Egyptian 
Equatorial Province from the Mahdists.769 However, Wingate's commanding officer, the 
Egyptian Army’s Brigadier-General, or Sirdar, Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener also offered his 
thoughts in a memorandum concerning the importance of maintaining British rule over 
Uganda. Among his reflections, no mention was made of the defence of Egypt in a Nile Valley 
Doctrine fashion. Instead, his emphasis was laid upon stemming the tide of ‘Mahommedan 
Arabs’ that with ‘religious fanaticism […] would be enabled to push back our efforts for 
improvement of Africa’. Despite presumably being the most strategically inclined of all 
government officials, Kitchener did not attach importance to Uganda, as he even proposed to 
cede the territory to Belgium or Germany, had they not had ‘their hands full.’770  
The fourth and most important of the memoranda that circulated in September 1892, was 
the one compiled by Whitehall’s most senior and influential Africa expert, Sir Percy 
Anderson.771 He had been responsible for formulating most of Salisbury’s policy toward the 
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region; served as the British delegate at the West African Conference in Berlin in 1884-5 and 
conducted the Anglo-German negotiations over Africa in 1890. Additionally he had given 
private advice to both the directors of the IBEA772 and the Church Missionary Society.773 Thus, 
in terms of ascertaining British motives for the acquisition of Uganda, the memorandum is of 
great significance as it was compiled by the originator of these policies at a time when the 
decisions and events were still relatively fresh in his mind.  
In his section enumerating why Uganda had come to form part of the British sphere of 
influence, Anderson stated that it had done so simply as a consequence of the Anglo-German 
Agreement of 1886 and the hinterland understanding of July 1887.774 His recollections 
confirm the thesis enumerated in the previous chapters that the establishment of British 
paramount influence in Uganda derived de facto from the initial 1886 treaty. And, 
importantly, that this was done for economic reasons as Uganda was regarded an important 
regional ‘trade centre’.775  Throughout his memorandum Anderson placed emphasis both on 
the slave trade and on the plight of the British missionaries as the principal grounds for past 
and projected intervention:  
Whatever may be its future, it must be an important factor in the anti-slavery 
struggle. Its resources would be invaluable to the slave-traders; on the other 
hand, it is the only native State that can resist Arabs of the type found in the 
Upper Basin of the Congo.776   
Hence, Anderson held that Uganda posed an excellent vantage from which to execute 
Britain’s anti-slave trade policy in the interior of Africa, particularly against the slave raiders 
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operating around the Upper Congo River. In contrast to Kitchener, Anderson issued a stern 
warning against a policy of evacuation:  
All those who know the country have grave apprehensions. They see the 
possibility of the return of the slave-traders, massacres of missionaries and of 
their flocks, the resumption of the old system of wars and depopulation of the 
neighbouring countries. Their fears may be exaggerated; they cannot be 
groundless.777  
It is likely that Anderson was deliberate in his allusion to a repeated Gordon incident by his 
mention of the CMS’s Bishop Tucker and the missionaries’ resolve to remain in Uganda: 
‘whatever may be their fate.’ Only seven years had passed since Gladstone’s government had 
presided over General Charles Gordon’s famous transition into the ranks of imperial martyrs. 
The words ‘remember Gordon’ had in some jingoist quarters become an epithet for liberal 
wavering in imperial affairs.778  
Anderson also broached local geo-strategic concerns in his comprehensive memorandum. He 
claimed that the effect of a British evacuation would be either a Belgian, or more likely, a 
French incursion into the region of the Upper Nile. A British evacuation, it was speculated, 
would lead to ‘the Nile Basin, in its upper waters, and the Equatorial Provinces, being brought 
under French rule.’779 But despite what is frequently claimed in the historiography, Anderson 
never directly linked the retention of Uganda to the defence of Egypt in his memorandum.780 
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Whilst he did mention the ‘Equatorial Provinces’, this was hardly out of Egyptian concerns, 
since the territories were perceived as a distinct region.  
The erstwhile southernmost of Egypt’s African provinces had since the mid-1880s been 
‘envisaged as an enclave of order, prosperity and progress in the heart of an Africa threatened 
by “barbarism”....’781 It was hoped, in the words of the historian Iain Smith, that Emin Pasha’s 
old province of Equatoria, as a part of the British Empire, ‘might act as a nucleus from which 
“civilization” might be extended to neighbouring territories.’782 Hence, the region 
surrounding the Upper Nile was in 1892, as it had been prior to the 1890 Heligoland Treaty, 
perceived in largely humanitarian and economic terms, as a humanitarian bridgehead - 
divorced from some alleged geo-strategic vision of East Africa which hinged on the defence 
of Egypt.   
However, in terms of deciphering motives, Anderson’s memorandum is most valuable in 
enumerating the reasons for why Uganda came to form part of the British sphere in 1890, not 
necessarily as the basis on which the Liberal government took the decision to delay 
evacuation. Rosebery approved of Anderson’s analysis as ‘a good memorandum’. In fact the 
foreign secretary had edited it heavily after it first had been presented on the 25 August until 
a finished version was published on the 13 September.783 One of these edits was the striking 
out of a sentence which professed Wingate’s insistence on holding Uganda, ostensibly for 
Egyptian reasons.784 Anderson’s memorandum did however fail to impress Gladstone: ‘I 
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thought it was a pleading from a Missionary Society or from the Company, or should have 
thought so but for the date from the F.O.’785  
Importantly for the purposes of determining British motives, Currie revealed in his letter to 
Anderson in August 1892 that he thought Rosebery was ‘favourable to retention’ but that he 
had Cabinet colleagues who would ‘make difficulties.’786 Notwithstanding the fact that 
Rosebery had personally ordered the memoranda to be produced only five days after 
assuming office, which in itself would indicate positive interest. The issue of Uganda was at 
the top of his agenda and dominated his correspondence with Gladstone for the whole of 
September 1892, despite the remainder of the cabinet was set against it. This is also revealed 
in Currie’s private letter; Rosebery was the only member of Gladstone’s government who was 
in favour of retention.787 Gladstone himself corroborated Rosebery’s singular dissent on the 
issue.788 Hence, it is very likely that the new Foreign Secretary already had come to a decision 
about holding Uganda before any of the memoranda were presented. Prominent members of 
the cabinet such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir William Harcourt were pledged against 
any imperial expansion. Harcourt even scorned Anderson’s memorandum as written in ‘the 
highest jingo tone [since it was advocating] the annexation of the whole country up to the 
Albert Lakes with a view to the “reconquest” of the Sudan.’789  
For the 81 year-old Gladstone, the situation was unprecedented: indeed it had been the first 
time in his long prime ministerial career that his foreign secretary took dissent over an 
important foreign policy issue.790 In a private letter to Gladstone immediately prior to the 
                                                          
785 Gladstone to Rosebery, 17 September 1892, Private, Gladstone Papers, Vol. CCIV, ADD MS 44289, BL. 
786 Currie to Anderson, 23 August 1892, Private, FO 84/2258, TNA. 
787 Ibid. 
788 Gladstone to Rosebery, 24 September 1892, Gladstone Papers, Vol. CCIV, ADD MS 44289, BL. 
789 A.C. Gardiner, Life of Sir W. Harcourt (London: Constable & Company, 1923), pp. 191-3. 
790 Rosebery to Gladstone, 26 September 1892, Confidential, Gladstone Papers, Vol. CCIV, ADD MS 44289, BL. 
226 
 
Cabinet meeting which delayed evacuation another three months, Rosebery made an implicit 
threat of resignation due to this ‘most heartfelt and bitter’ difference of opinion between 
them.791 Rosebery’s reticence against assuming the position of foreign secretary only weeks 
earlier would suggest that the potential threat was perceived as sincere. Hence, since 
Rosebery alone had forced the decision to postpone evacuation, it is only necessary to 
determine the convictions held by him to discover the motives of the British government.  
The private correspondence between Rosebery and Gladstone is revealing as to the foreign 
secretary’s reasons for ‘holding’ Uganda and leaves little to conjecture. Rosebery was 
consistent in his references to the ‘most grave’ and ‘disastrous’ consequences that would 
result from a policy of abandonment.792 This language is echoed in the memorials presented 
to the government by pressure groups and interested parties such as the CMS and the 
BFASS.793 In no uncertain terms Rosebery invoked the fear of a repeated Khartoum. To this 
effect he cited in his correspondence to Gladstone Consul-General Gerald Portal’s words that 
nothing less than ‘a general massacre’ [original underlining] would ensue upon the company’s 
evacuation.794 Little evidence suggests that this was an insincere or contrived fear, despite 
the assertions made by the historian Gordon Martel.795 Portal himself noted in his personal 
diary that an evacuation would ‘inevitably cause massacres.’796 Indeed, Rosebery thought 
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Uganda to be ‘one of those more or less damnosas hereditates that one government leaves, 
not unwittingly, to its successor.’797  
And why was Uganda such a burdensome inheritance? Simply because Gladstone’s 
government found itself in a predicament which was analogous to what had occurred in 
Khartoum seven years earlier. But at this time, it would be Rosebery, not only in the capacity 
as Lord Privy Seal as he was in 1885, but as foreign secretary and possible successor to the 
Liberal party’s leadership, who would preside over the inevitable scandal.798 Although 
Gladstone had argued that the public would hold the IBEA and Salisbury jointly responsible 
for any potential massacre, Rosebery differed: ‘Unluckily, public opinion will, roughly, attach 
the responsibility to the Govt.’799 Where Gladstone’s third government had wavered and 
belatedly decided to despatch a relief expedition to Gordon in 1884, Rosebery was adamant 
that his fourth government would not repeat this error. Hence, Rosebery found himself in a 
dilemma over Uganda. He could pursue the path of least resistance and follow the opinion of 
the Prime Minister, his new cabinet colleagues and the Manchester Guardian, which was 
generally ‘held to be the voice of liberal opinion,’ and sanction an evacuation; or, he could 
attempt to postpone an evacuation through persuasion by way of an information 
campaign.800 These were likely the grounds upon which he commissioned the memoranda to 
be drawn in August 1892. Rosebery had already made up his mind and only needed an 
‘impartial statement’ covering all possible reasons for retention in order to prevent the new 
government from being discredited already at its inception.801   
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Hence, the decision to delay evacuation for three months had little or nothing to do with 
strategic concerns. Indeed, the most strategically minded of the memoranda, namely that of 
Wingate’s which stressed the consequences for Egypt, did Rosebery ‘not think very highly 
of.’802 Since Rosebery was the only member of Gladstone’s cabinet in favour of retention and 
since he had made up his mind about this prior to production of any memoranda on the issue, 
it renders their projections largely irrelevant. Strategic aspects are completely omitted from 
the copious correspondence between the two political protagonists Rosebery and Gladstone 
in the month leading up to the cabinet decision. Perhaps this was not unsurprising since 
Gladstone was staunchly in favour of evacuating Egypt. But Rosebery was hardly a ‘jingo’ on 
the matter himself, as he stated six months later: ‘No one is more sensible than I am of the 
delicacy and perplexity of our position in Egypt. Were we out of it I should on the whole 
rejoice.’803 But although a massacre of missionaries and their converts was in any case a grim 
prospect, it is not unlikely that Rosebery was also concerned about how this would affect his 
political reputation: a consideration of particular importance since his aged chief Gladstone 
was nearing the end of his political career.     
 
‘An Appeal to the Nation’,804 Sept. – Oct. 1892 
Among the interested parties of the time to the IBEA’s occupation of Uganda were the Church 
Missionary Society and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. Both had organised 
deputations that had been received by Rosebery on 23 September and 20 October 
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respectively.805 The first deputation was organised by the CMS, the organisation which 
arguably had the greatest interests at stake in Uganda. CMS missionaries had been present in 
Uganda since 30 June 1877. Even though the missionaries only numbered seven, their 
converts represented one of the largest factions in Uganda at an estimated 25,000.806 By 1892 
Mwanga had converted to Catholicism and Lugard had driven him and his followers into exile 
to the Sesse Islands in the Victoria Nyanza. Hence it was feared that Mwanga and the Wa-
fransa faction would exact revenge upon the CMS missionaries and their Protestant converts 
upon the IBEA’s evacuation.807 Although Rosebery was the only member of the cabinet in 
favour of retention, he concealed this from the CMS so as not to pre-emptively commit the 
government, confessing to Gladstone that: ‘I was as loyal to you all that I left them fear under 
the impression that I was a strong evacuationist!’808  
After the cabinet meeting of 30 September 1892, which postponed the evacuation another 
three months, a feverish pamphlet war was unleashed, in a partially concerted action by the 
CMS, the BFASS and the IBEA.809 The editor of the missionary periodical The Record contacted 
the CMS’s Secretary, Frederic Edward Wigram on 5 October and asked him whether the 
newspaper should: ‘issue a special Uganda supplement […] especially showing the 
endangered & the present state of affairs; […] & any such statement or appeal as the 
Secretaries may wish to make at this crisis.’810 The free supplement entitled ‘the Fate of 
Uganda,’ richly illustrated over eight densely typed pages, was published on the 14 October, 
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a week earlier than originally proposed. As the editor had suggested, the pamphlet was a 
powerful piece of propaganda aimed at rallying support for the continued occupation of 
Uganda.  
It offered a detailed account of the history of the CMS’s mission and listed several warnings 
against evacuation from interested parties such as Bishop Tucker, Stanley, Frederick Lugard, 
the IBEA and Gerald Portal. The warnings were unanimous in their predictions of the 
‘disastrous results’ that was certain to follow a withdrawal of British influence.811 Over the 
final pages, meticulous instructions on how to formulate petitions to both Houses of 
Parliament were included. Among the main consequences emphasised by the petition were: 
‘anarchy and bloodshed,’ ‘the continuance and revival of the slave-trade in East Africa,’ 
‘native distrust of the English Government,’ and ‘great injury to English commercial 
interests.’812  The collection of petitions received by the Foreign Office identical in format and 
argumentation is testament to the influence of The Record’s special supplement.813 
Meanwhile, meetings had been held across Britain in support of the missionaries’ plight. In a 
speech at the Sectional Hall, the Bishop of Exeter drew both a parallel with the Sudan and of 
Britain’s moral obligations:  
And God also, in His great mercy, grant that we never withdraw the protecting 
ægis of England’s name, and England’s voice, and England’s hand from regions 
once sheltered by it, as was so disastrously done in Khartoum, as is now 
threatened in Uganda.814  
                                                          
811 The Record Supplement, 14 October 1892, CMS/G/Y/A7/1/2, CMS Papers, University of Birmingham. 
812 Ibid. 
813 Petitions to the Foreign Office, FO 84/2192 and FO 84/2241, TNA.  
814 Speech held by the Bishop of Exeter at the Sectional Hall, Thursday 13 October 1892 cited in The Record, 
No. 7685, Vo. XI (N.S.), Friday 14 October 1892, pp. 1046-7, in CMS/G/Y/A7/1/2, Cadbury Research Library, 
University of Birmingham. 
231 
 
Interest for Uganda had been ‘steadily rising’ over the autumn. A full gathering at the CMS 
had already been held and public meetings at the Guildhall and Mansion House were 
planned.815 The issue had even been raised at the Church of England’s Ruri-Decanal 
Conference at Greenwich in which the delegates resolved that an evacuation: ‘would be 
prejudiced to the honour of this country, and unjust to the people and the Christian converts 
in Uganda, who would thus be abandoned.’816 
A substantial number of petitions regarding Uganda were received at the Foreign Office over 
the months October and November 1892. Apart from the volume, 174 in total, the breadth 
of groups interested in the issue, bore not only testament to late-Victorian civic engagement 
in a general sense, but to the heightened mood of public opinion in this particular question.817 
The petitioners ranged from influential religious bodies such as the Church of Scotland, the 
Presbyterians of Scotland, the Free Church of Scotland and the Church of Ireland to an 
assortment of Chambers of Commerce such as that of Glasgow, Manchester, Edinburgh, 
Newport, Leith and Blackburn, to a collection of petitions from towns and cities such as 
Bristol, Swansea and Chester.818 None of the resolutions and memorials were concerned with 
any strategic aspect of holding Uganda. Rather they focussed on a number of issues already 
familiar to, and argued by, Rosebery. In near uniformity, all the petitions raised the holy trinity 
of consequences that would occur upon abandonment, namely: massacres of missionaries 
and converts; a resumption of the slave trade; and a blow to British trade.  
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Naturally, the missionary bodies were most attuned to the human and spiritual consequences 
of an evacuation. The clergy of Hull were under the persuasion that it would be: ‘most 
disastrous to the cause of Christianity & Civilisation in Central Africa, & would probably open 
the door to bloodshed & slavery.'819 Whilst the members of the public who attended the 
meeting at Chester Town Hall resolved: ‘that the Slave Trade would be grievously promoted, 
and that the cause of Christ as well as lawful commerce and national honour would be injured 
by the evacuation of Uganda.'820 And although Swansea Town Council believed that the IBEA 
had: ‘destroyed the government of that country’, it thought ‘the abandonment of it now, 
would place its people at the mercy of fanaticism and the evil passions of men, and would be 
a retrograde movement, and inimical to the honour and best traditions of our country.'821 
Hence, many of the petitions were also concerned with how an evacuation would damage 
British prestige and honour, particularly in Africa. Perhaps somewhat predictably, the Scottish 
petitioners laid emphasis on what their great explorer-missionary son had achieved in the 
region and how this had animated public opinion:  
In none of the Christian Missions which have gone forth from Scotland have its 
people, of all classes, shown so keen an interest as in those founded in Central 
Africa since the action of David Livingstone, thirty years ago.822  
Just as Salisbury had invoked Livingstone during the Anglo-German negotiations over East 
Africa in 1890,823 the Church of Scotland did at the next crossroads in 1892.   
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Simultaneously with the campaigning efforts of the CMS, the BFASS organised a deputation, 
150 strong, which met with Rosebery on 20 October.824 In an eagerness to make the 
deputation as large and influential as possible, the Anti-Slavery Society’s secretary Charles 
Allen invited dignitaries such as the Archbishop of Canterbury Edward Benson, and the 
Archbishop of Westminster Herbert Vaughan. The latter, a Roman Catholic Archbishop and 
later Cardinal, was even a life-member of the society.825 Benson had been unable to attend 
the deputation himself. However he did express his support of its cause in an open letter to 
Allen: ‘I hope for many reasons that the British Government will be able to adopt a policy 
which will prevent the disaster which it is naturally feared would follow withdrawal from 
Central Africa.’826  
The petition presented to Rosebery had unsurprisingly focussed on the effects that a 
withdrawal would have on the slave trade. It was taken as a matter of course that the ‘Slave-
Trade and Slave-hunting’ had ‘long prevailed’ in the region. The Society had viewed with ‘deep 
apprehension’ the consequences of a ‘retirement of British Agents’ and that it would ‘… be 
followed by an outburst of hostilities, and an immediate expansion of the Slave-trade.’ As a 
remedy the petitioners recommended that Uganda should be declared a protectorate and 
that a railway should be constructed to connect it with Mombasa in adherence to articles I 
and IV of the Brussels Act.827 A day after their meeting with the foreign secretary, William 
Henry Wylde, the former head of the Foreign Office’s Slave Trade Department, wrote a letter 
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of congratulations for the deputation’s ‘great success’ to the Society’s board member Joseph 
Sturge. In a reference to the deputation’s leader Reginald Bosworth Smith’s phrase ‘continuity 
of the moral policy’828 – which Rosebery later had made his own829 – Wylde was certain that 
Rosebery’s ‘words respecting the “continuity of Policy” as regards Slave Trade suppression 
which he says this Country is bound to carry out’ must afford them all ‘sincere pleasure.’830 
He also confided that some of the MP’s against the retention of Uganda were ‘wavering and 
would be glad to find a decent excuse to “volte face” [and] a little more exposure of Public 
Opinion will afford the required excuse.’831 
In historiographical terms, Wylde’s remarks concerning the ‘continuity of policy’ is hugely 
significant. Rosebery’s intention, both from the context in which the phrase was pronounced, 
and from the policy Britain had long pursued in this region, all indicate that Wylde’s 
interpretation was correct: that Rosebery revealed that he was committed to preserving the 
continuity of Britain’s anti-slave trade policy in East Africa through the retention of Uganda. 
But instead of construing it in what arguably was its proper context; historians subscribing to 
the strategic hypothesis have cited Rosebery’s statement as evidence of his collusion with 
Salisbury’s alleged, and distinctly novel strategic motives.832    
Rosebery himself, however, cautiously confided to Gladstone that he did not think the 
deputation was ‘very effective’ and proceeded to assure him that he had not made any 
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promises to the Society either way.833 He also reported that he had taken up an idea briefly 
proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir William Harcourt, namely of ‘handing over 
Uganda to Zanzibar.’ This, Rosebery recommended was the ‘best arrangement’ and despite 
also requiring an annual subsidy was ‘beyond all doubt the cheapest arrangement.’834  
Gladstone seemingly approved of the suggestion, but Rosebery reported only a week later 
that there were legal and constitutional ‘difficulties’ that prevented them from following 
through with the plan.835 The CMS and BFASS had certainly succeeded in mobilising popular 
support for the retention of Uganda during the autumn of 1892. A mobilisation that was 
crucial for achieving a metropolitan intervention, what Huzzey describes as the 
nationalisation of ‘responsibility for imperial interests […] through deft appeals to existing 
sentiments’.836     
 
IBEA’s Campaign and Rosebery’s Resolution, Sept. – Dec. 1892 
Campaigning was not only the preserve of adept and well-connected pressure groups. The 
IBEA also launched a publicity offensive aimed at influencing policymakers and public opinion. 
The man disparagingly described by the staunch ‘evacuationist’ Harcourt, as a ‘mischievous 
lunatic’, namely the IBEA’s man-on-the-spot Captain Frederick Lugard, returned home to 
Britain in October to assist in the company’s public relations campaign.837 Whilst Lugard went 
on a public-speaking tour and worked on a book that would be published the following year, 
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the IBEA’s director Ernest Bentley had already published a pamphlet.838 It was entitled: 
‘Handbook to the Uganda Question and Proposed East Africa Railway’ and, perhaps 
somewhat ambitiously, cost twopence. It contained a volley of 237 arguments in favour of 
retention and construction of a railway, whilst also included 60 passages which rhetorically 
caricatured the opposing arguments.839  
Every conceivable reason for retaining Uganda for the Empire was trumpeted, from 
humanitarian to commercial and strategic. The pamphlet’s most important function, however, 
came much later than the autumn of 1892. Its main role has been to influence and frame the 
historiography of the partition of East Africa. Bentley identified the arguments most likely to 
gain support from policymakers as geo-strategic, in particular those connected to ‘protecting’ 
a river known to all Englishmen versed in the Old Testament, namely the Nile. He lavished 
attention on the company’s vital role as the gatekeeper to Egypt - instead of mainly focusing 
on the more emotionally and morally evocative sentiments such as the slave trade or the 
plight of the missionaries and their converts. After all, the CMS and the BFASS had already laid 
claim to these good causes. If only used as a convenient, albeit speculative excuse at the time, 
it certainly captured the imagination of generations of historians hence that have interpreted 
the events and their motives.  
One of the most notorious examples of these arguments were:  
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That the relinquishment of Uganda to a civilised power immediately imperils 
the safety of Egypt, as the diversion or blocking of the head-waters of the Nile 
could stop her water supply and starve her population.840  
IBEA's agent Lugard would later include a similarly worded argument in his semi-biographical 
account published in 1893 that: 'Egypt is indebted for her summer supply of water to the 
Victoria lake, and a dam built across the river at its outlet from the lake would deprive Egypt 
of this'.841 Terje Tvedt even falsely cited Lugard’s assertion as evidence of the British 
government’s official policy and basis of decision to retain Uganda.842 However the argument 
formed merely a part of the IBEA's propaganda campaign aimed at protecting its investments 
in the kingdom. 
In November, Rosebery produced a comprehensive memorandum in which he evaluated the 
government’s options with regard to Uganda. In his characteristic fashion the Foreign 
Secretary offered a numbered list of five possible alternatives Britain could pursue; all of which 
were different variations of direct and indirect control, so complete abandonment was 
eliminated as a policy option. Rosebery believed, however, that declaring Uganda a 
protectorate was unrealistic since his cabinet colleagues would find this ‘distasteful.’843 Whilst 
the other proposals concerned various forms of ways in which Uganda could be ruled by proxy 
from Zanzibar. These were dismissed in favour of what Rosebery deemed the ‘best plan,’: ‘to 
send a Commissioner there to superintend the Company’s evacuation, and to make 
arrangements for an organized Government.’844 
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It had also come to light that the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and industrialist Cecil 
Rhodes had submitted two offers to the government regarding Uganda. In his proposal he 
would, free of charge, extend the Cape telegraph system to the country. In his other and 
unofficial offer he suggested to ‘manage and keep Uganda’ for a government subsidy of 
£24,000 per annum.845 Hence, among the many sub-imperial stakeholders to the political 
drama unfolding over Uganda, the arch-imperialist Rhodes also saw occasion to act. Almost a 
decade later it also emerged that Rhodes had, in 1891, secretly paid the Liberal Party’s 
election campaign organiser Francis Schnadhorst £5,000 on the condition that Britain 
remained in Egypt.846 Thus it was not the first time Rhodes had attempted to covertly 
influence Westminster’s Africa policy. Rosebery characterised Rhodes’s offer as ‘simple and 
tempting’, but thought it would ‘drain Zanzibar dry of all commerce from Uganda’ and that it 
would be ‘an evasion of our responsibilities.’847 If Rosebery only had been concerned with 
holding Uganda irrespective of other ‘responsibilities’ such as the slave trade or missionaries, 
as has been suggested in the strategic historiography, he is unlikely to have rejected this offer.  
On the 29 November, Gerald Portal received the news that Rosebery had appointed him the 
commissioner for Uganda and that he was to ‘start as soon as possible.’848 Portal was a rising 
star among British diplomatists, having recently served as Sir Evelyn Baring’s assistant in Egypt. 
The young Consul-General and Commissioner also had clear views on the inadequate nature 
of the IBEA’s administration of the British sphere; views that would be expressed in both the 
numerous despatches he sent back over the summer of 1893, and in his final report submitted 
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to Rosebery upon return to Britain the following year.849 What, however would form the main 
topic of Portal’s official report, was the question of ‘transport and communication,’ namely 
the Uganda Railway – a tool of imperialism perceived to be essential for the retention and 
development of Uganda, and a question which will be detailed in the following chapter.   
In anticipation of the report that would seal both Uganda and the IBEA’s fate, the company 
launched a second wave of its public relations campaign in the autumn of 1893. This came in 
the form of two books: The Rise of Our East-African Empire850 and British East Africa.851 The 
former was two volumes by Frederick Lugard and the latter, a more academic account of the 
IBEA’s history, by its Assistant Secretary P.L. McDermott. Perhaps unsurprising, what Low 
terms McDermott’s ‘apologia’ was overshadowed by Captain Lugard’s ‘handsome’ tales from 
Africa.852 But also unlike Lugard, McDermott did not assert that the company was present in 
East Africa on geo-strategic grounds. His summary of events, largely based on his own 
recollections, press clippings from The Times and official government speeches, left out geo-
strategy. It is unlikely that such a centrally placed agent of the IBEA would avoid raising this 
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The events outlined above which transpired between 1890 and 1893 are relevant to the 
history of the partition of East Africa on three separate accounts. Firstly, they challenge the 
orthodox historiography which suggests Salisbury attached primacy to the retention of 
Uganda; secondly they demonstrate Rosebery’s crucial agency and his motives; and thirdly it 
shows both how important the Uganda question was to the British public and how influential 
public opinion was to policymaking over the issue. In this respect it also exposes how 
influential networks and religious leaders rapidly could mobilise popular support over issues 
which intersected concepts such as national honour, anti-slavery or Christianity. The policy-
decisions made in the autumn of 1892 proved to be of equal significance to those of 1886 and 
1890 in terms of facilitating the eventual annexation of East Africa to the British Empire. 
Without Rosebery’s decisive intervention, the IBEA would not have been able to sustain its 
occupation and Uganda would likely have fallen outside the British orbit.  
Apart from its potential for counterfactual speculations, the period is particularly well-suited 
for testing the dominant historiographical narrative and has revealed that Salisbury made 
policy-decisions entirely inconsistent with this strategic explanatory model. The Conservative 
Prime Minister exposed himself as largely indifferent to the fate of Uganda on two separate 
occasions. He refused to assist the IBEA to sustain its occupation both in the autumn of 1891 
and in the spring of 1892. Instead of dispensing a relatively minor annual subsidy of £40,000, 
Salisbury indirectly left the responsibility of holding this territory, which allegedly was of 
critical geo-strategic significance to the British Empire, on the narrow financial shoulders of a 
missionary organisation – the Church Missionary Society. If Salisbury had perceived Uganda 
to be of any strategic relevance for Egypt or, in particular the route to India, then surely a 
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grant of this diminutive magnitude would not have prevented his government from taking 
decisive action.  
Evidently the protagonist himself did not ascribe Uganda anywhere near the same importance 
as the later generations of imperial historians eager to posit novel interpretations of British 
expansion during the partition of Africa. Although Salisbury’s sanction of the company’s 
withdrawal was done with little fanfare, it was far from inadvertent, hence his actions 
undermines the whole interpretative framework that has been constructed surrounding 
British policy in 1880-90s East Africa. 
With this historiographical ‘red herring’ extricated, the true range of motives which eventually 
led to the full incorporation of East Africa into the British Empire can be fully explored and 
elucidated. Contrary to what Low claimed in his analysis of the public campaigns concerning 
the Uganda question in 1892, the British public were not ignorant of the Foreign Office’s 
ostensible ‘real thinking’ on the matter.853 Perceived in terms of the arguments Rosebery 
himself used in his private correspondence with Gladstone, the petitioners were remarkably 
well informed about the factors which ultimately led to the Liberal government’s 
intervention: massacres of missionaries and their converts; resumption of the slave trade; a 
blow to British trade; and a dishonour to the British name were the same reasons Rosebery 
had argued privately. Presiding over a repeated Khartoum was also a disastrous spectre which 
haunted the new foreign secretary, surely aware that his political reputation relied on 
avoiding another ‘Gordon incident,’ but at this time with a Bishop Tucker rather than a 
General Gordon. 
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Although it is evident that the slave trade was not prevalent in any substantial measure in the 
kingdom of Buganda at the time, it was that particular matter, however erroneous, which the 
British public primarily associated with the wider region. The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society pushed this agenda both as a genuine expression of concern, but also from a need to 
remain relevant in a world which increasingly had rid itself of slavery. The ‘Uganda Question’ 
had struck a powerful resonance in late-Victorian civic consciousness; a consciousness that 
was eager to export its Victorian brand of values encapsulated in Livingstone’s three tenets 
to far flung imperial outposts. But it was the risk of abandonment, the removal of Britain’s 
protecting and ‘civilising’ aegis that was the most emotionally evocative for the British public 
in the heyday of the ‘New Imperialism.’ To do so, it was believed, would not only lead to 
disastrous consequences in Uganda, but perhaps more importantly, it would constitute a 
national humiliation and dishonour the British name. Since Britain, the nation which had 
identified itself as the strongest and most civilised among the civilised nations, would be 
exposed as too weak to live up to its professed ideals.854  
This may serve to explain why the question over the evacuation of a country, which few had 
heard of until that very same autumn of 1892, caused such a fervent public response. What 
the  campaigns orchestrated by the three parties most interested in the plight of Uganda, 
namely the IBEA, the CMS and the Anti-Slavery Society initiated, soon took on a life of its own 
in the imagination of the British public. The ‘Uganda Question’ should thus not be simply 
perceived as a question of whether or not to abandon an obscure kingdom in Equatorial 
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Central Africa, but as one of whether to abandon the very ideals and values which defined the 
British imperial identity.  
The final chapter concerns the technology which enabled Britain to substitute its 
predominantly maritime engagement with a continental presence in East Africa. The Uganda 
Railway, as it became known, was central to the British vision for the region throughout the 
partition process, both in terms of economic development and for execution of anti-slave 




The Full Incorporation of East Africa and the Uganda Railway: Anti-Slave Trade Policy on 
the Cheap, 1885-96 
 
The Uganda Railway, extending from Mombasa to the eastern shores of the Victoria Nyanza, 
was one of the British Empire’s costliest infrastructure projects. Despite the substantial capital 
outlay of £5.5 million,855 it served upon completion in 1902 only a miniscule market and it 
was this seeming futility that quickly earned it the epithet ‘the lunatic line’.856 Retrospectively 
the railway may have epitomised the epoch of new imperialism’s naïve fervour for territorial 
expansion – an enthusiasm for empire that neither did, nor ever could, meet the expectations 
invested in it. However, to its contemporary promoters the railway was regarded as anything 
but an ill-conceived vanity project. It was heralded a sine qua non to the retention and 
development of East Africa, no less than an essential component for the spread of ‘legitimate 
commerce’ and the civilisation that it was believed attended it to the interior of the continent. 
It represented a logical conclusion to the continuing influence of Britain’s honourable anti-
slave trade policy. 
The way in which the majority of the historiography has reconciled its substantial cost with 
its apparent lack of commercial utility, has been to position the railway within the orthodox 
strategic explanatory model – since naturally, no expense was too great for the defence of 
the empire. But although this line of reasoning offers a tempting proposition, it is divorced 
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from the documentary evidence which suggests that a very different set of considerations 
were at play antecedent to the decision to construct the line. It is clear that from very early 
on in the process which eventually led to the incorporation of East Africa into the British 
Empire, the question of transport, and in particular the construction of a railway, was integral 
to William Mackinnon’s vision. Due to geographical features such as the absence of navigable 
rivers and biological quirks such as the tse-tse fly, all movement of goods relied on human 
porters. Obviously this was a mode of transport which was too slow, too expensive and too 
unreliable as any permanent solution.  
However, it should also be seen in conjunction with the other railway projects that had either 
already been realised or were under way in the European colonial empires such as in the 
Congo Free State or in South Africa. By the 1890s, the Indian railway network had matured to 
an extent that it had given rise to its own railway construction industry, and it was these Indian 
master masons that would eventually construct the Uganda line.857 One might suggest that 
this revolutionary piece of transportation technology formed one of the key factors that 
enabled the partition of Africa – from Leopold’s Congo Free State in the west, to the 
northward expansion of the Cape Colony in the south, and indeed of Mackinnon’s sphere in 
the east. The railways enabled the European powers to expand their domains from small 
coastal footholds to vast continental holdings that extended into the very interior of Africa. 
Thus, regions which had been regarded about as accessible as the far side of the moon 
became – once the rails had been laid – only a few days train ride away.  
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The railways had in the decades prior to the 1890s, enjoyed remarkable international success 
and not only in densely populated regions.858 When constructed in more desolate areas – 
epitomised by the Pacific Railways crossing the American West – they had created markets 
where there were none, so there was little reason for its contemporary promoters to doubt 
in its inevitable success even in underpopulated East Africa. By linking the coastal city of 
Mombasa with the Victoria Nyanza, Mackinnon could tap into what was hoped to be a large 
inland market, since the lake could be plied by steamers so as to connect the various 
producers with the network hub at Kisumu for transport to the coast and trans-shipment on 
British-India Steam Navigation Company steamers to international markets.859 What the 
railway then facilitated was that it made landlocked high-bulk products such as agricultural 
produce marketable. Testament to this transformative effect is the subsequent status of the 
Kenyan highlands as the granary of East Africa. 
Although it was not only in commercial terms that the railway was regarded by the British 
policy establishment or public – it was its potential as a tool with which to suppress the slave 
trade that the line became notorious in Britain’s imperial milieux. As both the British and 
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society and indeed Salisbury were aware, a railway constructed to the 
interior would also shift British anti-slave trade policy from its focus on the coast to the inland. 
The former had advocated this strategy for years, but with the conclusion of the General Act 
at Brussels in 1890, and Britain’s ratification in 1892, the radical change in policy became 
sanctioned under international treaty obligations.860 Contrary to what is suggested in most of 
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the historiography of the Uganda Railway, it will be argued that Salisbury was genuinely 
motivated by philanthropic concerns in his advocacy of the railway. In particular it will be 
demonstrated that there was a prevailing perception of the line as a cost-saving and 
humanitarian measure, a way in which Britain could execute its anti-slave trade policy on the 
cheap. Although this might seem counterintuitive, or perhaps ironic, granted what would 
ultimately be the tremendous cost of the project, it was held that by constructing the railway 
Britain would be enabled to suppress the inland slave trade and eradicate the trafficking at 
its source. This would render the costlier East African anti-slave trade naval squadron 
redundant. 
The chapter will first examine how the railway was integral to Mackinnon’s plans for East 
Africa over the 1880s and it will then consider how the prospect influenced government policy 
toward the Imperial British East Africa Company. It will then investigate the effect of 
humanitarian lobbying activity and how the railway became an important issue for British 
pressure groups such as the Anti-Slavery Society or the Church Missionary Society. Lastly it 
will demonstrate the extent to which the Uganda Railway was a result of Salisbury and 
Rosebery’s agency and that their motives for advancing it in Parliament were principally out 
of economic and humanitarian considerations.      
 
 The Partition of East Africa and the Railway, 1885-90 
The construction of the Uganda Railway commenced in 1896, a full six years after the kingdom 
of Buganda was incorporated in the British sphere of influence and a year after the region 
was declared a British protectorate. But despite the fact that building only began after the 
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formal annexation process was completed, the plans for its construction had been a key 
determinant of British planning and policymaking toward East Africa over the almost two 
preceding decades – initially on a private level, but as British involvement increased the 
question assumed an official character. The first recorded instance of the railway being 
mentioned was during the National Trade Union Congress of 1879.861 William Mackinnon, the 
owner of the British-India Steam Navigation Company had in 1872 expanded his steamship 
packet service to Zanzibar and half a decade later his commercial vision for the region had 
evolved into something altogether more comprehensive.862 Pre-dating the European 
scramble for African territories in the 1880-90s, he sought in 1877, a concession from the 
Sultan of Zanzibar to establish a new ‘East India Company in Africa.’ The plan was however 
scuppered by Salisbury who secretly intervened by instructing the Sultan Barghash not to 
award Mackinnon the rights to the mainland.863 Marie de Kiewiet who authored the first 
scholarly account of the IBEA, rightly hypothesised Salisbury’s motives as derived from a wish 
not to precipitate a large-scale partition of the region.864 But this early sojourn proved not to 
be the conclusion to British involvement in Zanzibar and its environs, rather the prologue to 
the partition proper of the 1880s and 90s. 
It was not until the German declaration of a protectorate on the East African mainland in the 
spring of 1885 that the question of a railway re-emerged. With Germany’s challenge to British 
hegemony, came the retort from Britain’s men on the spot; Consul-General Sir John Kirk and 
his deputy Frederic Holmwood. The latter lobbied for the construction of a railway with such 
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zeal that it provisionally came to be known as the ‘Holmwood railway scheme.’865 As a man 
of his time, he held unflinching belief in the radical transformative power of railways and 
stated to Mackinnon’s business partner, the Manchester cotton magnate James Hutton, that 
‘it is impossible to believe […] that any forces could successfully continue to resist the civilizing 
influences of a railway…’866 Holmwood had the preceding month argued in similar terms in a 
despatch to the foreign secretary, ‘the proposed railway […] will most effectually neutralize 
every pending evil, as well as confer incalculable good on African and our commerce.’867 
Hence the railway was brought forward as a catch-all solution to the composite policy-
considerations Britain faced in East Africa.  
Holmwood’s views were echoed by both Kirk and the young Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert 
Kitchener who, in his report concerning ‘British Lines of Communications with the Indian 
Ocean’, had identified Mombasa as the ideal vantage from which to strategically counter the 
German position at Dar-es-Salaam, and to pursue Britain’s anti-slave trade policy. Importantly 
Kitchener perceived the coastal-town as the only suited terminus for the Uganda Railway:  
Mombasa is the most probable port from which any railway system for the 
opening up of the interior would start, and its possession would give England a 
commercial base, without which it would be impossible to develop the trade of 
Central Africa.868  
Whilst Kirk had briefly contemplated the port of Ushambala which commanded the Pangani 
Valley, he found it unsuitable for large vessels and too unhealthy for Europeans. Instead he 
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was ‘satisfied that no port on the coast can compare with that of Mombasa, in case it is ever 
seriously intended to construct a railway to the interior.’869 
As declared by Anderson in the summer of 1885, Britain’s interests in East Africa were 
exclusively ‘humanitarian and commercial.’870 What Holmwood had alluded to in his 
reference to ‘every pending evil’ was the slave trade – the illicit human trafficking Britain was 
pledged against. Indeed he professed explicitly that construction of the railway: ‘if 
accompanied with the political measure [would] complete the work which has so long been 
carried on, at such an immense cost, by England in connection with her anti-slavery policy.’871 
Hence, the railway posed such an ideal proposition since it addressed both aspects of British 
interests in the region: it would facilitate legitimate trade and suppress the slave trade. In 
particular it would make British commercial activities on the mainland sustainable over the 
long term – a form of ‘effective occupation’ which was essential to check any further 
expansion of the German protectorate. Implicitly, the railway question turned on whether 
Britain desired to maintain a presence in East Africa or retire in favour of Germany. This 
commercial and humanitarian formula was the guise the railway assumed in 1885 and would 
remain so throughout the following decade. 
Despite Holmwood’s internal Foreign Office advocacy, it was private actions that took place 
outside official channels which determined British reactions to Germany’s intrusion. 
Nevertheless, the railway assumed primacy also in these plans. Harry Johnston, on a botanical 
expedition for Kew Gardens to Mount Kilimanjaro, had in 1884 acquired treaty rights to a 
small section of land in Taveta next to the mountain.872 He had initially offered the treaty to 
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the Foreign Office, recommending the construction of a railway so as to make it commercially 
sustainable, but governmental inaction led him to instead present the treaty to Hutton and 
Mackinnon.873 It was thus on the basis of Johnston’s territorial rights that the ‘Syndicate for 
establishing British Commerce & Influence in East Africa,’ which in 1888 would receive a royal 
charter as the Imperial British East Africa Company, was formed in 1885. From its very 
inception and pre-dating the chartered company itself, British commercial interests in the 
region viewed a connection with the interior as paramount. Indeed, the second of the 
syndicate’s three stated aims was ‘To open a direct route to Victoria Nyanza & the Soudan & 
thereby establish stations & commerce in the interior of E Africa.’874  The recollections 
contained in Anderson’s September 1892 memorandum confirm the emphasis on reaching 
the interior.875 Uganda and its Upper Nile environs were perceived to be the economic 
heartland of the region – controlling it was the key to the British syndicate and later chartered 
company’s commercial success. This was understood to be only achievable with a railway.  
Prior to the negotiation of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886, the railway was 
vociferously lobbied for by every interested party, from Mackinnon to Stanley and in 
particular by the new Consul General to Zanzibar, Charles Euan Smith. Upon his arrival at 
Zanzibar from his ill-fated Emin Relief Expedition, Stanley had made three recommendations 
or ‘great measures’ to the IBEA, the second of which was: ‘the immediate construction of a 
railway between Mombasa and Port-Kavirondo on the Victoria Nyanza’876 This measure was 
held by Stanley to be critical for achieving the first on his list of priorities: ‘the entire 
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subjucation of Uganda to English interests.’877 Euan Smith estimated the cost of constructing 
such a line to be between ‘2 ½ to 3 millions sterling’ but despite the substantial capital 
requirements involved, he entertained ‘little doubt that, with the enthusiasm that will be 
aroused by Stanley’s presence and personal pleading, this sum will be easily obtainable. The 
construction of a railway would mean the commercial downfall of Zanzibar and would greatly 
aid in the satisfactory solution of the East-African question.’878  
Once news of the personal scramble for Uganda between Jackson and Peters had become 
known in Zanzibar three months later, Euan Smith reiterated his arguments, but with a new-
found urgency: ‘…they [IBEA] should gird themselves to the task and decide on the 
construction and immediate commencement on a large scale of the railway from Mombasa 
to Victoria Nyanza…’879 Again the issue of cost was trivialised by the man on the spot who 
thought that ‘in the present temper of the English people and backed by the eloquence of Mr. 
Stanley, Sir William Mackinnon should have no difficulty in attaining any quantity of money 
for the realization of the schemes in question.’880 Clearly, Foreign Office officials judged public 
opinion to be supportive of the venture. 
     
A Railway Survey, 1890-92 
As the previous two chapters demonstrated, the political landscape in East Africa had by 1890 
been significantly altered. Whilst the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty had 
incorporated Uganda into the British sphere, the conclusion of the Brussels Anti-Slave Trade 
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Conference afforded a legal rationale to construct the railway. Britain’s ratification of the 
General Act for the Suppression of the Slave Trade in 1892 led to a radical shift in British anti-
slave trade policy.881 It was a move away from an entirely maritime focus on suppression of 
slave trafficking, or the ‘export trade’ through the use of naval squadrons stationed off the 
east coast of Africa, to a continental and land-based strategy in which railways formed a 
fundamental part. It was also a shift in policy that Salisbury initially had been reluctant to 
commit to.882 These new treaty commitments had certainly not gone unnoticed to the parties 
most interested in Britain’s East Africa policy such as the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society, the Church Missionary Society or indeed the IBEA – in particular the two former made 
their voices heard during the Uganda debates in the autumn of 1892.883  
Over the next two years, all three bodies seized upon the treaty’s Article I Section III which 
emphasised ‘The construction of roads, and in particular railways, connecting the advanced 
stations with the coast.’884 A railway had however already been constructed in the British 
sphere in East Africa.885 The ‘ambitiously’ entitled Central African Railway was inaugurated at 
Mombasa on 29 August 1890, but the 30 miles of light railway was obviously unequal to the 
task of connecting the coast with the Victoria Nyanza.886 Mackinnon seized quickly on the 
opportunity offered by the Brussels Act and was first to point out the impending change in 
official policy. Not entirely deprived of self-interest, he reminded Salisbury of these 
obligations:  
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When the Company was formed the British Government had not promised 
specifically to do more for the slave trade suppression than might be implied 
by the continuance of the Cruisers on the Coast. At Brussels however they 
came under heavy engagements to do a great deal more, and it is on the 
shoulders of this Company as representing British Dominion in East Africa that 
the tasks must fall.887  
The company had however an excellent track record of upholding this imperial interest in 
their sphere of influence. According to Mackinnon his company had ‘secured the freedom of 
4000 slaves, while the average number liberated by the operations of Her Majesty’s Cruisers 
does not exceed 200 annually.’888 One of these ‘new and most onerous duties’ was railway 
construction which he urged Salisbury’s government to support, either through a guarantee 
of 3 per cent of a capital outlay of 1 to 1.5 million or a direct grant of between £30-40,000 
p.a. for twenty five years.889 IBEA planned not only a railway to the lake, but also to ‘place 
steamers upon it [so as to] thereby prevent the iniquitous raids made by the Arabs for the 
purpose of procuring slaves.’ In Mackinnon’s estimation the railway would reduce 
transportation costs by ‘over 80 per cent’ relative to slave porterage, thus removing the 
demand for porter slaves: ‘The Government can thus convert the cruel and guilty slave borne 
traffic into a legitimate and useful trade.’890 
Evidently suppression of the slave trade formed the IBEA’s principal argument in their quest 
for a government subsidy. However this humanitarian engagement was also reflected in 
Salisbury’s own pronouncements and correspondence. As the fourth chapter has already 
shown, Salisbury had declared at the conclusion of the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar 
                                                          






treaty that it would ‘furnish a powerful assistance’ against the slave trade.891 In a speech given 
almost a year later, he predicted that ‘whenever that railway can be made I believe that the 
end of the African exportation of the slave will have been attained.’892  
But it was not just rhetoric playing to an audience sympathetic to anti-slavery. In an internal 
memorandum he argued that: ‘the railway would dry up the machinery by which the slave 
caravans are kept in action.’893 Salisbury clearly linked construction of the railway with slave 
trade suppression. The Prime Minister offered a detailed explanation of the mechanism with 
which the railway would achieve this abolitionist end:   
But if the caravans for the purpose of legitimate commerce were to cease, as 
under the influence of the railway they must necessarily do, slave caravans 
could not possibly continue. In the first place the occupation of those who 
accompany caravans, & of those who feed them on the road, would be so 
greatly destroyed by the disappearance of the legitimate traffic, that they 
would not remain in existence in quantities sufficient to maintain the slave 
traffic. The slave traffic by itself, hampered & hindered, always uncertain of 
success, & liable to the greatest risks, would not be a sufficient occupation to 
maintain the numbers whose cooperation would be necessary; […] But the 
railway would have a still more effective operation, in that it would make the 
use of a caravan at all so suspicious as to carry with it in everycase the 
condemnation of slave trading. A man could use a caravan for no purpose 
except for slave trading; & therefore the knowledge that he used it would 
expose him to punishment; & would still more expose to punishment the 
merchants by whose aid alone such things could be organised. Conducting, 
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taking part in, aiding, organising, or supplying a caravan, would all become 
synonymous with slave trading.894  
It was on these grounds that Salisbury, in January 1891, sought Parliamentary funds for a 
survey of the terrain traversed by the projected railway.895 Naturally Salisbury was also 
cognisant of its economic potential. Without one it could hardly be expected that the 
company could attain profitability or that the region would attain any measure of economic 
self-sufficiency.  
An entire network of railways had been built in India over the mid-nineteenth century and by 
the 1880s and 1890s reports of their profitability was being received in Whitehall.896 If the 
railway had the desired effect of eliminating the slave trade in the region, the Royal Navy 
would also free up the capacity and cost of the five cruisers it maintained in East African 
waters and make them deployable in areas of greater strategic interest.897 It was with these 
arguments in mind, that Salisbury, the former chairman of the Great Eastern Railway 
Company,898 already responsible for expanding the British rail network together with his 
board member George Wodehouse Currie,899 sent a letter to the Treasury which argued 
strongly for the necessary funds to construct the line.900  
In the two letters he sent to the Treasury, Salisbury stated ‘that the construction of a railway 
is the most economical as well as the most effective’ way in which Britain can meet its 
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humanitarian obligations under the Brussels Act.901 A great inland trading network was 
envisioned with the railway as a land corridor and, with the introduction of steamers, the lake 
itself an equatorial hub. But Salisbury emphasised that the project was principally of a 
humanitarian nature – ‘actuated rather by philanthropic’ than commercial motives.902 
Despite what arguably would have been an opportune moment to invoke a weighty imperial 
concern such as the defence of Egypt, he concluded his letters without mentioning any 
strategic considerations. Rather, he sketched a potential profit sharing arrangement between 
the company and the government whereby any revenues exceeding 5% p.a. would be equally 
shared between the two parties. The Treasury did not offer any objections. In embellishing 
Salisbury’s arguments, the Treasury even added that the cost of the railway would be partly 
offset by the £100,000 annual maintenance costs in addition to £8-10,000 in payable bounties 
of the Anti-Slavery Squadron operating outside the East African coast.903  
It would thus lay weight to two principal considerations when giving assent to grant the 
necessary funds; the legal obligations Britain had recently undertaken at the Brussels 
Conference; and secondly that the railway was an economising measure, saving the annual 
expenditure of the East African Naval Squadron and of manning the coast to interior corridor 
with a string of armed posts.904 Granted that the House of Commons would continue its anti-
slavery policy, implying the maintenance of an anti-slavery squadron costing £110,000 p.a. 
and assuming that the railway would make this naval unit redundant through the total 
eradication of slave trafficking within the British sphere, the annual cost saving would amount 
to £85,000 p.a. over the 25-year period. It is likely that the Treasury had taken due note of 
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Salisbury’s argument as to the favourable effect upon ‘commerce & industry’ it would have, 
as opposed to the singular humanitarian purpose fulfilled by a purely military cordon.905 
Hence, the railway project advanced by Salisbury was by its contemporaries perceived to be 
a form of humanitarianism on-the-cheap, which is a point often obscured by its substantial 
expense of £5.5 million. The IBEA had thus in January 1891 secured the assent for a 25-year 
Treasury guarantee of 2% annual interest on a capital sum not exceeding £1.25 million to 
finance a metre gauge railway from Mombasa to the Victoria Nyanza, but a Parliamentary 
approval still remained. Parliament, it was calculated, would be more inclined to provide a 
financial guarantee with a surveyed route so as to avoid future cost overruns.  
 
The Issues Raised by a Railway Survey 
‘In short’ the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir George Goschen informed IBEA director and MP 
Sir Lewis Pelly, ‘the House of Commons would reject a Bill unsupported by a Survey’.906 In 
anticipation of parliamentary opposition to any bill expanding Britain’s imperial 
commitments, Goschen would ‘test the feeling of the House’ by presenting an estimate for a 
railway survey. Although the survey was less than the full loan guarantee the IBEA had 
requested from Salisbury, it was ‘better than nothing’ as it would make public the company’s 
connection with the government.907 It was anticipated that the official affiliation would serve 
to reduce the risk associated with the project in the eyes of private investors. However, the 
decision came late in the parliamentary year and with the summer adjournment at the end 
of July imminent, the Leader of the House had promised not to introduce any matter of a 
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contentious nature.908 Describing the bill as ‘in the highest degree contentious’,909 Sir William 
Harcourt urged Goschen to postpone its debate until the next session of parliament. In 
agreement he replied that the postponement did not imply any deviation from the policy the 
government had obliged itself to follow under the General Act.910 Jackson, the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, had assured Pelly of ‘no withdrawal or change of policy on the part 
of Government’ and suggested the IBEA proceed with the survey in order to save time.911 The 
commencement of a survey would supposedly not confer any financial risk to the directors as 
they ‘may not only trust but may rely upon the Government introducing and doing their best 
to pass the vote and reimburse moneys.’912 Under this understanding the IBEA sent an 
expedition under the leadership of Captain Macdonald to survey the projected route of the 
railway. Although the postponement made political sense, the logic did not translate to the 
IBEA’s financial liquidity, which at this point was under severe duress.913  
Salisbury had himself written to Goschen earlier in September and stated that if he examined 
the IBEA’s finances he would ‘not be very much pleased by the result’ and that they had 
‘undertaken a speculation which cannot pay unless there are minerals.’ Despite admitting 
that ‘there is not much to be done in the way of trade, there is a great work of civilisation 
before them.’914 Salisbury also invoked the economising rationale, as the government ‘is 
under a permanent obligation to spend money upon the slave trade, judicious assistance in 
                                                          
908 Kiewiet, History of the British East Africa Company, p. 284. 
909 Hansard, HoC Debate, 20 July 1891, col. 1760. 
910 Hansard, HoC Debate, 20 July 1891, cols. 1759-60. 
911 Memorandum of an interview between Pelly, Jackson and Welby, 20 July 1890, FO 84/2173, TNA. 
912 Ibid. 
913 60% of the initial subscribed capital had been spent by the 3rd quarter 1891 Financial Statement, 3rd 
February 1892, Mackinnon Papers, SOAS. 
914 Salisbury to Goschen, 20 September 1891, cited in Cecil, Salisbury Vol. IV, pp. 313-14. 
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measures which will kill the slave trade may be a very profitable outlay of money.’915 
Importantly he sketched a compromise solution:  
If I had my way and could command the assent of the House of Commons, I 
should put two steamers on each of the three lakes – Nyasa, Nyanza, and 
Tanganyika. Then put two more on the Tana and make the short railway from 
Tana to Nyanza lake. The slave trade off the East African coast south of 
Gardafui would be at an end. Nothing would then remain except watching the 
Red Sea…’916  
Nor in his letter to Goschen had Salisbury made any mention of strategic concerns. Rather he 
had construed his arguments favouring railway construction entirely within the framework of 
Britain’s anti-slave trade policy. 
Salisbury’s proposed compromise of a ‘short railway’ coupled with the use of steamers would 
not only incur cost savings for the Treasury, but the proposition also runs counter to any 
strategic intention. Indeed Salisbury’s suggestion was a modified version of a proposal 
Mackinnon had sent to the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society only two weeks earlier.917 
The Tana River was not easily navigable, only light craft was able to negotiate the distance 
between the coast and the inland railway terminus due to the highly variable water levels – 
this consequently reduced the entire transport system’s troop carrying potential. Should the 
railway have been intended as a strategic weapon providing logistical support for an offensive 
against the Mahdist Sudan, both reliability and a much greater volume of soldiers and 
impedimenta would be needed than what was required for the protection of native villages 
against the operations of slave raiders. The fact that Salisbury was willing to offer this 
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compromise solution, and thus reduce the railway to simply a facilitator for low-volume trade 
and the provider logistical support for a relatively small number of troops would indicate that 
his motives, as he himself stated, were principally rooted in advancing legitimate trade and 
suppressing the slave trade.918  
Since Lugard’s administration of Uganda drained the company’s coffers of £40,000 annually 
and contributed nothing in return, a decision to evacuate the kingdom was reached to 
prevent bankruptcy.919 In the hope of forcing the government’s hand, the board of directors 
communicated the result of their deliberations to the FO on 31 July 1891 that the IBEA’s 
presence in Uganda would be extinguished by the end of that year.920 But as was described in 
the previous chapter, the Church Missionary Society did not welcome the news of the 
company’s impending withdrawal.  After Mackinnon had himself pledged £10,000, the CMS 
managed to raise the remaining £30,000 through private donations and the IBEA was thus 
able to sustain Lugard’s administration for another year.921  
The CMS had by the autumn of 1891 not only identified the continued presence of the 
company as important for the security of their missionaries and converts in Uganda, but had 
also deduced that the railway was vital for the survival of the company itself.922 In a special 
committee meeting of the CMS, where both the former Consul-General to Zanzibar Charles 
Euan Smith and the IBEA director George Mackenzie were in attendance, the railway question 
was raised. The board-members, who doubtlessly had been well-advised by the IBEA 
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representative, held that the company’s survival was inextricably linked to what was 
euphemistically termed the ‘cooperation’ of the government whose policy in turn was 
ultimately derived from ‘the declaration of the Brussels Conference for the suppression of 
slavery.’923 The CMS hoped that this ‘cooperation’ would be forthcoming as earmarked 
subsidies and hence take ‘the form of constructing a Railway to the lake.’924 With such 
guarantees it was believed that:  
…the prospects of the Company’s enterprise would be so favourably affected 
as to justify the confidence of the Board in its ability thereon to raise the 
required capital to warrant their continued occupation of Uganda.925  
The railway was also an issue that the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society had raised at 
frequent intervals in its committee meetings between October 1891 and August 1894.926 
Prompted by the prominent abolitionist Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton927 about the ‘great danger 
which would befall the Antislavery cause by the abandonment of the Kingdom of Uganda’ the 
society had in October 1891 resolved to urge Salisbury both to halt the abandonment and 
‘facilitate the construction of the proposed railway.’928 Hence, the railway assumed the 
position of a lynchpin not only for the commercial interests of the IBEA, but also as a cause 
célèbre of Britain’s humanitarian lobby.   
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Over the course of 1892, the IBEA spent the remainder of its £500,000 initially subscribed 
capital, but courtesy of the campaigning efforts of the CMS and Anti-Slavery Society the 
government was aware that the railway discussion had been raised from being largely an 
internal IBEA and FO matter to a national concern.929 Thus on 3 March 1892, these two factors 
pressured the government to finally act out the promise it had made to the IBEA some nine 
months earlier and introduce the survey vote with a request for a grant-in-aid of £20,000.930 
The inconspicuous sum hid the fact that it represented a major alteration of British imperial 
policy – a fact which was not lost on the anti-imperialist opposition.  
A perceptive Liberal MP, James Bryce had argued against the proposal on the grounds that: 
‘a survey involves defence, defence involves annexation; and so what we are substantially 
asked to do is to take the first step to annexation.’931 If the vote failed, the company would 
have little recourse but bankruptcy since its potential profitability was entirely dependent 
upon the future railway. The situation also exposed two choices for the government: either 
to assert effective occupation through direct administration of the territory; or to let the claim 
to the British sphere of influence lie fallow and thus forfeit British jurisdiction and potentially 
lose the territory to a rival power. Both parties perceived the survey as a foot in the door for 
imperial expansion, hence its contentious nature, and the two days its debate tolled the 
House of Commons. It also revealed the almost identical association the railway had with the 
retention of Uganda. A line from the coast would present Parliament with a fait accompli for 
incorporating Uganda into the British Empire, the absence of which would free her from 
additional imperial entanglements.  
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However, as Sir Lewis Pelly argued on behalf of the Government: ‘empire never stands still, 
and empire founded largely on trade least of all.’932 The vote passed, but Salisbury did not 
press the matter further. As the previous chapter demonstrated, Salisbury did not offer any 
resistance to the IBEA’s decision to withdraw from Uganda in the autumn of 1891, nor did he 
protest at their resolution to evacuate the country in May 1892.933 In June, a month before 
the general election he lost to Gladstone’s coalition with the Irish nationalists, Salisbury 
declared that:  
With respect to the holding of Uganda, I quite admit that, as long as 
communications are as difficult as they are now, it would be very arduous for 
our country to maintain our position there. I have a remedy which I hope the 
new Parliament will adopt, and that is to encourage the making of a railway.934   
To cheers in the House of Commons, Salisbury also added: ‘As soon as a railway is made there 
will not be the slightest difficulty in retaining our hold over Uganda.’935  
 
Factors Leading to the Decision to Construct the Railway, 1892-96 
It was a late-Victorian celebrity and a favourite of the Queen who took his seat in the grand 
office overlooking St. James’s Park in August 1892.936 Due to Archibald Primrose’s popularity 
among voters and within the Liberal Party, the new foreign secretary Lord Rosebery was the 
predicted successor and heir to the ageing stalwart William Gladstone. After the 1892 general 
election, Gladstone had formed a minority government which relied upon the support of the 
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Irish nationalists. The combination of the new government’s weak political base and 
Rosebery’s personal popularity and position within the party enabled him to pursue a foreign 
policy somewhat independent of the resolutions adopted by the Cabinet.937  
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the retention of Uganda was in large measure a 
consequence of Rosebery’s agency, since he had been convinced of the substantial human 
and political costs associated with abandonment. Rosebery’s accession to the Foreign Office 
heralded continuity in British foreign policy, but not of the geo-strategic and Egyptocentric 
kind that has been ascribed to both incumbent and predecessor by the orthodox 
historiography,938 but rather in terms of Britain’s anti-slave trade policy.939 The outcomes 
were the same with regard to holding Uganda and ensuring the construction of a railway from 
the coast, but they derived from a very different set of motives. As the general public debates 
and political deliberations concerning the retention of Uganda also have been detailed, this 
section will seek to emphasise the significance of the railway as a rallying cause of both the 
IBEA and the humanitarian lobbying groups – and in particular, how it influenced 
policymaking over this period. The other causal factor which will be examined is Gerald 
Portal’s report in order to show how it afforded political legitimacy to the transfer of 
governmental responsibility in East Africa, from the sub-imperial vehicle that was the IBEA to 
the government. In other words, the substitution of indirect British influence enacted through 
a chartered company to that of formal protectorate status under the auspices of the Foreign 
Office.       
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The Uganda Debacle and the Railway 
‘Uganda has lately been the subject of so much attention that I think the following notes may 
be of interest’940 reads the first page of the extensive memorandum written by Staff Captain 
Hubert Foster and circulated in the Foreign Office early September 1892. Foster’s remarks 
aptly described the position Uganda had assumed within the FO and more importantly in 
British public opinion during the summer and autumn of 1892. In May, the IBEA had again 
announced its decision to withdraw from Uganda to the outpost of Dagoreti.941 The projected 
evacuation unleashed an outcry in late-Victorian public opinion, stoked by the interested 
parties’ publicity campaigns.942 It was a public uproar over defeatist imperial policy which had 
little to do with geo-strategic concerns. Rather it was centred on the presumed massacres of 
British missionaries and their converts, the loss of potential markets and indeed the damage 
to national prestige.943 For the new government, time was of the essence. Lugard’s men in 
Uganda had already been given their new year’s marching orders and considering that the 
voyage from the coast to the interior took three months, they had only until 1 October to 
decide the fate of his administration.944  
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, a number of memoranda were drawn up for the 
benefit of informing policy in September 1892. The most influential of these was the one 
compiled by Anderson. In his memorandum, which strongly urged for the retention of 
Uganda, Anderson invoked the old IBEA adage that ‘with communication by rail, the cost of 
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holding Uganda would be trifling.’945 Anderson, in league with the other old Africa hands Euan 
Smith and Kirk – both friends of Mackinnon and subordinates of Sir Bartle Frere in 1873, Kirk 
had even taken up employment with the IBEA – were unanimous about the desirability of 
constructing the railway.946 But it was not just Mackinnon’s influential network close to 
decision makers that lobbied for a railway.947 Both the CMS and the Anti-Slavery Society 
mobilised in force. Only a year had passed since the last campaign for the retention of Uganda 
and whilst the first effort was a low-key affair internal to the CMS, the 1892 campaign was a 
full-scale mobilisation aimed at convincing both the British public and policy establishment.  
The railway took pride of place in not only the memorials the humanitarian organisation 
presented to Rosebery, but also in the numerous petitions the foreign office received during 
the campaign.948 In the CMS’ influential supplement to the missionary newspaper The Record, 
Stanley’s testimony was published which urged for a government intervention to ensure the 
immediate construction of the railway. Stanley issued a dramatic warning: ‘postponement of 
the railway would be disastrous to humanity and most injurious to the moral, religious, 
commercial, and political interests of the Empire.’949  
Although the CMS had taken a lead in both Uganda campaigns, in 1892 there seem to have 
been an unstated, but natural division of responsibilities between it and the Anti-Slavery 
Society. Key issues both years had been those pertaining to the mission itself, namely the 
missionaries and their converts, and that of the slave trade. Whilst the CMS had pushed both 
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issues in 1891,950 the dynamics of the 1892 campaign was one which was clearly divided 
between the two respective societies and the railway had been identified as a slave trade 
issue. Thus it was the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society which fronted the Uganda 
Railway project in the autumn of 1892.951 It had been a matter the society had studiously 
considered internally for a year prior to the campaign. In April a sub-committee had even 
been formed singularly ‘for the purpose of drawing up a statement exhibiting facts and 
arguments that should be made public in the interest of promoting the proposed Railway.’952 
In early June a special committee meeting was held ‘with reference to the proposed Mombasa 
and Victoria-Nyanza Railway’ and somewhat unusually the society had the minutes of the 
meeting printed – doubtlessly in order to ensure its rapid distribution since the IBEA had only 
a fortnight earlier notified its retirement from Uganda. The minute included a long extract 
from the speech Salisbury had given in Glasgow a year earlier in which he professed that 
Britain was pledged to uphold the resolutions concluded at the Slave Trade conference in 
Brussels to ‘pursue the evil to its home and kill it at its root.’953  
Not only was the relevant article 1 section 3 of the General Act invoked, which recommended 
the construction of roads and railways, but also, on the authority of an unnamed ‘Indian 
Administrator’ that affording an ‘Imperial Guarantee, not exceeding £70,000 per annum 
would, to a large extent, render needless a service so costly in lives and treasure as has been 
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described.’954 Evidently BFASS echoed Salisbury’s economic reasoning by referring to the East 
African anti-slave trade squadron; a railway would render the cruisers which had for decades 
patrolled the East African coast costing the treasury an approximate £100,000 a year 
redundant. Apart from the cost-saving rationale, the society also raised the argument that 
the railway would open up new markets for British industry, a particularly salient point when 
considered in light of the contemporary financial crisis unleased by Baring’s Bank in 1890. This 
was of particular importance to ‘the British working classes’ since the region would be free of 
the ‘hostile protective duties’ so many existing colonies had implemented. The Society 
concluded that: ‘the Mombasa Railway and similar undertakings should hold a prominent 
position and be advocated upon Anti-Slavery grounds.’955 
The Anti-Slavery Society’s interest in the railway was reflected in the memorial it presented 
to Rosebery on 20 October which demanded only two actions from the government: a 
treasury guarantee on the interest for the capital required for construction of the railway and 
that the entire region was to be declared a British protectorate.956 Reginald Bosworth Smith, 
a published author and schoolmaster, led the influential deputation to Rosebery and in his 
speech he enlarged on Britain’s duty of ‘maintaining a continuity of the moral policy of 
England with regard to the slave-trade.’957 Rosebery’s reply to the BFASS reflected both his 
avowed motives and belief in liberal imperialism; as such it is worth quoting in full:  
                                                          
954 Committee Meeting 3 June 1892, para 397b, Vol 6, E2/11, Minute Books of the British and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society, Rhodes House, University of Oxford. 
955 Ibid. 
956 Memorial to be presented to Lord Rosebery on Thursday, October 20, 1892, para 482, Benson 113 ff. 479-
94, Benson Papers, Lambeth Palace Library.  
957 Eric Graham, ‘Smith, Reginald Bosworth (1839–1908)’, rev. M. C. Curthoys, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36153, accessed 10 June 
2014], and Lord Rosebery’s Speech to the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 20 October 1892, cited in 
New Zealand Herald and Daily Southern Cross, Volume XXIX, Issue 9053, 5 December 1892, Page 4. 
270 
 
That continuity of moral policy is a moral force by which, in my opinion, this 
country is to be judged; it is the salt which savours our history; it is the spirit 
which has exalted it; and in my belief it is by that, when we have to pass away, 
that we shall come to be judged. It is not by exploits in the field that Greece 
remains to us; it is by the spirit and form of her literature. It is not by her 
campaigns that Rome is best remembered, but by her laws, and, in a lesser 
degree, by her roads and aqueducts which are the signs of her civilisation; and, 
in the same way, I believe when this country come to stand before the bar of 
history, she will stand when all else has passed away, not by her fleets nor her 
armies and commerce – because other nations have fleets and armies and 
commerce – but by the heroic self-denying exertions which she has put 
forward to put down this iniquitous traffic. (Cheers.) I know that when we 
speak of extending commerce other nations look upon us askance. They 
believe us to be occupied by selfish, grasping, and greedy motives; but there is 
one point on which they cannot deny that we have been actuated by a higher 
and purer spirit, and that this is the cause which you represent. My belief is, 
gentlemen, that, having put our hands to the plough in this great enterprise, 
we should not be able, even if we were willing, to look back with regard to 
Uganda.’958 
Rosebery, a prolific amateur historian,959 certainly offered a lofty defence of Britain’s ‘moral 
policy’ in his speech. It also offers a rebuke to the subsequent generations of historians who 
have ‘looked askance’ to his motives. Despite the fact that the cabinet was deeply divided on 
the issue, with Harcourt arguing that: ‘we have already as much Empire as the nation can 
carry’,960 the reluctance to force a confrontation with Rosebery who had implicitly threatened 
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to resign from the cabinet,961 as demonstrated in the previous chapter, pushed the 
government into the decision to delay the evacuation of Uganda962 until 31 March 1893.963 In 
terms of his views on the railway, Rosebery had in an interview with Mackinnon expressed 
his stance: Rosebery did ‘not hold out any prospect of the Gov[ernment] proposing that 
railroad. The cost was too great…’ Mackinnon quipped that British public opinion was 
staunchly for it, to which Rosebery replied: ‘if that is so, I should have no objection to being 
forced by the country in that direction, but I fear that nothing would be done spontaneously 
by H.M.G[overnment] and [you] must remember that several of my colleagues hold the 
strongest opinions and are publicly pledged against it’.964 
 
Portal’s Report and the Railway Question 
Ultimately the deliberations ended with a resolution to send an Imperial Commissioner to 
Uganda in order to ascertain the potential of filling the administrative vacuum left by a 
departed IBEA with what had been referred to as ‘organized Government.’965 The man chosen 
for the task of preparing a report of the situation in Uganda and the potential for a railway 
was the Consul-General in Zanzibar, Sir Gerald Portal. The athletic Old Etonian was a rising 
star in the diplomatic service (his life was cut short when he died of typhoid fever in January 
1894). Despite his relatively young age of 35, he had already served 14 years as a diplomat 
which included a six year spell under Sir Evelyn Baring at Cairo, a mission to Abyssinia about 
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which he later published a book and five years in Zanzibar and the British sphere of influence 
in East Africa.966 Portal’s background is of particular historiographical interest in relation to 
this thesis due to his close association with Baring; indeed the British resident at Cairo 
regarded him as his successor and as such it would be reasonable to presume that Portal 
might have subscribed to the same views on ‘Nile Valley Doctrine’ as its supposedly greatest 
proponent.967 However neither Portal’s despatches to the Foreign Office, nor his personal 
diary entries, or indeed his posthumous publication concerning the ‘mission to Uganda’ are 
suggestive of any particular interest in the Nile.968  
The most characteristic aspect of Portal’s writing, both privately and official, was his strong 
resentment of the IBEA and the company’s administrative failings: whether it was their 
‘swashbuckling mode of proceeding’ or propensity ‘to “let things slide” & to leave 
disagreeable questions to look after themselves’.969 Indeed, he candidly declared to Rosebery 
at the end of January 1893 that:  
I contend that after 5 years of fair trial the Company has utterly failed to carry out the 
conditions of their Royal Charter, & that they have forfeited their right to hold it any 
longer, & this conclusion may I submit, be strengthened & confirmed by their 
acknowledged failure in evacuation of Uganda.970 
                                                          
966 C. A. Harris, ‘Portal, Sir Gerald Herbert (1858–1894)’, rev. H. C. G. Matthew, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22555, accessed 12 June 
2014] 
967 Gerald Portal, The British Mission to Uganda in 1893 (London: Edward Arnold,, 1894), Lord Cromer’s 
Introduction. 
968 See: Portal, Mission to Uganda and: Gerald Portal’s Personal Diary, Gerald Portal Papers, Rhodes House, 
Oxford University.  
969 See: Portal to Rosebery, Private, 24 January 1893; Portal to Rosebery, Private, 3 March 1893; Portal to 
Rosebery, Private & Confidential, 22 March 1893, in Gerald Portal Papers Afr s 109-111, Rhodes House, 
University of Oxford. 




And added a week later that: 
there is no hope of any improvement or development of this part of E. Africa 
so long as the IBEACo continue to exercise any political or administrative 
powers, either here or on the coast.971 
Even long before his fact-finding mission, Portal had expressed his views to Anderson that any 
official support to the IBEA would be akin to ‘throw[ing] good money after bad.’972 However 
Salisbury thought the IBEA could still for a time retain its use: ‘to help a Company into 
liquidation before its time is not regarded as a friendly act.’973 Gordon Martel alleges that 
Rosebery had privately instructed Portal to write a favourable report.974 Since Harcourt had 
already agreed to the Zanzibar proposition, the scheme that involved Zanzibar taking the 
administrative and financial responsibility for holding Uganda, it is argued that Portal’s 
conclusions as to the fate of the kingdom had already by November 1892 been an open secret 
to the British policy establishment at Westminster.975    
By the summer of 1893, the Foreign Office received the first of Portal’s dispatches. In line with 
his earlier pronouncements, Portal found it ‘difficult to be too severe’ on the IBEA’s 
administration976 and let the Union Jack promptly fly over Uganda upon the company’s 
departure.977 He was disappointed by ‘the burnt, brown, arid plains and hills’978 he had 
traversed, and threw cold water on the company’s claims ‘that 500,000,000 acres of fertile 
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land are waiting to be tickled by a hoe to smile into plenty’.979 The Imperial Commissioner’s 
report on the infertility of the land was substantially corroborated by the Railway Survey 
Report presented by Captain Pringle; despite that both held that certain highland districts 
were well suited for European colonisation. The Royal Engineer did also factually describe the 
ongoing Arab slave trading in the region and detailed the techniques adopted by Arab 
traffickers to avoid detection. He argued that a railway would partially alleviate these 
humanitarian issues by making the use of caravans imply illegal slave trafficking and thus 
make them more vulnerable to detection. Pringle further stated that the IBEA had freed 2,364 
slaves during its operations, whilst the equivalent for the government was only around 600 in 
the corresponding period.980  
Although Portal was unequivocal in his criticism of the IBEA’s operations in the interior, his 
conclusions as to Uganda and the railway were more opaque. It has already been suggested 
in the historiography that Rosebery himself re-wrote Portal’s report to suit his agenda,981 but 
no evidence has been produced to support this claim.982 However, by 30 August 1893 a draft 
of Portal’s report had been completed since Anderson in his letter to his superior the 
Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Philip Currie pronounced that:  
I have read attentively Portal’s admirable report. I have not a word of criticism 
to say on the practical character of his recommendations, nor on the details of 
his remarks.983  
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But Portal’s report itself is omitted from the relevant files and does not emerge until 1 
November.984 Rosebery himself wrote to Gladstone in November and informed him of Portal’s 
arrival. The foreign secretary had: ‘seen him for a few minutes’ before he left for the 
countryside ‘for two or three days to mature his report.’ Rosebery assured Gladstone that: 
‘As soon as I receive it, I will send it myself and circulate it. Honestly, I have not touched it…’985 
There must at the time have circulated rumours concerning the report as despite these 
assurances Rosebery felt again compelled to reassure Gladstone in December: ‘As regards 
Portal’s report. I have considered myself bound in honour not to look at it until it was 
circulated to the Cabinet, and, consequently, I have only a very recent acquaintance with it.’986  
In his report published in November, Portal listed twenty-five factors which detailed the 
Uganda question and stated that:  
those of a purely economic character would appear to weight on the side of 
evacuation since no hope need be entertained of Uganda being able, at all 
events for some years to come, to repay the cost of its occupation; while those 
of a philanthropic or strategical nature may be quoted in favour of the 
maintenance of some form of British preponderance.987  
Of those ‘philanthropic’ factors mentioned, was ‘the danger, or indeed the certainty of an 
almost immediate resuscitation of slave-raiding and slave-trading in the event of the 
withdrawal of European control.’988 Portal also described Uganda as occupying ‘a strategical 
position of great natural importance, dominating the northern and western shores of Lake 
Victoria, holding almost the only access to Lakes Albert and Albert Edward and controlling the 
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head waters of the Nile.’ Hence, Portal also invokes the argument that the IBEA had launched 
during its 1892 campaign.989 Following his analysis of whether or not to retain Uganda, Portal 
evaluated the question of the railway:  
The whole problem of the development of East and Central Africa, the prospect 
of the creation of a profitable British trade, the suppression of internecine 
religious wars, the security of European travellers, the control of the Lake 
district and of the upper waters of the Nile, and, above all, I may confidently 
add, the only hope of really and definitely killing the slave-trade within a 
reasonable time, - all resolve themselves into the all important and 
overshadowing question of Transport and Communication.990  
Evidently Portal perceived the railway as essential to a British retention of the kingdom, and 
afforded humanitarian concerns substantial weight. Despite his tutelage by Baring in Cairo, 
Portal made no references to the security of Egypt in his report. Instead he framed his 
arguments for the retention of Uganda within the rhetoric of the British civilising mission and 
anti-slave trade policy. 
Moreover, in February 1892, Portal had produced a despatch which resembles in wording his 
final November report: ‘That the whole question of the development of East Africa resolves 
itself ultimately with a question of transport.’991 But unlike its successor, this report does not 
mention any railway, instead Portal suggested a string of stations, or: ‘a system of depots or 
relays of men & beasts who could be hired from station to station. These stations should be 
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at interval of not more than 10 days journey.’992 Hence, instead of a railway Portal suggested 
the adoption of a sort of ‘pony express’ from the coast to the lake.  
However, in 1894 Portal posthumously published a book entitled The British Mission to 
Uganda,993 in this account which is based on Portal’s notes and diary entries, few explicit 
mentions are made of the railway. Portal himself warned that:  
Throughout this chapter I have been careful to avoid any mention of a railway. 
It would hardly be proper for me to discuss here the pros and cons of this 
scheme. If a railway is ever built the whole way to the Lake, that would of 
course in itself settle all the questions which have been raised above.’994  
The issues raised in the foregoing pages were the problems of slave-trading and how it was 
interlinked with human porterage, the penetration of British commerce and indeed transport: 
‘…like almost every other East African problem which can be presented, [it] resolves itself at 
once into the great all-shadowing question of transport.’995 Frequent mentions were also 
made of a book entitled The Development of Africa of which emphasis is laid on navigable 
rivers and railways.996 This adds weight to the view that Rosebery did not alter the report, 
despite his strong convictions he had no need to. 
Regardless of whether Rosebery had influenced or indeed edited the report, it does illustrate 
the grounds on which British policy toward East Africa was formulated. If both Rosebery’s and 
what, ostensibly are Portal’s words are taken at face value, it does suggest that the report 
was genuine and not doctored by Rosebery. Indeed, Portal’s posthumously published book 
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corroborates this interpretation as it mirrors the November 1893 report – namely that he did 
recommend the railway’s construction, since in his eyes, it would solve all of East Africa’s 
pending problems, be it the introduction of legitimate commerce or suppression of the slave 
trade. 
A Fait Accompli: Uganda and the Railway, 1894-96 
Whilst the final decision to construct the railway was not announced in Parliament until 
August 1895, it could be argued that by the time Rosebery had taken the Liberal party 
leadership, and ipso facto the British premiership in March 1894, the project was a fait 
accompli. Only a month after Portal’s untimely death, Rosebery forcefully set out his East 
Africa policy in a memorandum circulated in the Cabinet. Doubtlessly inspired by Portal, it 
made clear that Rosebery had lost all confidence in the IBEA who in his view merely ‘block the 
way, or at any rate largely hamper our action.’997 In his eyes the company was unfit for 
purpose since it had been both unable and unwilling ‘to carry out the obligations of its 
Charter, which are the promotion of trade and good government, the civilization of the 
natives, and the suppression of the Slave Trade.’998  
The other aspect to Rosebery’s memorandum concerned Uganda, which he divided into 
administration of the country and the railway. Rosebery believed ‘that the railway would be 
of incalculable value to the development of [Britain’s] position in East Africa’ – firstly since it 
would ‘attract to ours all the commerce of the region’ and secondly because it would deal ‘a 
mortal blow to the Slave Trade within it.’999 The only two problems Rosebery thought stood 
in its way were the substantial cost and the political opposition. However he was confident 
                                                          





that both hurdles would be overcome: the railway would not in any case be proposed ‘in this 
financial year’; and the opposition to the project ‘were uttered under different circumstances, 
and need not be held binding should it be resolved to maintain the occupation of Uganda.’1000 
The cost of the railway was not believed to be more excessive than the expenditure of ‘France 
or Germany in their spheres of influence’ so Rosebery found it ‘right to contemplate a not 
extravagant expenditure in the development of the Uganda Protectorate, should such a 
Protectorate be established.’ Hence, the railway and the retention of Uganda were perceived 
as two facets of the same issue. 
What makes this memorandum so significant, apart from Rosebery’s first mention of a 
‘Uganda Protectorate’ and his candid advocacy of the railway, was the fact that Gladstone 
retired less than a month later and Rosebery succeeded him as Prime Minister which gave the 
policy-statement added weight. Whether Rosebery was aware of Gladstone’s impending 
retirement at the time of writing is unknown, but he did express his ‘anguish’ in a secret letter 
to him twelve days later.1001 In his heartfelt letter to the man he had been ‘personally attached 
to’ since 1879, he acknowledged that:  
it would be affectation to deny that there is also a difference of opinion; - 
opinion perhaps is too weak a word, for with me it is a matter of faith. In this 
one point at any rate we are agreed – that it involves the peace of the world. 
Unfortunately we are at two poles asunder as regards the means.1002  
What Rosebery alluded to was his own stance as a liberal imperialist whilst Gladstone 
preferred to avoid imperial entanglements.      
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Portal’s report was finally presented to parliament in April with a vote upon its 
recommendations held in June.1003 According to the Radical MP Labouchère’s line of 
arguments, the IBEA, and implicitly the entire expansionist policy of the liberal government, 
was ‘a damnosa hereditas’1004 from Salisbury. In his attack on the proposition, the ‘Little 
Englander’ denounced it as jingoism, reiterated the lack of commercial potential in the region 
and rejected the existence of a slave trade originating in Uganda.1005 But the vote over 
administrative expenses and by implication the incorporation of Uganda into the British 
Empire did carry, with a protectorate declared 27 August. However the cabinet’s railway 
proposal was rejected in line with Rosebery’s February prediction. At the end of May 1895, 
two Cabinet meetings were held devoted fully to East Africa and it was agreed ‘after a long 
windy and irrelevant discussion’ that a Protectorate over the remaining portion of land 
separating Uganda from the sea was to be declared, what eventually would form the British 
East Africa Protectorate.1006  
Rosebery pressed hard for a decision to construct the railway and would tolerate no delay as 
‘the matter touched his honour and his conscience’.1007 His patience would not be challenged, 
as a ‘harmonious’ Cabinet meeting held the next day could dispatch to the Queen ‘that the 
railroad must be made forthright and that it will be commenced as soon as the necessary 
arrangements can be completed’.1008 But less than a month passed when on 25 June, Salisbury 
was back in power and he lost no time in completing his project. In August 1895 the 
Government submitted the cost estimates for a railway to parliament and the vote for the 
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initial £20,000 of expenses carried.1009 The Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs George Curzon, 
declared that his government had ‘decided that the railway is to be constructed the whole 
way from the ocean to the lake’ and received applause from the House.1010 The railway was 
by now an accomplished fact: a permanent Railway Committee had been established and 
appointed a chief engineer to lead the construction.1011 On 2 July 1896, the Uganda Railway 
Bill was introduced to parliament, and although Labouchère bitterly exclaimed that whenever 
‘they annexed some wretched, miserable jungle in the centre of Africa they would be called 
upon to build a railroad to it’, the vote carried.1012  The last key in the last rail was hammered 
in at the Victoria Nyanza on 21 December 1901, which completed a permanent way all the 
582 miles from Mombasa.  
 
Conclusion 
In the two decades prior to its construction, the Uganda Railway was perceived as an essential 
prerequisite for the development of East Africa. Its identical association with the retention of 
Uganda was clearly demonstrated during the autumn of 1892 when both the lobbying 
activities of pressure groups and the internal deliberations of the government, revealed that 
the Uganda question was inseparable from that of the railway. This propelled, what was 
ostensibly the innocuous issue of transportation infrastructure in a remote region of Britain’s 
informal empire, into the very heart of British imperial discourse.  
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Despite the overwhelming documentary evidence to the contrary, the railway has been 
wedded to the Egypto-centric historiographical narrative. This was the way in which 
generations of historians of the partition reconciled the project’s substantial cost with its 
minimal commercial utility. However this post facto explanation fails to take into account 
Britain’s prevailing interests in East Africa during the time of the project’s conception and the 
expectations entertained for the region. These imperial interests, equally commercial and 
humanitarian, were also reflected in the rationale to construct the railway. It was not 
unreasonably anticipated that a transport link between the coast and the great interior lake 
the Victoria Nyanza would generate trade, indeed enough to make the chartered company 
independent of external sources of finance. At the same time it was also held, in league with 
similar projects in the Congo that a railway would stamp out the inland slave trade. This was 
neither an unreasonable assumption since the maritime suppression strategy had proven 
woefully inadequate to handle the upsurge in trafficking over the 1880s – a railway would 
‘open up’ the region and make human porterage redundant and thus remove local demand 
for slaves, whilst slavers themselves would be left vulnerable to detection.  
A ‘cynical commentator’1013 might also recognise that it was convenient for the IBEA to clad 
the project in the high-worthy ideals of anti-slavery in order to gain public support. Influential 
supporters such as the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society and the Church Missionary 
Society were useful allies to have in order to sway public and political opinion. Whilst 
recognising that IBEA did entertain commercial objectives, it would be disingenuous to 
suggest that the IBEA simply manipulated these humanitarian groups and ideals for their own 
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purely economic motives. Mackinnon’s company was never a purely commercial enterprise. 
Notwithstanding the philanthropic obligations in its charter which stressed suppression of the 
slave trade, or the company’s public pronouncements in the press, it is unlikely that a man of 
Mackinnon’s business acumen would have ventured on such an expensive enterprise with his 
eyes closed to the low probability of financial reward. Indeed, it is not improbable that 
Mackinnon, at the end of an accomplished career in which he had built one of the world’s 
largest shipping companies desired to partially venture into the realm of philanthropy, hardly 
an unprecedented choice among the wealthy.  
The concept of a line connecting the coast with the Equatorial lakes – the Uganda Railway –
was nearly as old as Britain’s direct engagement with Zanzibar and East Africa itself, coming 
in the wake of Sir Bartle Frere’s Mission in the 1870s and a natural next step after the 
construction of the Mackinnon-Sclater road. But it was not until the partition proper of the 
1880-90s that the railway emerged as a serious proposition, as a way in which to counter 
German preponderance on the mainland and indeed to combat the slave trade. 
The plethora of motives for advocating the railway reflected the diversity of stakeholders, 
although two main reasons remained constant throughout: economic and humanitarian. The 
IBEA required its construction so as to survive financially, and it was on this basis that the CMS 
appropriated the project. Via the vicarious motive of sustaining the IBEA’s presence in 
Uganda, the future of its own missionaries and converts would be safeguarded. Thus a 
missionary society, in league with an abolitionist society came to campaign for an 
infrastructure project. In the same vein is the personal agency of both Salisbury, and courtesy 
of his adherence to the doctrine of continuity in foreign policy, Rosebery, in spearheading the 
project politically. In Gwendolen Cecil’s biography of her father Lord Salisbury, she remarks 
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upon the sentimental value he attached to his ‘cherished project’ which he guarded with 
‘militant paternity,’ no doubt testament to his personal enthusiasm for railway construction 
attained through his years in the industry.1014 But what should not be lost sight of, however, 
is the railway’s symbolic role as a prestige project – both a material representation of Britain’s 
commitment to anti-slavery, but also of its status as a first rate world power and coloniser. 
The enabler of what Rosebery referred to as Britain’s ‘moral policy’ was the Uganda Railway 
– both a permanent way and a permanent reminder of what he termed the ‘heroic self-
denying exertions’ that aimed to put a final end to the East African slave trade.1015  
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The annexation of East Africa represented a natural part, and indeed a conclusion, to the 
humanitarian engagement Britain long had maintained in the western sphere of the Indian 
Ocean. To paraphrase Clausewitz, partition was in-part the continuation of anti-slave trade 
policy by other means.1016 Yet, despite its importance, this humanitarian concern was still only 
one among a range of metropolitan and sub-imperial interests that are evident from the 
documentary record left from the period. Far from being an abrupt event, the incorporation 
of East Africa into the British Empire was a gradual process in which a spectrum of factors, 
such as: missionary interests, commercial opportunity and trading interests, publicity 
concerns and public opinion, national honour and imperial prestige, Indian interests and 
indeed strategic concerns – local and imperial, all, at various junctures, came to influence 
decision-making.  
However, contrary to the interpretation that dominates the historiography, the partition of 
Zanzibar, Uganda and the remaining mainland territories were divorced from Egyptian 
security concerns. When these geo-strategic concerns eventually achieved any form of 
prominence in public or political discourse it was at the very end of the partition process, once 
incorporation as protectorates were faits accomplis. Moreover, the particular agency 
afforded to Salisbury in bringing about the incorporation of Uganda and the ‘Upper Nile 
Valley’ is entirely in conflict with his policy decisions which suggest that he maintained a 
largely disinterested stance toward the East African territories.   
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Whilst Germany declared a portion of the East African mainland a protectorate in 1885, it 
took almost a decade for Britain to do the same. A corresponding British status was granted 
to Zanzibar in 1890, to Uganda in 1894, and to the remaining territories separating the 
kingdom of Buganda with the coast in 1895. Both the chronology of protectorates and indeed 
the final bilateral agreement’s unofficial name – the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar 
treaty1017 – should have offered the historian simple clues as to what British priorities in the 
region were. This, however, is not reflected in the majority of the historiography which holds 
that the British expansion into East Africa instead was connected to the alleged security 
considerations of a different geo-political zone altogether, and indeed, held as a classic 
example of how grand strategy influenced the scramble for Africa.  
Perceiving the East African partition through the prism of Fashoda, or positioning Uganda 
within a vast Egyptian hinterland certainly made for a seductive proposition; as witnessed by 
the volume of scholarship devoted to the explanatory model after it was first proposed by 
Langer in 1935.1018 A geo-strategic model such as this could also render intelligible why, at the 
end of the partition, the distribution of British territories in Africa ran in an almost unbroken 
line from Cairo in the north to Cape Town in the south. Naturally the primacy of India and by 
extension, its strategic lynchpins to the north and south of the African continent, dictated its 
own geo-strategic logic to policymakers such as Salisbury and Rosebery. Not even remote 
backwaters such as Uganda escaped India’s gravitational pull and required incorporation into 
an immense British exclusion zone so as not to prejudice Britain’s hold on these pivotal 
regions of imperial defence. After all, Rosebery himself quoted in 1901 the subject of his 
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biography, Napoleon, that ‘the master of Egypt is the master of India.’1019 However, as the 
evidence put forward in this thesis has established, the Egypto-centric interpretation might 
rather be understood as a classic example of a reductive and fallacious retrospective historical 
analysis. 
The Nilotic model was in part launched as a revisionary retort to the dominance of Marxist 
analyses of imperial expansion. But instead of nuancing the interpretations of the East African 
partition, its legacy has been to obscure Britain’s efforts to suppress the Indian Ocean slave 
trade, a regional engagement that had lasted from the beginning of the nineteenth century 
to well into the twentieth. It is not without irony that by persistently second-guessing the 
volumes of contemporary correspondence and analyses, the revisionist historians instead 
perpetuated the narrative the interested parties themselves spun at the end of the process, 
in order to justify the substantial and, to a degree, unexpected cost of imperial occupation 
and construction of a railway that seemingly had very little purpose.   
As the first two chapters made clear, it was on anti-slavery logic that a mainland presence was 
contemplated by the Liberal government during the years prior to the German incursion. 
Partition reflected the shift in the execution of Britain’s anti-slave trade policy, from a 
maritime to a shore-based approach. Such a radical change would likely never have been 
contemplated had it not been for the prospect of using a railway. This path-breaking new 
technology represented, in transportation terms, a paradigm-shift in the way it obscured the 
contrast between movement by sea and land. For East Africa in particular the effect was 
substantial. The region had little road infrastructure, few natural harbours or navigable rivers, 
                                                          




whilst the tsetse fly rendered the use of horses or other beasts of burden impracticable. As 
such, the Uganda Railway offered the logistical framework for transplanting slave trade 
suppression from the sea and coastal zone to ‘its root’ in the interior. 
Britain had from the early 1870s built a system of slave trade suppression based on both naval 
force and a treaty network, the latter executed through the co-opted political influence of its 
client-state Zanzibar. However, as the first chapter demonstrated, this system broke down a 
decade later. At first it was the decommissioning of the highly successful stationary depot 
ship HMS London that forced a reconsideration of tactics. Later, the declaration of a German 
protectorate in 1885 critically undermined the Sultan of Zanzibar’s authority and by extension 
British influence. In 1882 Hill had recommended substituting the naval patrol with ‘agencies 
working onshore’.1020 Whilst little resulted from this apart from the despatch of Vice-Consuls, 
it did mark the tentative beginning of the shift toward a land-based presence. An 
intensification of this policy, and indeed a direct reversal of Salisbury’s 1878 decision to 
sabotage Mackinnon’s plans for a mainland concession, occurred in 1884 when Granville 
sanctioned Johnston’s scheme to establish a proto-colony near Kilimanjaro as a base from 
which to attack the slave trade.  
Whilst slave trafficking had remained at relatively stable levels throughout most of the 1880s, 
it revived substantially in 1888. Germany’s presence on the mainland, the departure of Kirk 
and in particular the death of Sultan Barghash, all had contributed to this end. Yet it was the 
reaction to this revived slave trade that had direct consequences for the partition. Pressure 
from public opinion and the organised campaigns directed by Cardinal Lavigerie and the 
BFASS, led Salisbury to call for the convening of the Brussels Anti-Slave Trade Conference and, 
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in concert with Germany, the institution of a blockade of the East African coastline. Whilst the 
Anglo-German blockade did little but highlight Anglo-German governmental co-operation and 
the markedly different approaches to colonialism adopted by British and German agents, 
Britain’s ratification of the Brussels Act institutionalised the new shore-based focus of anti-
slave trade policy, in particular by committing it to construct railways.  
It was via the vector of the Uganda Railway that the British mainland presence in East Africa 
was construed by contemporary policymakers, such as Salisbury, as a cost-saving measure, or 
indeed as anti-slavery on the cheap. It was a generally held notion that railways were the best 
tool available to suppress the slave trade, and that offering the IBEA a guarantee on the 
interest for a loan to finance the railway was far cheaper than the annual expenditure on the 
then redundant naval patrol. By linking Mombasa with the interior and the vast inland lake, 
the Victoria Nyanza, the railway would also enable the IBEA to control what was expected to 
be substantial trade flows to and from Central Africa, and render high-bulk produce 
marketable at the coast. This railway was throughout the partition process perceived as a sine 
qua non to the retention and development of East Africa and a solution to the composite 
challenges that faced the British colonisers in the region. 
Importantly, the second chapter demonstrated that the geographical scope of the partition 
was substantively determined already at the start of the partition process. By following in the 
footsteps of their German compatriot the explorer Gustav Fischer, the members of the 
Society for German Colonisation had used one of the southern caravan routes into the interior 
and established the nucleus protectorate to the west of Zanzibar. British exploration activity, 
on the other hand, had focussed its efforts on the northern mainland and used the route 
terminating at Mombasa as a vantage. When a German protectorate was formally declared 
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in the spring of 1885, the Foreign Office discretely scrambled to enlist private British interests 
to prevent the entirety of the mainland falling to German hands. This was achieved when 
Hutton and Mackinnon formed a syndicate, the IBEA’s precursor, to develop the territories to 
the north of the German protectorate with Mombasa as the requisite port. 
In order to avoid territorial disputes and achieve British recognition for German claims, Peters 
offered the northern territories to Mackinnon in the autumn of 1886. It was on this basis that 
the geographical north-south division of the mainland was formally laid down in the Anglo-
German Agreement of the same year. The following ‘hinterland understanding’ of July 1887 
excluded Germany from making treaties in the territories anterior to the British sphere of 
influence. Hence, the first bilateral partition treaty had already by 1886-7 ensured that the 
territories encompassing Uganda and the White Nile lay within the British exclusion zone – a 
coincidental result of Peters’ choice of forming a German protectorate on the southern 
mainland.  
Contrary to what has been claimed by the Egypto-centric historiography, the expansion of the 
British sphere of influence to comprise Uganda in 1890 was not the product of Salisbury’s 
grand strategy, but rather a combination of unintended individual agency and economic 
expectations for the interior. The IBEA’s treaty with kabaka Mwanga of Buganda had come 
about as a coincidental result of Frederick Jackson’s presence near the kingdom, indeed even 
against his explicit orders to avoid Uganda. Mackinnon’s later ratification of Jackson’s treaty 
occurred after his designs on the Equatorial Province had been dashed by Emin’s enlistment 
with his German counterparts. The inclusion of Uganda was thus a form of consolation prize 
in lieu of Equatoria and a way in which the IBEA could tap into what was believed the ‘great 
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trade markets of Central Africa.’1021 The company’s survival depended upon this expansion 
since its control of the coast and the immediate hinterland was insufficient to make it 
commercially viable. Whilst retrospectively these economic expectations for Equatorial Africa 
might appear naïve, they should be perceived in conjunction with the generally lacklustre 
financial conditions of a British economy affected by the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1870-90s.  
The bilateral negotiations between Britain and Germany which resulted in the Anglo-German 
‘Heligoland-Zanzibar’ Treaty in 1890 had been arranged by the two states as a way in which 
to contain the local rivalry between the colonial companies. This arbitration which had been 
agreed a year in advance and initially only concerned a dispute over two islands off Witu had, 
upon German initiative, been expanded to comprise all outstanding territorial disputes 
between Britain and Germany. Salisbury had certainly not timed the negotiations so as to take 
maximum advantage of an ostensibly weak German counterpart or indeed arranged them for 
the purposes of securing the Nile Valley. Since the partition of Uganda was among the ‘points 
which were not contended’1022 it was also resolved at the very beginning of the negotiations.  
Salisbury had not sanctioned the company’s expansion for geo-strategic reasons, but in order 
to ensure the economic viability of Britain’s imperial policy-tool. Should the IBEA collapse it 
would forfeit British territorial claims due to the absence of ‘effective occupation’ and leave 
a region which for decades had been subject to a wide range of British imperial interests such 
as missionary-work, exploration, anti-slave trade policy and the British Indian trading 
community, open to annexation by a rivalling European power. Preserving the IBEA kept both 
the financial costs and accountability in terms of anti-slave trade policy execution with the 
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private imperial proxy and at a safe distance from Salisbury’s government, whilst still retaining 
East Africa within the British orbit.   
Salisbury’s disinterest in Uganda, and by extension the region which comprised the Nile 
watershed, was demonstrated in the following two years when he twice approved of the 
company’s decision to evacuate the kingdom. No assistance was offered by his government 
to the IBEA to hold its position, and had it not been for private donations from the CMS, the 
IBEA would have been forced to extinguish its presence already in 1891. Whilst news of the 
first potential evacuation received little publicity, the second occasion in 1892 was a highly 
public affair. This episode which Low termed a ‘very remarkable movement in Victorian public 
opinion’1023 serves to reveal the considerable force popular imperialism exerted upon 
contemporary policymakers. But it also betrays the erroneous grounds on which the Egypto-
centric historiography has based its interpretations: since it was during these publicity 
campaigns, orchestrated by the CMS, BFASS and IBEA, that the argument which positioned 
the company as a gatekeeper to Egypt and the Nile was launched. Although the argument 
does not appear in official or private correspondence between key policymakers such as 
Rosebery or Gladstone, and was only used as a speculative excuse by the IBEA’s agents 
Frederick Lugard and Ernest Bentley, it certainly has had great historiographical significance. 
The retention of Uganda was almost entirely due to Rosebery’s agency. His motives for doing 
so were consistently expressed as the prevention of massacres of British missionaries and 
their converts. Rosebery did not want to preside over another imperial scandal analogous to 
that of Gordon at Khartoum which had taken place some seven years earlier. As Rosebery had 
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used the expert opinion drawn up during the autumn of 1892 as an ‘impartial opinion’1024 to 
influence his other Cabinet members to accede to his ‘retentionist’ stance; the decision to 
despatch Gerald Portal to Uganda in 1893 was the final component to this nominally impartial 
information campaign. Naturally Portal’s conclusions were in favour of retention and paved 
the way for the declaration of Uganda as a British protectorate in 1894, with the remaining 
territories separating it from the coast incorporated in 1895.  
As Rosebery himself declared to the Anti-Slavery Society, he was committed to the ‘continuity 
of moral policy’1025 in regard to Uganda. This was a policy of liberal imperialism which both 
had led Granville to sanction a British territorial presence in East Africa in 1884, and which 
prevented Rosebery from sanctioning abandonment of Uganda in 1892. Perhaps it was the 
keen foreign policy observers at Swansea Town Council who petitioned Rosebery 'in the 
interest of trade, humanity and good government' that best summarise these Victorian 
sensibilities and the British stance:     
This Council is further of opinion that as the advent of the Imperial British East 
Africa Company to Uganda has destroyed the government of that country by 
its native chiefs, the abandonment of it now, would place its people at the 
mercy of fanaticism and the evil passions of men, and would be a retrograde 
movement, and inimical to the honour and best traditions of our country.1026 
The partition of East Africa marked no discontinuity in British policy. It was not spurred by 
sudden defensive concerns external to the region. On the contrary it was the result of local 
dynamics and represented the continuation of Britain’s longstanding dual engagement: 
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protection of commercial interests and the execution of anti-slave trade policy. Within a 
decade this presence simply transitioned from being pursued informally via the client-state 
of Zanzibar, to an indirect presence through the IBEA, until the territories were finally placed 
under the direct control of the Foreign Office. Rather than indicating any unwavering British 
interest for the region, the incremental evolution in sovereign-status reflected the geo-
political change brought about by the European contestation over African territories. And, it 
was rather the absence of weighty imperial concerns such as geo-strategy, in favour of softer 
humanitarian and commercial factors which reconciles Salisbury’s ambivalent interest for the 
region. Indeed the time he showed most concern for East Africa was during the 1888 revival 
of the slave trade. 
Any such renewal of slave trafficking was deemed unacceptable to a potent combination of 
public opinion, influential pressure groups and policy-makers. Britain had aligned its national 
and moral prestige with the eradication of this ‘scourge’ of humanity, while the anticipated 
social stability that resulted from ending the slave trade was perceived to be beneficial for 
commercial development.1027 Conversely, by not asserting sovereignty, British policy-makers 
would antagonise not only the ‘jingoist' segments of its electorate, but also those inclined to 
humanitarianism and commercial enterprise. Annexation was, incidentally, the path of least 
resistance and East Africa was the ideal theatre in which to display Britain's commitment to, 
and bask in the reflected glory of, these professed values; values which were perceived to be 
integral to the British imperial identity and prestige. Against this backdrop it is unnecessary 
to invoke an Egypto-centric explanatory model that has little to no basis in documentary 
evidence. The annexation of East Africa is no historical conundrum. It formed a policy 
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continuum, a natural consequence of Britain's self-proclaimed ‘civilising mission' rooted in 
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Slave Trade Statistics 
 
Figure 3 Slaves Captured by the Royal Navy's Anti-Slave Trade Squadron, 1873-90 
 
Source: 
Data extracted from: FO 881/4676, T 1/14421, HCA 35/87, FO 881/5165, FO 881/5366, FO 881/5459, 







Figure 4 ‘Embarrassing,’ Punch, Volume 98, 7 June 1890, pp. 266-7. 
 
Before the results of the Anglo-German ‘Heligoland-Zanzibar’ Treaty had been announced, Salisbury 
had held a speech at the Merchant and Taylors’ Company in London where he had termed Africa as 
a 'most embarrassing and inconvenient continent'.1028 Salisbury’s apparent reluctance to expand the 
empire in East Africa had attracted criticism and the prime minister was, rather undeservedly in light 
of the treaty’s results, lampooned in the weekly magazine Punch.1029 It seems his contemporaries 
were better attuned to Salisbury’s hesitant stance toward imperial expansion than the later cadres 
of Egypto-centric historians who painted him an imperialist par excellence. It also bears testament to 
the irresistible power popular imperialism constituted among all layers of Victorian society, including 
the chattering classes (readers of Punch). 
 
 
                                                          
1028 ‘Lord Salisbury at the Merchant Taylors' Company, The Times, 23 May 1890, p. 10. 
1029 ‘Embarrassing,’ Punch, Volume 98, 7 June 1890, pp. 266-7. 
